Give ingest a real tenant identity (write-routing deferred, disclosed)

Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across
CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last
major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a
config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates
(smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS
certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and
attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it
deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or
Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed
explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not
silently left half-done.

New pieces:

- metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/
  ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its
  SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed,
  not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext
  exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/
  ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out.
- enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/
  -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same
  offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in
  this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint
  (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its
  tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed
  /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all.
- ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver
  (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client
  implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP
  call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import,
  same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape
  api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path.
  PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC
  metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch
  closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no
  tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a
  `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it.

Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed:
rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every
other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new
endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a
session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver
(real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as
authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake
resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured
resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing
token).

Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate,
separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be
refused outright, so it must not default on just because
enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml
leaves it unset, same as ever.

Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md,
docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its
summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not
yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -228,14 +228,30 @@ than one `tenant_memberships` row now gets a real `GET
 pending-login token, distinct from a real session by both Go type and
 JWT claim name — a real token-confusion bug this design's own tests
 caught before it shipped) instead of the flat refusal Phase 4 shipped
-with earlier. What still keeps this phase from being done: the actual
-tenant-picker *page* doesn't exist (`web` has no session/cookie-handling
-code at all yet, and `enterprise-auth` has no CORS middleware for a
-cross-origin `fetch` with credentials — both real, separately-scoped
-frontend gaps), and ingest itself has no tenant concept for either
-storage engine (every record lands in the one shared ClickHouse database
-and Tantivy index no matter what — undesigned, not just unbuilt). Full
-accounting:
+with earlier. Ingest tenant-awareness — the gap this section used to
+call "undesigned" — now has a real, if intentionally partial, design:
+`ingest` (AGPL core) gained an optional `TenantResolver`
+(`ingest/internal/grpcserver`), a per-tenant bearer credential an agent
+presents (minted via `enterprise-auth
+-create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>`, validated over the network via a
+new `POST /internal/authorize-ingest` endpoint — never an `enterprise/`
+import, same boundary shape as `api/authz.Authorizer`), and the
+resolved tenant ID is attached to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka
+message header before it's produced. **What's still deferred, clearly**:
+nothing downstream reads that header yet — neither `ingest`'s own
+ClickHouse writer nor `search`'s independent Redpanda consumer route a
+record's write into a per-tenant destination, so every record still
+lands in the one shared ClickHouse database/Tantivy index regardless of
+which tenant it's now correctly tagged with. That write-routing split
+(likely another "second binary," mirroring `enterprise-api`) is real,
+scoped, remaining work — attaching a verified tenant identity as early
+as possible was deliberately built as a self-contained first step, not
+the whole feature. What still keeps this phase from being done: the
+actual tenant-picker *page* doesn't exist (`web` has no session/cookie-
+handling code at all yet, and `enterprise-auth` has no CORS middleware
+for a cross-origin `fetch` with credentials — both real, separately-
+scoped frontend gaps), and per-tenant write-routing for ingest per the
+above. Full accounting:
 `/docs/security/threat-model.md`; step-by-step verification procedure
 (not yet run against a live cluster in this environment):
 `/docs/phase-4-runbook.md`. The rest of this section describes the exit

deploy/helm/sentry/templates/ingest.yaml

@@ -32,6 +32,24 @@ spec:
                 secretKeyRef:
                   name: {{ .Release.Name }}-clickhouse
                   key: password
+            {{- if and .Values.enterprise.enabled .Values.ingest.requireTenantCredential }}
+            # Enables ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver.
+            # Deliberately its OWN opt-in, not folded into
+            # enterprise.enabled directly (same reasoning
+            # api.yaml/enterprise-api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't
+            # set just because enterprise.enabled is true -- see that
+            # env var's own comment there): turning this on requires
+            # every agent to already present a valid `Authorization:
+            # Bearer <ingest token>` (minted via `enterprise-auth
+            # -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>`) or be refused
+            # outright, which would silently break ingest for any
+            # not-yet-reconfigured agent if it defaulted on alongside
+            # enterprise.enabled. Off (the default) leaves every record
+            # without a tenant_id header, same as every Phase 0-3
+            # deployment.
+            - name: ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL
+              value: "http://{{ .Release.Name }}-enterprise-auth:8082"
+            {{- end }}
           ports:
             - name: grpc
               containerPort: 4317

deploy/helm/sentry/values.yaml

@@ -71,6 +71,13 @@ ingest:
   # "boring, well-understood" preference as everywhere else in this
   # repo -- use cert-manager or an equivalent, don't hand-roll it here).
   tlsSecretName: ""
+  # Only meaningful when enterprise.enabled is also true -- see
+  # templates/ingest.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL comment for why this is
+  # its own deliberate opt-in, not folded into enterprise.enabled
+  # directly: turning it on requires every agent to already present a
+  # valid ingest credential (`enterprise-auth
+  # -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>`) or be refused outright.
+  requireTenantCredential: false
 
 search:
   image:

docker-compose.yml

@@ -156,6 +156,16 @@ services:
       # TLS_*_FILE env vars are left at their defaults
       # (/etc/sentry-ingest/{server,server-key,ca}.pem) — matches where
       # the volume below mounts the generated dev certs.
+      #
+      # ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL is deliberately NOT set here (see
+      # ingest/internal/grpcserver's TenantResolver): with it unset,
+      # PushBatch attaches no tenant_id header to any record, matching
+      # every Phase 0-3 deployment's behavior. Setting it to
+      # "http://enterprise-auth:8082" would require every agent to
+      # present a valid `Authorization: Bearer <ingest token>` (minted
+      # via `enterprise-auth -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>`) or
+      # be refused outright -- not turned on here since nothing in this
+      # compose file provisions one.
     volumes:
       - ./hack/dev-certs/out:/etc/sentry-ingest:ro
 

docs/architecture.md

@@ -139,13 +139,23 @@ escape hatch is opaque to any compiler-injected filter.
   ran in the environment it was built in — Tantivy is an embedded
   library, so the cross-tenant isolation probe needed no live database
   or Docker to execute for real, and it passed.
-- Neither storage engine's isolation extends to *ingest*: every record
-  `ingest` produces lands in the one shared ClickHouse database and the
-  one shared (default) Tantivy index regardless of tenant. A
-  newly-provisioned tenant's database/index are real and isolated at
-  query time — and permanently empty until something upstream of
-  `chrunner`/`searchclient` becomes tenant-aware on the write side,
-  which is undesigned, not merely unbuilt.
+- **Ingest identity is now built, though write-routing isn't.** `ingest`
+  (AGPL core) gained an optional `TenantResolver`
+  (`ingest/internal/grpcserver`): an agent presents a per-tenant bearer
+  credential (`enterprise-auth -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>`
+  mints one, only its hash stored), validated over the network via a new
+  `POST /internal/authorize-ingest` endpoint (never an `enterprise/`
+  import — same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape
+  `api/authz.Authorizer` already uses), and the resolved tenant ID rides
+  as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header on every record produced. What
+  isn't built yet: neither `ingest`'s own ClickHouse writer nor
+  `search`'s independent Redpanda consumer reads that header back to
+  route the write anywhere per-tenant — every record still lands in the
+  one shared ClickHouse database and Tantivy index regardless of tenant,
+  correctly tagged but not yet isolated at write time. That per-tenant
+  write-routing split is real, scoped remaining work (likely another
+  "second binary," mirroring `enterprise-api`), not something this
+  change claims to have closed.
 - `deploy/operator`'s `Tenant` CRD and `enterprise-api -provision-tenant`
   are now unified, deliberately lightweight: `-provision-tenant` stays
   the sole real actor (ClickHouse + `rbacstore`), and now also syncs its
@@ -167,8 +177,9 @@ plain `api`), sharing a host-port/network-alias trick so `alerting`/
 `web` need no conditional config either way. With both storage engines'
 connection/index-layer mechanisms built, deployment topology enforced at
 both the Helm and docker-compose layers, and the two provisioning
-mechanisms unified, the largest remaining gap is ingest's lack of
-tenant-awareness, which is undesigned, not merely unbuilt.
+mechanisms unified, the largest remaining gap is ingest's per-tenant
+*write-routing* (identity is now attached at ingest time; nothing
+downstream of Redpanda consumes it yet to isolate the write, see above).
 
