Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates (smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not silently left half-done. New pieces: - metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed, not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/ ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out. - enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/ -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all. - ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import, same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path. PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it. Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed: rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver (real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing token). Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate, separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be refused outright, so it must not default on just because enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml leaves it unset, same as ever. Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
256 lines
7.7 KiB
Go
256 lines
7.7 KiB
Go
package grpcserver
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"sync"
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"testing"
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"github.com/segmentio/kafka-go"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
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"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/ingest/internal/config"
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logsv1 "github.com/sentry/sentry/proto/sentry/logs/v1"
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)
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type fakeProducer struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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written [][]kafka.Message
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err error
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}
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func (f *fakeProducer) WriteBatch(_ context.Context, msgs []kafka.Message) error {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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if f.err != nil {
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return f.err
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}
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batch := make([]kafka.Message, len(msgs))
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copy(batch, msgs)
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f.written = append(f.written, batch)
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return nil
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}
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// fakeResolver is an in-memory stand-in for
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// ingest/internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver, keyed by token.
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type fakeResolver struct {
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tenantByToken map[string]string
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}
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func (f *fakeResolver) ResolveTenant(_ context.Context, token string) (string, error) {
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tenantID, ok := f.tenantByToken[token]
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if !ok {
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return "", errors.New("fakeResolver: unknown token")
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}
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return tenantID, nil
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}
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func newTestServer(p batchProducer) *Server {
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return New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), config.GRPCConfig{}, config.TLSConfig{}, p, nil)
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}
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func newTestServerWithResolver(p batchProducer, resolver TenantResolver) *Server {
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return New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), config.GRPCConfig{}, config.TLSConfig{}, p, resolver)
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}
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// contextWithBearerToken builds an incoming gRPC context carrying an
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// "authorization: Bearer <token>" metadata entry -- the shape a real
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// grpc-go server hands PushBatch once TLS/framing is stripped away, so
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// this exercises the same metadata.FromIncomingContext path production
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// traffic does, not a shortcut around it.
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func contextWithBearerToken(token string) context.Context {
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return metadata.NewIncomingContext(context.Background(), metadata.Pairs("authorization", "Bearer "+token))
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}
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func TestPushBatchAssignsRecordID(t *testing.T) {
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fp := &fakeProducer{}
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s := newTestServer(fp)
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req := &logsv1.PushBatchRequest{
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BatchId: "b1",
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Records: []*logsv1.LogRecord{
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{Host: "h1", Message: "one"},
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{Host: "h1", Message: "two"},
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},
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}
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resp, err := s.PushBatch(context.Background(), req)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("PushBatch() error = %v", err)
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}
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if resp.GetAccepted() != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("Accepted = %d, want 2", resp.GetAccepted())
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}
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fp.mu.Lock()
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defer fp.mu.Unlock()
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if len(fp.written) != 1 || len(fp.written[0]) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected written batches: %+v", fp.written)
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}
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seen := make(map[string]bool)
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for _, m := range fp.written[0] {
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var rec logsv1.LogRecord
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if err := proto.Unmarshal(m.Value, &rec); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unmarshaling produced message: %v", err)
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}
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if rec.GetRecordId() == "" {
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t.Fatalf("record_id was not assigned for message %q", rec.GetMessage())
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}
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if seen[rec.GetRecordId()] {
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t.Fatalf("duplicate record_id %q across records in the same batch", rec.GetRecordId())
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}
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seen[rec.GetRecordId()] = true
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}
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}
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func TestPushBatchOverwritesAgentSuppliedRecordID(t *testing.T) {
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fp := &fakeProducer{}
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s := newTestServer(fp)
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req := &logsv1.PushBatchRequest{
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Records: []*logsv1.LogRecord{
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{Host: "h1", Message: "one", RecordId: "agent-supplied-should-be-ignored"},
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},
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}
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if _, err := s.PushBatch(context.Background(), req); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("PushBatch() error = %v", err)
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}
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fp.mu.Lock()
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defer fp.mu.Unlock()
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var rec logsv1.LogRecord
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if err := proto.Unmarshal(fp.written[0][0].Value, &rec); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unmarshaling produced message: %v", err)
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}
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if rec.GetRecordId() == "agent-supplied-should-be-ignored" {
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t.Fatal("expected ingest to overwrite any agent-supplied record_id")
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}
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if rec.GetRecordId() == "" {
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t.Fatal("expected a server-assigned record_id")
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}
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}
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func TestPushBatchEmptyRecordsIsANoOp(t *testing.T) {
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fp := &fakeProducer{}
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s := newTestServer(fp)
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resp, err := s.PushBatch(context.Background(), &logsv1.PushBatchRequest{})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("PushBatch() error = %v", err)
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}
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if resp.GetAccepted() != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("Accepted = %d, want 0", resp.GetAccepted())
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}
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fp.mu.Lock()
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defer fp.mu.Unlock()
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if len(fp.written) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("expected no batches written for an empty request, got %d", len(fp.written))
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}
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}
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// TestPushBatchNoResolverAttachesNoTenantHeader is the regression test
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// for single-tenant deployments' behavior staying unchanged: with no
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// TenantResolver configured, records are produced exactly as before --
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// no tenant_id header at all -- even with a bearer token present (it's
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// simply never inspected).