 ## Licensing boundary
 

docs/phase-4-runbook.md

@@ -554,6 +554,63 @@ all -- a cross-origin `fetch` with credentials from `web`'s origin to
 actual picker UI is real, separately-scoped frontend work; this section
 only closes the backend half.
 
+## 13. Ingest tenant identity (no per-tenant write-routing yet)
+
+The identity mechanism was chosen deliberately (config-supplied
+tenant_id + a shared-secret token ingest validates, not per-tenant
+mTLS certs -- smaller real implementation, no new PKI). Verified in
+this environment without Docker or a live enterprise-auth, using the
+same fake-client-at-every-layer discipline as everything else in this
+runbook that doesn't need a live stack:
+
+```sh
+cd enterprise
+go test ./internal/rbacstore/... -run IngestCredential -v
+# skip-gated (RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR) -- CreateIngestCredential/
+# ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential round trip, and the
+# regression test that only a SHA-256 hash is ever persisted, never the
+# plaintext token.
+
+go test ./internal/authhandler/... -run AuthorizeIngest -v
+# real HTTP round trip against POST /internal/authorize-ingest with a
+# fake credential validator -- proves a session token (service or
+# human) does NOT work as an ingest credential, since this endpoint
+# never calls session.Manager.Validate at all.
+
+cd ../ingest
+go test ./internal/tenantresolver/... -v
+# real HTTP round trip (httptest), same shape as api/authz.
+# HTTPAuthorizer's own tests -- forwards the bearer token, parses
+# tenant_id, treats a non-2xx or an empty tenant_id as an error.
+
+go test ./internal/grpcserver/... -run 'Resolver|TenantHeader' -v
+# PushBatch with a fake TenantResolver: no resolver configured ->
+# unchanged behavior, no tenant_id header at all; resolver configured ->
+# every produced Kafka message carries a tenant_id header matching the
+# resolved tenant; missing or invalid bearer token -> the whole batch is
+# refused (codes.Unauthenticated), fail-closed, never falls back to "no
+# tenant."
+```
+
+**Not built, and explicitly scoped out for now**: per-tenant write
+routing. Neither `ingest/internal/consumer` (the ClickHouse writer) nor
+`search/src/consumer.rs` (a completely independent Redpanda consumer,
+not called through `ingest` at all -- see that file) reads the
+`tenant_id` Kafka header back to route a record's write into a
+per-tenant ClickHouse database or Tantivy index. Every record still
+lands in the one shared destination regardless of tenant, correctly
+tagged but not yet isolated at write time -- see CLAUDE.md and
+`/docs/security/threat-model.md`'s "Read this first" for the full
+disclosure. Also not built: any Helm/`docker-compose.yml` wiring that
+issues an agent a real ingest credential automatically (`enterprise-
+auth -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>` is, like every other
+credential-minting flag in this codebase, a manual operator action) --
+`deploy/helm/sentry/values.yaml`'s `ingest.requireTenantCredential`
+(default `false`) only turns on *validation*, deliberately not folded
+into `enterprise.enabled` directly, since flipping that flag with no
+agents holding a credential yet would refuse all ingest traffic outright
+rather than degrading gracefully.
+
 ## Known gaps (do not treat this phase as done without reading these)
 
 Full accounting: `/docs/security/threat-model.md`. Headline items:
@@ -578,11 +635,17 @@ Full accounting: `/docs/security/threat-model.md`. Headline items:
   that split (declarative request vs. imperative provisioning action)
   is intentional, not the "two disconnected sources of truth" gap this
   bullet used to describe.
-- **Ingest has no tenant concept for either storage engine.** Every
-  record `ingest` produces lands in the one shared ClickHouse database
-  and the one shared Tantivy index no matter what. A newly-provisioned
-  tenant's storage is real, isolated at query time, and permanently
-  empty until this changes — undesigned, not just unbuilt.
+- **Ingest now has a real tenant identity (§13), but no per-tenant
+  write-routing yet.** An agent presents a bearer credential
+  (`enterprise-auth -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>`),
+  `ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver` validates it (fail-closed)
+  and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a `tenant_id`
+  Kafka message header. Nothing downstream reads that header back yet --
+  every record still lands in the one shared ClickHouse database and the
+  one shared Tantivy index no matter what. A newly-provisioned tenant's
+  storage is real, isolated at query time, and permanently empty until
+  the write-routing split is built (a real, scoped follow-up, no longer
+  an undesigned one).
 - **Human SSO login now works for both OIDC (§3a) and SAML (§3b)** --
   each verified with a real fake IdP (genuine cryptographic signing and
   verification), not yet a real external IdP or a running

docs/security/threat-model.md

@@ -68,15 +68,30 @@ provisioned, pointing at the same ClickHouse/Postgres. The Helm chart
 makes the *default*, chart-managed path correct; it isn't a runtime
 guard against misconfiguration.
 
-**Ingest is not tenant-aware for either storage engine**, and this is
-more load-bearing than it sounds: `chrunner`/`searchclient` prove *read*
-isolation given tenant-scoped data exists, but nothing writes
-tenant-scoped data yet. Every record `ingest` produces lands in the one
-shared ClickHouse database and the one shared (default) Tantivy index,
-regardless of tenant. A newly-provisioned tenant's ClickHouse database
-and Tantivy index are real, isolated, and queryable through
-`enterprise-api` — and permanently empty, until ingest itself becomes
-tenant-aware, which is undesigned, not just unbuilt.
+**Ingest now has a real tenant identity, but no per-tenant write
+routing yet** — a narrower, more precise gap than "not tenant-aware at
+all." `chrunner`/`searchclient` prove *read* isolation given tenant-
+scoped data exists; a new optional `ingest/internal/grpcserver.
+TenantResolver` closes the "does a record know which tenant it belongs
+to" half by validating a per-tenant bearer credential an agent presents
+(`enterprise-auth -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>` mints one; only
+its SHA-256 hash is ever stored) against a new `POST
+/internal/authorize-ingest` endpoint, and attaching the resolved tenant
+ID to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before
+producing it — fail-closed: once a resolver is configured, a missing or
+invalid credential refuses the whole batch, never falls back to "no
+tenant." What's still missing is the "does that identity actually
+change where the record is written" half: neither `ingest`'s own
+ClickHouse writer nor `search`'s independent Redpanda consumer reads
+that header back to route the write anywhere per-tenant yet. Every
+record still lands in the one shared ClickHouse database and the one
+shared (default) Tantivy index, regardless of tenant — correctly tagged,
+not yet isolated at write time. A newly-provisioned tenant's ClickHouse
+database and Tantivy index remain real, isolated, and queryable through
+`enterprise-api` — and permanently empty, until that write-routing split
+is built (likely another "second binary," mirroring `enterprise-api`
+itself), which is now scoped, disclosed remaining work, not an
+undesigned gap.
 
 ## System overview
 
@@ -114,10 +129,12 @@ sentryctl ──▶ api, alerting (Bearer token when SENTRYCTL_TOKEN is set)
 ```
 
 Ingest path (agent → Redpanda → ingest → ClickHouse, and Redpanda →
-search → Tantivy) carries no tenant concept at all yet either — every
-ingested log record lands in the one shared `logs` table/index. Tenant
-isolation for *ingest*, not just query, is out of scope for what's built
-so far and is not separately designed in
+search → Tantivy): `ingest` now resolves and tags each record with a
+real tenant ID (see "Read this first" above), but nothing downstream
+routes on it yet — every ingested log record still lands in the one
+shared `logs` table/index. Tenant isolation for the *write* path is
+still out of scope for what's built so far and is not separately
+designed in
 `/docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md`; named here as a gap that design doc
 doesn't yet cover, not just an implementation gap.
 
@@ -420,7 +437,8 @@ terms:
 | `system.*` ClickHouse metadata isolation | **Built, not live-verified** — same caveat as above |
 | Tantivy per-tenant index routing (`search/src/registry.rs`) | **Enforced, verified live** — real Tantivy indices, real cross-tenant probe, all passing |
 | Tantivy tenant_id resolution (`enterprise/internal/searchclient`) | **Enforced, verified live** — real gRPC wire-level test |
-| Ingest tenant-awareness (ClickHouse and Tantivy both) | **Not implemented, undesigned** — every ingested record lands in the single shared database/index regardless of tenant |
+| Ingest tenant *identity* (credential validation, tagging) | **Built and tested** — fail-closed `TenantResolver`, `tenant_id` Kafka header attached per record |
+| Ingest tenant *write-routing* (ClickHouse and Tantivy both) | **Not implemented, now scoped** — every record still lands in the single shared database/index regardless of tenant; consuming the tenant_id header to route the write is real, disclosed remaining work |
 | Deployment actually routing traffic to `enterprise-api` (Helm) | **Enforced** — `api`/`enterprise-api` are mutually exclusive, same flag as RBAC/audit/SSO |
 | Deployment actually routing traffic to `enterprise-api` (docker-compose) | **Enforced** — `api`/`enterprise-api` are mutually exclusive via `COMPOSE_PROFILES`, same flag choice as Helm's `enterprise.enabled`; verified via `docker compose config`, not an actual `docker compose up` in this environment |
 | Human SSO login — OIDC | **Built, verified with a real fake IdP** (not yet tried against a real external IdP) |

enterprise/README.md

@@ -182,24 +182,60 @@ silently left out:
   a cross-origin `fetch` with credentials from `web`'s origin needs
   it), neither of which is verifiable in this environment without a
   live backend and a browser session to exercise.
-- **Ingest tenant-awareness, for either storage engine** -- `chrunner`/
-  `searchclient` prove read isolation given tenant-scoped data exists,
-  but nothing writes it: every record `ingest` produces still lands in
-  the single shared ClickHouse database and the single shared Tantivy
-  index. A newly-provisioned tenant's storage is real and isolated, and
-  permanently empty. Undesigned, not just unbuilt -- see
-  `/docs/security/threat-model.md`.
-- Any deployment-topology mechanism that actually routes traffic to
-  `enterprise-api` instead of `api` -- both binaries exist,
-  `docker-compose.yml` includes `enterprise-api` available but not
-  wired into `web`'s default base URL, and the Helm chart has no
-  service for it at all yet. **This is now the single largest gap** --
-  both storage engines' isolation mechanisms themselves are built.
+- **Ingest write-routing, for either storage engine** -- identity is now
+  real (see "Ingest tenant identity" below), but nothing consumes it
+  yet: `chrunner`/`searchclient` prove read isolation given tenant-
+  scoped data exists, and every record `ingest` produces is now tagged
+  with a real tenant ID, but neither `ingest/internal/consumer` (the
+  ClickHouse writer) nor `search/src/consumer.rs` (a completely
+  independent Redpanda consumer) reads that tag back to route the write
+  anywhere per-tenant. Every record still lands in the single shared
+  ClickHouse database and the single shared Tantivy index regardless of
+  tenant. A newly-provisioned tenant's storage is real and isolated, and
+  permanently empty. Now scoped, disclosed remaining work, not an
+  undesigned gap -- see `/docs/security/threat-model.md`.
+
+Deployment-topology routing (does traffic actually reach `enterprise-api`
+instead of `api`) is no longer deferred -- both `deploy/helm/sentry` and
+`docker-compose.yml` make it a single-flag choice now (`enterprise.
+enabled` / `COMPOSE_PROFILES`), see CLAUDE.md.
+
+## Ingest tenant identity
+
+`ingest` (AGPL core) gained an optional `TenantResolver`
+(`ingest/internal/grpcserver`) -- nil by default, the same "off unless
+configured" shape as every other optional integration point in this
+codebase. When `ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL` is set, `PushBatch` requires an
+`authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry on every call,
+resolves it via a new `POST /internal/authorize-ingest` endpoint on
+*this* service (`internal/authhandler`, backed by a new
+`ingest_credentials` table in `internal/rbacstore` -- only a SHA-256
+hash of the token is ever stored), and attaches the resolved tenant ID
+to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing
+it. Fail-closed: once a resolver is configured, a missing or invalid
+credential refuses the whole batch, never falls back to "no tenant."
+
+Mint a credential with `-create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>` (prints
+the plaintext token exactly once -- see `ingest_credentials`' migration
+comment for why it can't be recovered again, only reissued);
+`-list-ingest-credentials-tenant=<id>`/`-revoke-ingest-credential=<id>`
+manage existing ones. `ingest`'s own HTTP client
+(`ingest/internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver`) is the piece that
+actually calls `/internal/authorize-ingest` -- never an `enterprise/`
+import (`ingest` is AGPL core), same "network boundary, not import
+boundary" shape `api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer` already uses for the query
+path.
+
+**What this does not do**: change where a record is actually written.
+See "Deliberately deferred" above -- attaching a verified tenant
+identity as early as possible (right where the credential is presented)
+was built as a self-contained first step; per-tenant write-routing for
+both storage engines is separate, scoped follow-up work.
 
 ## Package layout
 