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func TestPushBatchNoResolverAttachesNoTenantHeader(t *testing.T) {
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fp := &fakeProducer{}
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s := newTestServer(fp)
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req := &logsv1.PushBatchRequest{Records: []*logsv1.LogRecord{{Host: "h1", Message: "one"}}}
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if _, err := s.PushBatch(contextWithBearerToken("irrelevant"), req); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("PushBatch() error = %v", err)
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}
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fp.mu.Lock()
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defer fp.mu.Unlock()
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for _, h := range fp.written[0][0].Headers {
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if h.Key == TenantIDHeaderKey {
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t.Fatalf("expected no %s header with no resolver configured, got %q", TenantIDHeaderKey, h.Value)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestPushBatchWithResolverAttachesTenantHeader(t *testing.T) {
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fp := &fakeProducer{}
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resolver := &fakeResolver{tenantByToken: map[string]string{"real-token": "acme"}}
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s := newTestServerWithResolver(fp, resolver)
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req := &logsv1.PushBatchRequest{Records: []*logsv1.LogRecord{
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{Host: "h1", Message: "one"},
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{Host: "h1", Message: "two"},
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}}
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if _, err := s.PushBatch(contextWithBearerToken("real-token"), req); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("PushBatch() error = %v", err)
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}
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fp.mu.Lock()
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defer fp.mu.Unlock()
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if len(fp.written[0]) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("expected 2 messages written, got %d", len(fp.written[0]))
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}
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for _, msg := range fp.written[0] {
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found := false
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for _, h := range msg.Headers {
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if h.Key == TenantIDHeaderKey {
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found = true
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if string(h.Value) != "acme" {
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t.Fatalf("%s header = %q, want acme", TenantIDHeaderKey, h.Value)
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}
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}
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}
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if !found {
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t.Fatalf("expected every record to carry a %s header", TenantIDHeaderKey)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestPushBatchWithResolverRejectsMissingToken(t *testing.T) {
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fp := &fakeProducer{}
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resolver := &fakeResolver{tenantByToken: map[string]string{"real-token": "acme"}}
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s := newTestServerWithResolver(fp, resolver)
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req := &logsv1.PushBatchRequest{Records: []*logsv1.LogRecord{{Host: "h1", Message: "one"}}}
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_, err := s.PushBatch(context.Background(), req) // no bearer token in context at all
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if status.Code(err) != codes.Unauthenticated {
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t.Fatalf("PushBatch() error = %v, want Unauthenticated", err)
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}
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fp.mu.Lock()
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defer fp.mu.Unlock()
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if len(fp.written) != 0 {
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t.Fatal("a batch with no bearer token must never reach the producer once a resolver is configured")
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}
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}
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// TestPushBatchWithResolverRejectsInvalidToken is the fail-closed
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// regression test: a resolver configured but a token it doesn't
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// recognize must refuse the whole batch, never fall back to "no tenant"
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// (which would silently defeat the point of requiring a credential at
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// all).
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func TestPushBatchWithResolverRejectsInvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
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fp := &fakeProducer{}
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resolver := &fakeResolver{tenantByToken: map[string]string{"real-token": "acme"}}
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s := newTestServerWithResolver(fp, resolver)
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req := &logsv1.PushBatchRequest{Records: []*logsv1.LogRecord{{Host: "h1", Message: "one"}}}
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_, err := s.PushBatch(contextWithBearerToken("wrong-token"), req)
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if status.Code(err) != codes.Unauthenticated {
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t.Fatalf("PushBatch() error = %v, want Unauthenticated", err)
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}
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fp.mu.Lock()
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defer fp.mu.Unlock()
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if len(fp.written) != 0 {
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t.Fatal("a batch with an invalid token must never reach the producer once a resolver is configured")
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}
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}
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