 ```
-cmd/enterprise-auth/   config loading, OIDC discovery at startup, health/authorize/features endpoints, -mint-service-token, -create-tenant, -grant-membership-*, -revoke-membership-*, -list-memberships-tenant
+cmd/enterprise-auth/   config loading, OIDC discovery at startup, health/authorize/features/authorize-ingest endpoints, -mint-service-token, -create-tenant, -grant-membership-*, -revoke-membership-*, -list-memberships-tenant, -create-ingest-credential-tenant, -list-ingest-credentials-tenant, -revoke-ingest-credential
 cmd/enterprise-api/     multi-tenant-aware alternative to api/cmd/api -- see its own doc comment
 internal/tenant/        the ID type -- see its package doc comment before touching it
 internal/oidc/           coreos/go-oidc wiring: discovery, login redirect, code exchange + ID token verification
@@ -218,8 +254,13 @@ internal/apiconfig/       enterprise-api's own env-var config
 internal/config/          enterprise-auth's env-var config
 ```
 
-Future additions: ingest tenant-awareness (undesigned), and real
-deployment-topology wiring for `enterprise-api` -- see "Status" above.
+`ingest/internal/tenantresolver` (AGPL core, not enterprise/, since
+ingest must never import enterprise/) is the client side of `internal/
+authhandler`'s new `POST /internal/authorize-ingest` -- see "Ingest
+tenant identity" above.
+
+Future additions: per-tenant write-routing for ingest (ClickHouse and
+Tantivy both) -- see "Ingest tenant identity" above.
 
 ## Why OIDC and SAML aren't hand-rolled
 

enterprise/cmd/enterprise-auth/main.go

@@ -79,6 +79,9 @@ func main() {
 	revokeTenant := flag.String("revoke-membership-tenant", "", "tenant id to revoke a membership from -- both -revoke-membership-* flags are required together")
 	revokeUserEmail := flag.String("revoke-membership-user-email", "", "email of the user whose tenant_memberships row to delete")
 	listMembershipsTenant := flag.String("list-memberships-tenant", "", "print every user with a membership in this tenant (id, email, display name, role) and exit")
+	createIngestCredentialTenant := flag.String("create-ingest-credential-tenant", "", "mint a new ingest bearer token for this tenant, print it once, and exit -- see ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver")
+	listIngestCredentialsTenant := flag.String("list-ingest-credentials-tenant", "", "print every ingest credential's id/created_at for this tenant (never the token itself -- only its hash is stored) and exit")
+	revokeIngestCredential := flag.String("revoke-ingest-credential", "", "delete an ingest credential by id (see -list-ingest-credentials-tenant) and exit")
 	// -healthcheck: same self-check mode as api/-healthcheck (see that
 	// binary's doc comment) -- enterprise-auth's image is distroless too.
 	healthcheck := flag.Bool("healthcheck", false, "self-check mode for Docker's HEALTHCHECK")
@@ -132,6 +135,15 @@ func main() {
 	if *listMembershipsTenant != "" {
 		os.Exit(runListMemberships(ctx, logger, rbac, *listMembershipsTenant))
 	}
+	if *createIngestCredentialTenant != "" {
+		os.Exit(runCreateIngestCredential(ctx, logger, rbac, *createIngestCredentialTenant))
+	}
+	if *listIngestCredentialsTenant != "" {
+		os.Exit(runListIngestCredentials(ctx, logger, rbac, *listIngestCredentialsTenant))
+	}
+	if *revokeIngestCredential != "" {
+		os.Exit(runRevokeIngestCredential(ctx, logger, rbac, *revokeIngestCredential))
+	}
 
 	// oidcProvider stays nil (loginhandler.RegisterRoutes then registers
 	// nothing) unless OIDC is actually configured -- matches every other
@@ -187,7 +199,7 @@ func main() {
 		OIDCEnabled: cfg.OIDC.IssuerURL != "",
 		SAMLEnabled: cfg.SAML.IDPMetadataURL != "",
 	}
-	authhandler.New(logger, sessionManager, features).RegisterRoutes(mux)
+	authhandler.New(logger, sessionManager, features, rbac).RegisterRoutes(mux)
 	loginhandler.New(logger, oidcProvider, samlProvider, sessionManager, rbac, cfg.PostLoginRedirectURL, cfg.SelectTenantRedirectURL).RegisterRoutes(mux)
 
 	srv := &http.Server{Addr: cfg.HTTPListenAddr, Handler: mux}
@@ -355,6 +367,60 @@ func runListMemberships(ctx context.Context, logger *slog.Logger, rbac *rbacstor
 	return 0
 }
 
+// runCreateIngestCredential mints a new ingest bearer token for a
+// tenant and prints it to stdout exactly once -- rbacstore only ever
+// stores its hash (see ingest_credentials's doc comment), so this
+// output is the only chance to capture the plaintext. An agent presents
+// it as an `Authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry on every
+// PushBatch call; ingest resolves it to a tenant via
+// POST /internal/authorize-ingest.
+func runCreateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, logger *slog.Logger, rbac *rbacstore.Store, tenantID string) int {
+	if _, err := rbac.GetTenant(ctx, tenantID); err != nil {
+		logger.Error("looking up tenant", "tenant_id", tenantID, "error", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	token, err := rbac.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		logger.Error("creating ingest credential", "error", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	fmt.Println(token)
+	return 0
+}
+
+func runListIngestCredentials(ctx context.Context, logger *slog.Logger, rbac *rbacstore.Store, tenantID string) int {
+	if _, err := rbac.GetTenant(ctx, tenantID); err != nil {
+		logger.Error("looking up tenant", "tenant_id", tenantID, "error", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	creds, err := rbac.ListIngestCredentialsForTenant(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		logger.Error("listing ingest credentials", "error", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	if len(creds) == 0 {
+		fmt.Println("(no ingest credentials)")
+		return 0
+	}
+	for _, c := range creds {
+		fmt.Printf("%s\t%s\n", c.ID, c.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339))
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+func runRevokeIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, logger *slog.Logger, rbac *rbacstore.Store, id string) int {
+	if err := rbac.RevokeIngestCredential(ctx, id); err != nil {
+		if err == rbacstore.ErrNotFound {
+			logger.Error("no ingest credential with this id", "id", id)
+		} else {
+			logger.Error("revoking ingest credential", "error", err)
+		}
+		return 1
+	}
+	logger.Info("revoked ingest credential", "id", id)
+	return 0
+}
+
 // runHealthcheck mirrors api/cmd/api/main.go's runHealthcheck exactly --
 // see that function's doc comment for why this execs the binary against
 // itself rather than using an external tool.

enterprise/internal/authhandler/authhandler.go

@@ -7,9 +7,16 @@
 // signed tokens with a different Role claim, so one validation path
 // handles both, and the Role claim (not which header carried it) is what
 // determines whether the result looks like a human or a service identity.
+//
+// POST /internal/authorize-ingest is a sibling endpoint, same network-
+// boundary shape but for a different caller (`ingest`, core/AGPL, not
+// api/authz) and a different credential type (an ingest bearer token
+// checked against rbacstore's ingest_credentials table, not a
+// session.Manager JWT) -- see ingestCredentialValidator's doc comment.
 package authhandler
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
@@ -32,19 +39,32 @@ type Features struct {
 	SAMLEnabled bool
 }
 
-type Handler struct {
-	logger   *slog.Logger
-	manager  *session.Manager
-	features Features
+// ingestCredentialValidator is the narrow interface POST
+// /internal/authorize-ingest needs -- *rbacstore.Store is the production
+// implementation. Unlike session-backed /internal/authorize, this
+// endpoint validates a completely different credential type (an ingest
+// bearer token, checked against enterprise/internal/rbacstore's
+// ingest_credentials table, never a session.Manager-signed JWT), so it
+// needs a dependency session.Manager alone can't supply.
+type ingestCredentialValidator interface {
+	ValidateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, token string) (tenantID string, err error)
 }
 
-func New(logger *slog.Logger, manager *session.Manager, features Features) *Handler {
-	return &Handler{logger: logger, manager: manager, features: features}
+type Handler struct {
+	logger            *slog.Logger
+	manager           *session.Manager
+	features          Features
+	ingestCredentials ingestCredentialValidator
+}
+
+func New(logger *slog.Logger, manager *session.Manager, features Features, ingestCredentials ingestCredentialValidator) *Handler {
+	return &Handler{logger: logger, manager: manager, features: features, ingestCredentials: ingestCredentials}
 }
 
 func (h *Handler) RegisterRoutes(mux *http.ServeMux) {
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /internal/authorize", h.handleAuthorize)
 	mux.HandleFunc("GET /auth/features", h.handleFeatures)
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /internal/authorize-ingest", h.handleAuthorizeIngest)
 }
 
 type featuresResponse struct {
@@ -100,6 +120,32 @@ func (h *Handler) handleAuthorize(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	})
 }
 
+type authorizeIngestResponse struct {
+	TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
+}
+
+// handleAuthorizeIngest is ingest/internal/grpcserver.HTTPTenantResolver's
+// server side -- ingest calls this once per PushBatch (with the bearer
+// token the agent presented) to resolve which tenant the batch belongs
+// to, the network-boundary equivalent of api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer
+// calling /internal/authorize, for a different credential type.
+func (h *Handler) handleAuthorizeIngest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	token := bearerToken(r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
+	if token == "" {
+		http.Error(w, "no credentials presented", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+
+	tenantID, err := h.ingestCredentials.ValidateIngestCredential(r.Context(), token)
+	if err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, "invalid ingest credential", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeIngestResponse{TenantID: tenantID})
+}
+
 func bearerToken(header string) string {
 	const prefix = "Bearer "
 	if !strings.HasPrefix(header, prefix) {

enterprise/internal/authhandler/authhandler_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package authhandler
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
@@ -11,13 +12,37 @@ import (
 	"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/session"
 )
 
+// fakeIngestCredentialValidator is an in-memory stand-in for
+// *rbacstore.Store's ValidateIngestCredential, keyed by token.
+type fakeIngestCredentialValidator struct {
+	tenantByToken map[string]string
+}
+
+func newFakeIngestCredentialValidator() *fakeIngestCredentialValidator {
+	return &fakeIngestCredentialValidator{tenantByToken: map[string]string{}}
+}
+
+func (f *fakeIngestCredentialValidator) ValidateIngestCredential(_ context.Context, token string) (string, error) {
+	tenantID, ok := f.tenantByToken[token]
+	if !ok {
+		return "", errNotFound
+	}
+	return tenantID, nil
+}
+
+var errNotFound = &fakeNotFoundError{}
+
+type fakeNotFoundError struct{}
+
+func (*fakeNotFoundError) Error() string { return "not found" }
+
 func testHandler(t *testing.T) (*Handler, *session.Manager) {
 	t.Helper()
 	m, err := session.NewManager([]byte("this-is-a-32-byte-test-signing-key!"))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("session.NewManager: %v", err)
 	}
-	return New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{}), m
+	return New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{}, newFakeIngestCredentialValidator()), m
 }
 
 func doAuthorize(t *testing.T, h *Handler, mutate func(*http.Request)) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
@@ -121,7 +146,7 @@ func TestFeaturesReflectsConfiguredMechanisms(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("session.NewManager: %v", err)
 	}
-	h := New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{OIDCEnabled: true, SAMLEnabled: false})
+	h := New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{OIDCEnabled: true, SAMLEnabled: false}, newFakeIngestCredentialValidator())
 
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	h.RegisterRoutes(mux)
@@ -173,3 +198,78 @@ func TestAuthorizeTokenFromWrongManagerIsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
 	}
 }
+
+func doAuthorizeIngest(t *testing.T, h *Handler, mutate func(*http.Request)) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	h.RegisterRoutes(mux)
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/internal/authorize-ingest", nil)
+	if mutate != nil {
+		mutate(req)
+	}
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	return rec
+}
+
+func TestAuthorizeIngestResolvesTenant(t *testing.T) {
+	m, err := session.NewManager([]byte("this-is-a-32-byte-test-signing-key!"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("session.NewManager: %v", err)
+	}
+	validator := newFakeIngestCredentialValidator()
+	validator.tenantByToken["real-token"] = "acme"
+	h := New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{}, validator)
+
+	rec := doAuthorizeIngest(t, h, func(r *http.Request) {
+		r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer real-token")
+	})
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, body = %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	var body authorizeIngestResponse
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
+	}
+	if body.TenantID != "acme" {
+		t.Fatalf("TenantID = %q, want acme", body.TenantID)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuthorizeIngestNoCredentialsIsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := testHandler(t)
+	rec := doAuthorizeIngest(t, h, nil)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuthorizeIngestUnknownTokenIsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
+	h, _ := testHandler(t)
+	rec := doAuthorizeIngest(t, h, func(r *http.Request) {
+		r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-real-token")
+	})
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuthorizeIngestRejectsSessionToken is the regression test for the
+// two /internal/authorize* endpoints validating genuinely different
+// credential types: a real session.Manager-signed token (a service
+// token or human session) must not work as an ingest credential, since
+// it was never checked against rbacstore.ValidateIngestCredential --
+// this endpoint doesn't call session.Manager.Validate at all.
+func TestAuthorizeIngestRejectsSessionToken(t *testing.T) {
+	h, m := testHandler(t)
+	sessionToken, err := m.IssueServiceToken("alerting")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("IssueServiceToken: %v", err)
+	}
+	rec := doAuthorizeIngest(t, h, func(r *http.Request) {
+		r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+sessionToken)
+	})
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401 (a session token must not validate as an ingest credential)", rec.Code)
+	}
+}

enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ingest_credentials.go

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+package rbacstore
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+)
+
+// IngestCredential is one ingest_credentials row -- see
+// metadata/migrations/0034_create_ingest_credentials.sql's doc comment
+// for why only a hash is stored. Consumed by
+// ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver (an HTTP call to
+// enterprise-auth's POST /internal/authorize-ingest, which calls
+// ValidateIngestCredential below) so an agent's records can be
+// attributed to a tenant at the point they enter the system.
+type IngestCredential struct {
+	ID        string
+	TenantID  string
+	CreatedAt time.Time
+}
+
+func hashIngestToken(token string) string {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
+	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+}
+
+// CreateIngestCredential generates a new bearer token for tenantID and
+// returns the plaintext exactly once -- only its hash is ever persisted
+// (see this file's package doc comment). There is no way to retrieve a
+// lost token again; the only recovery is issuing a new one
+// (RevokeIngestCredential + CreateIngestCredential), the same "can't
+// recover, can only reissue" UX every real API-key system uses.
+func (s *Store) CreateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (token string, err error) {
+	raw := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: generating ingest credential: %w", err)
+	}
+	token = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(raw)
+
+	_, err = s.pool.Exec(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO ingest_credentials (id, tenant_id, token_hash)
+		VALUES ($1, $2, $3)`,
+		uuid.NewString(), tenantID, hashIngestToken(token))
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: creating ingest credential: %w", err)
+	}
+	return token, nil
+}
+
+// ValidateIngestCredential hashes the presented token and looks up which
+// tenant it belongs to via an indexed exact-match on the UNIQUE
+// token_hash column -- the only production call site is
+// enterprise-auth's POST /internal/authorize-ingest handler, per an
+// agent's PushBatch request.
+func (s *Store) ValidateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, token string) (tenantID string, err error) {
+	row := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT tenant_id FROM ingest_credentials WHERE token_hash = $1`, hashIngestToken(token))
+	if err := row.Scan(&tenantID); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+			return "", ErrNotFound
+		}
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: validating ingest credential: %w", err)
+	}
+	return tenantID, nil
+}
+
+// RevokeIngestCredential deletes a credential by ID (not by token --
+// the plaintext is never stored, so revocation has to name the row some
+// other way; ListIngestCredentialsForTenant is what an operator uses to
+// find the ID).
+func (s *Store) RevokeIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
+	tag, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM ingest_credentials WHERE id = $1`, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: revoking ingest credential: %w", err)
+	}
+	if tag.RowsAffected() == 0 {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ListIngestCredentialsForTenant never returns the plaintext token (it
+// isn't stored) -- just enough (ID, creation time) for an operator to
+// decide which one to revoke.
+func (s *Store) ListIngestCredentialsForTenant(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]IngestCredential, error) {
+	rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, `
+		SELECT id, tenant_id, created_at FROM ingest_credentials
+		WHERE tenant_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at`, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: listing ingest credentials: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+
+	var out []IngestCredential
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var c IngestCredential
+		if err := rows.Scan(&c.ID, &c.TenantID, &c.CreatedAt); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("rbacstore: scanning ingest credential: %w", err)
+		}
+		out = append(out, c)
+	}
+	return out, rows.Err()
+}

enterprise/internal/rbacstore/rbacstore_test.go

@@ -771,3 +771,122 @@ func TestListMembershipsForTenant(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected editor entry: %+v", got)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestCreateAndValidateIngestCredential(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	tenantID := "test-tenant-" + uniqueSuffix()
+	if _, err := s.CreateTenant(ctx, tenantID, "Test Tenant"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTenant: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	token, err := s.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+	if token == "" {
+		t.Fatal("expected a non-empty token")
+	}
+
+	got, err := s.ValidateIngestCredential(ctx, token)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ValidateIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != tenantID {
+		t.Fatalf("ValidateIngestCredential tenant = %q, want %q", got, tenantID)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidateIngestCredentialRejectsUnknownToken(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	if _, err := s.ValidateIngestCredential(context.Background(), "not-a-real-token"); err != ErrNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("ValidateIngestCredential error = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIngestCredentialTokenNeverStoredAsPlaintext is the regression test
+// for this table's whole reason for hashing: the raw token string must
+// not appear anywhere in the persisted row (only its hash), so a
+// database leak doesn't hand out usable credentials.
+func TestIngestCredentialTokenNeverStoredAsPlaintext(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	tenantID := "test-tenant-" + uniqueSuffix()
+	if _, err := s.CreateTenant(ctx, tenantID, "Test Tenant"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTenant: %v", err)
+	}
+	token, err := s.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	var stored string
+	row := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT token_hash FROM ingest_credentials WHERE tenant_id = $1`, tenantID)
+	if err := row.Scan(&stored); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reading stored token_hash: %v", err)
+	}
+	if stored == token {
+		t.Fatal("the plaintext token must never be stored directly in token_hash")
+	}
+	if stored != hashIngestToken(token) {
+		t.Fatalf("stored hash = %q, want sha256(token) = %q", stored, hashIngestToken(token))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRevokeIngestCredential(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	tenantID := "test-tenant-" + uniqueSuffix()
+	if _, err := s.CreateTenant(ctx, tenantID, "Test Tenant"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTenant: %v", err)
+	}
+	token, err := s.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+	creds, err := s.ListIngestCredentialsForTenant(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil || len(creds) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("ListIngestCredentialsForTenant = (%+v, %v), want exactly one", creds, err)
+	}
+
+	if err := s.RevokeIngestCredential(ctx, creds[0].ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("RevokeIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.ValidateIngestCredential(ctx, token); err != ErrNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("ValidateIngestCredential after revoke = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRevokeIngestCredentialNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	if err := s.RevokeIngestCredential(context.Background(), uuid.NewString()); err != ErrNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("RevokeIngestCredential error = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestListIngestCredentialsForTenantExcludesOtherTenants(t *testing.T) {
+	s := testStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	tenantID := "test-tenant-" + uniqueSuffix()
+	otherTenantID := "test-tenant-" + uniqueSuffix()
+	if _, err := s.CreateTenant(ctx, tenantID, "Test Tenant"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTenant: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.CreateTenant(ctx, otherTenantID, "Other Tenant"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTenant other: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, tenantID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateIngestCredential: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.CreateIngestCredential(ctx, otherTenantID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateIngestCredential other: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	creds, err := s.ListIngestCredentialsForTenant(ctx, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ListIngestCredentialsForTenant: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(creds) != 1 || creds[0].TenantID != tenantID {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected credentials: %+v", creds)
+	}
+}

ingest/cmd/ingest/main.go

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/sentry/sentry/ingest/internal/consumer"
 	"github.com/sentry/sentry/ingest/internal/grpcserver"
 	"github.com/sentry/sentry/ingest/internal/producer"
+	"github.com/sentry/sentry/ingest/internal/tenantresolver"
 )
 
 func main() {
@@ -53,7 +54,18 @@ func main() {
 	if *mode == "server" || *mode == "all" {
 		p := producer.New(cfg.Redpanda)
 		defer p.Close()
-		srv := grpcserver.New(logger, cfg.GRPC, cfg.TLS, p)
+		// resolver stays nil (every batch's tenant_id header is simply
+		// never set) unless ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL is configured -- matches
+		// every other "off unless configured" optional dependency in
+		// this codebase.
+		var resolver grpcserver.TenantResolver
+		if cfg.EnterpriseAuthURL != "" {
+			resolver = tenantresolver.New(cfg.EnterpriseAuthURL)
+			logger.Info("ingest tenant resolution configured", "enterprise_auth_url", cfg.EnterpriseAuthURL)
+		} else {
+			logger.Info("ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL not set -- ingest records carry no tenant_id, single-tenant behavior")
+		}
+		srv := grpcserver.New(logger, cfg.GRPC, cfg.TLS, p, resolver)
 		g.Go(func() error { return srv.Run(ctx) })
 	}
 

ingest/internal/config/config.go

@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ type Config struct {
 	Redpanda   RedpandaConfig
 	ClickHouse ClickHouseConfig
 	Batch      BatchConfig
+	// EnterpriseAuthURL enables per-tenant ingest credential validation
+	// (internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver) when set -- empty (the
+	// default) is a documented no-op, same "off unless configured" shape
+	// as every other optional enterprise integration point in this
+	// codebase (e.g. api's own ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL).
+	EnterpriseAuthURL string
 }
 
 type GRPCConfig struct {
@@ -70,6 +76,7 @@ func Load() (Config, error) {
 			Username: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_USERNAME", "default"),
 			Password: getenv("CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD", ""),
 		},
+		EnterpriseAuthURL: getenv("ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL", ""),
 	}
 
 	maxSize, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("CONSUMER_BATCH_MAX_SIZE", "500"))

ingest/internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -19,12 +19,16 @@ func TestLoadDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	if cfg.Batch.FlushIntervalMS != 2000 {
 		t.Errorf("Batch.FlushIntervalMS = %d, want 2000", cfg.Batch.FlushIntervalMS)
 	}
+	if cfg.EnterpriseAuthURL != "" {
+		t.Errorf("EnterpriseAuthURL = %q, want empty (tenant resolution off by default)", cfg.EnterpriseAuthURL)
+	}
 }
 
 func TestLoadOverridesFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv("GRPC_LISTEN_ADDR", ":9999")
 	t.Setenv("REDPANDA_BROKERS", "a:9092,b:9092")
 	t.Setenv("CONSUMER_BATCH_MAX_SIZE", "10")
+	t.Setenv("ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL", "http://enterprise-auth:8082")
 
 	cfg, err := Load()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -39,6 +43,9 @@ func TestLoadOverridesFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
 	if cfg.Batch.MaxSize != 10 {
 		t.Errorf("Batch.MaxSize = %d, want 10", cfg.Batch.MaxSize)
 	}
+	if cfg.EnterpriseAuthURL != "http://enterprise-auth:8082" {
+		t.Errorf("EnterpriseAuthURL = %q, want http://enterprise-auth:8082", cfg.EnterpriseAuthURL)
+	}
 }
 
 func TestLoadInvalidBatchSizeErrors(t *testing.T) {

ingest/internal/grpcserver/server.go

@@ -4,6 +4,22 @@
 // happen exactly once, here, rather than in either downstream consumer)
 // and otherwise forwards records unchanged onto Redpanda — normalization
 // into the ClickHouse row shape happens later, on the consumer side.
+//
+// If a TenantResolver is configured, PushBatch also resolves which
+// tenant the call's bearer credential belongs to and attaches it as a
+// "tenant_id" Kafka message header on every record produced -- the first
+// step of Phase 4's ingest tenant-awareness (see
+// /docs/phase-4-runbook.md and CLAUDE.md's "ingest itself has no tenant
+// concept" gap). Deliberately scoped no further than that for now:
+// nothing downstream (this package's own consumer, or `search`'s
+// separate Redpanda consumer) reads that header yet to route a record's
+// write into a per-tenant ClickHouse database/Tantivy index -- every
+// record still lands in the one shared destination either way, tenant_id
+// header or not. That's real, disclosed, deferred follow-up work, not
+// silently incomplete: attaching a verifiable tenant identity as early
+// as possible (right where the credential is actually presented) is a
+// self-contained, independently valuable step on its own, and it's what
+// any later per-tenant write-routing work will consume.
 package grpcserver
 
 import (
@@ -11,12 +27,14 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net"
+	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	"github.com/segmentio/kafka-go"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
 	"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
 
@@ -24,6 +42,12 @@ import (
 	logsv1 "github.com/sentry/sentry/proto/sentry/logs/v1"
 )
 
+// TenantIDHeaderKey is the Kafka message header a resolved tenant ID is
+// attached under -- exported so internal/consumer (or a future per-
+// tenant write-routing consumer) can read it back by the same name
+// without duplicating the literal.
+const TenantIDHeaderKey = "tenant_id"
+
 type Server struct {
 	logsv1.UnimplementedLogIngestServer
 
@@ -31,6 +55,7 @@ type Server struct {
 	grpcCfg  config.GRPCConfig
 	tlsCfg   config.TLSConfig
 	producer batchProducer
+	resolver TenantResolver
 }
 
 // batchProducer is the subset of *producer.Producer this package depends
@@ -39,8 +64,22 @@ type batchProducer interface {
 	WriteBatch(ctx context.Context, msgs []kafka.Message) error
 }
 
-func New(logger *slog.Logger, grpcCfg config.GRPCConfig, tlsCfg config.TLSConfig, p batchProducer) *Server {
-	return &Server{logger: logger, grpcCfg: grpcCfg, tlsCfg: tlsCfg, producer: p}
+// TenantResolver validates an ingest credential (a bearer token
+// presented via gRPC metadata, `authorization: Bearer <token>`) and
+// resolves which tenant it belongs to. nil is a deliberate no-op: every
+// record's Kafka message gets no tenant_id header at all, matching every
+// ingest deployment's behavior before per-tenant ingest credentials
+// existed. The real implementation
+// (ingest/internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) is a plain HTTP client
+// calling enterprise-auth's /internal/authorize-ingest -- never an
+// enterprise/ import, since this package is AGPL core (same "network
+// boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.Authorizer uses).
+type TenantResolver interface {
+	ResolveTenant(ctx context.Context, token string) (tenantID string, err error)
+}
+
+func New(logger *slog.Logger, grpcCfg config.GRPCConfig, tlsCfg config.TLSConfig, p batchProducer, resolver TenantResolver) *Server {
+	return &Server{logger: logger, grpcCfg: grpcCfg, tlsCfg: tlsCfg, producer: p, resolver: resolver}
 }
 
 // Run blocks serving gRPC until ctx is canceled, then gracefully stops.
@@ -77,6 +116,28 @@ func (s *Server) PushBatch(ctx context.Context, req *logsv1.PushBatchRequest) (*
 		return &logsv1.PushBatchResponse{Accepted: 0}, nil
 	}
 
+	// tenantID stays empty (no header attached below) unless a resolver
+	// is actually configured -- single-tenant deployments never present
+	// a bearer credential and never need to. Once a resolver IS
+	// configured, a missing/invalid credential fails the whole batch
+	// closed rather than falling back to "no tenant" -- exactly the
+	// same fail-closed shape enterprise/internal/chrunner.Registry.RunSQL
+	// uses on the read side, applied here at the point data enters the
+	// system.
+	var tenantID string
+	if s.resolver != nil {
+		token, ok := bearerTokenFromContext(ctx)
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "missing bearer credential")
+		}
+		resolved, err := s.resolver.ResolveTenant(ctx, token)
+		if err != nil {
+			s.logger.Error("resolving ingest tenant", "batch_id", req.GetBatchId(), "error", err)
+			return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid ingest credential")
+		}
+		tenantID = resolved
+	}
+
 	msgs := make([]kafka.Message, 0, len(req.GetRecords()))
 	for _, rec := range req.GetRecords() {
 		// Assigned here, once, before this record is produced to
@@ -92,10 +153,14 @@ func (s *Server) PushBatch(ctx context.Context, req *logsv1.PushBatchRequest) (*
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "marshaling record: %v", err)
 		}
-		msgs = append(msgs, kafka.Message{
+		msg := kafka.Message{
 			Key:   []byte(rec.GetHost()),
 			Value: val,
-		})
+		}
+		if tenantID != "" {
+			msg.Headers = []kafka.Header{{Key: TenantIDHeaderKey, Value: []byte(tenantID)}}
+		}
+		msgs = append(msgs, msg)
 	}
 
 	if err := s.producer.WriteBatch(ctx, msgs); err != nil {
@@ -103,6 +168,26 @@ func (s *Server) PushBatch(ctx context.Context, req *logsv1.PushBatchRequest) (*
 		return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unavailable, "writing to transport: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	s.logger.Debug("batch produced to redpanda", "batch_id", req.GetBatchId(), "records", len(req.GetRecords()))
+	s.logger.Debug("batch produced to redpanda", "batch_id", req.GetBatchId(), "records", len(req.GetRecords()), "tenant_id", tenantID)
 	return &logsv1.PushBatchResponse{Accepted: uint32(len(req.GetRecords()))}, nil
 }
+
+// bearerTokenFromContext reads the same "authorization: Bearer <token>"
+// gRPC metadata shape HTTP's Authorization header uses -- an agent sets
+// this once per PushBatch call (see the agent's grpc.rs), not per
+// record.
+func bearerTokenFromContext(ctx context.Context) (string, bool) {
+	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	values := md.Get("authorization")
+	if len(values) == 0 {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	const prefix = "Bearer "
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(values[0], prefix) {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	return strings.TrimPrefix(values[0], prefix), true
+}

ingest/internal/grpcserver/server_test.go

@@ -2,12 +2,16 @@ package grpcserver
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/segmentio/kafka-go"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
 	"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
 
 	"github.com/sentry/sentry/ingest/internal/config"
@@ -32,8 +36,35 @@ func (f *fakeProducer) WriteBatch(_ context.Context, msgs []kafka.Message) error
 	return nil
 }
 
+// fakeResolver is an in-memory stand-in for
+// ingest/internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver, keyed by token.
+type fakeResolver struct {
+	tenantByToken map[string]string
+}
+
+func (f *fakeResolver) ResolveTenant(_ context.Context, token string) (string, error) {
+	tenantID, ok := f.tenantByToken[token]
+	if !ok {
+		return "", errors.New("fakeResolver: unknown token")
+	}
+	return tenantID, nil
+}
+
 func newTestServer(p batchProducer) *Server {
-	return New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), config.GRPCConfig{}, config.TLSConfig{}, p)
+	return New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), config.GRPCConfig{}, config.TLSConfig{}, p, nil)
+}
+
+func newTestServerWithResolver(p batchProducer, resolver TenantResolver) *Server {
+	return New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), config.GRPCConfig{}, config.TLSConfig{}, p, resolver)
+}
+
+// contextWithBearerToken builds an incoming gRPC context carrying an
+// "authorization: Bearer <token>" metadata entry -- the shape a real
+// grpc-go server hands PushBatch once TLS/framing is stripped away, so
+// this exercises the same metadata.FromIncomingContext path production
+// traffic does, not a shortcut around it.
+func contextWithBearerToken(token string) context.Context {
+	return metadata.NewIncomingContext(context.Background(), metadata.Pairs("authorization", "Bearer "+token))
 }
 
 func TestPushBatchAssignsRecordID(t *testing.T) {
@@ -124,3 +155,101 @@ func TestPushBatchEmptyRecordsIsANoOp(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected no batches written for an empty request, got %d", len(fp.written))
 	}
 }
+
+// TestPushBatchNoResolverAttachesNoTenantHeader is the regression test
+// for single-tenant deployments' behavior staying unchanged: with no
+// TenantResolver configured, records are produced exactly as before --
+// no tenant_id header at all -- even with a bearer token present (it's
+// simply never inspected).
+func TestPushBatchNoResolverAttachesNoTenantHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	fp := &fakeProducer{}
+	s := newTestServer(fp)
+
+	req := &logsv1.PushBatchRequest{Records: []*logsv1.LogRecord{{Host: "h1", Message: "one"}}}
+	if _, err := s.PushBatch(contextWithBearerToken("irrelevant"), req); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("PushBatch() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	fp.mu.Lock()
+	defer fp.mu.Unlock()
+	for _, h := range fp.written[0][0].Headers {
+		if h.Key == TenantIDHeaderKey {
+			t.Fatalf("expected no %s header with no resolver configured, got %q", TenantIDHeaderKey, h.Value)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPushBatchWithResolverAttachesTenantHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	fp := &fakeProducer{}
+	resolver := &fakeResolver{tenantByToken: map[string]string{"real-token": "acme"}}
+	s := newTestServerWithResolver(fp, resolver)
+
+	req := &logsv1.PushBatchRequest{Records: []*logsv1.LogRecord{
+		{Host: "h1", Message: "one"},
+		{Host: "h1", Message: "two"},
+	}}
+	if _, err := s.PushBatch(contextWithBearerToken("real-token"), req); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("PushBatch() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	fp.mu.Lock()
+	defer fp.mu.Unlock()
+	if len(fp.written[0]) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 2 messages written, got %d", len(fp.written[0]))
+	}
+	for _, msg := range fp.written[0] {
+		found := false
+		for _, h := range msg.Headers {
+			if h.Key == TenantIDHeaderKey {
+				found = true
+				if string(h.Value) != "acme" {
+					t.Fatalf("%s header = %q, want acme", TenantIDHeaderKey, h.Value)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if !found {
+			t.Fatalf("expected every record to carry a %s header", TenantIDHeaderKey)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPushBatchWithResolverRejectsMissingToken(t *testing.T) {
+	fp := &fakeProducer{}
+	resolver := &fakeResolver{tenantByToken: map[string]string{"real-token": "acme"}}
+	s := newTestServerWithResolver(fp, resolver)
+
+	req := &logsv1.PushBatchRequest{Records: []*logsv1.LogRecord{{Host: "h1", Message: "one"}}}
+	_, err := s.PushBatch(context.Background(), req) // no bearer token in context at all
+	if status.Code(err) != codes.Unauthenticated {
+		t.Fatalf("PushBatch() error = %v, want Unauthenticated", err)
+	}
+
+	fp.mu.Lock()
+	defer fp.mu.Unlock()
+	if len(fp.written) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("a batch with no bearer token must never reach the producer once a resolver is configured")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPushBatchWithResolverRejectsInvalidToken is the fail-closed
+// regression test: a resolver configured but a token it doesn't
+// recognize must refuse the whole batch, never fall back to "no tenant"
+// (which would silently defeat the point of requiring a credential at
+// all).
+func TestPushBatchWithResolverRejectsInvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
+	fp := &fakeProducer{}
+	resolver := &fakeResolver{tenantByToken: map[string]string{"real-token": "acme"}}
+	s := newTestServerWithResolver(fp, resolver)
+
+	req := &logsv1.PushBatchRequest{Records: []*logsv1.LogRecord{{Host: "h1", Message: "one"}}}
+	_, err := s.PushBatch(contextWithBearerToken("wrong-token"), req)
+	if status.Code(err) != codes.Unauthenticated {
+		t.Fatalf("PushBatch() error = %v, want Unauthenticated", err)
+	}
+
+	fp.mu.Lock()
+	defer fp.mu.Unlock()
+	if len(fp.written) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("a batch with an invalid token must never reach the producer once a resolver is configured")
+	}
+}

ingest/internal/tenantresolver/tenantresolver.go

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+// Package tenantresolver is ingest's HTTP client for resolving an
+// agent-presented ingest credential to a tenant -- calls enterprise-
+// auth's POST /internal/authorize-ingest over the network, never
+// importing enterprise/ (ingest is AGPL core; enterprise/ is
+// commercial-licensed and must never be imported by core code -- same
+// "network boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer
+// already uses for the query path, and enterprise-auth's own doc
+// comment on POST /internal/authorize-ingest). nil (no resolver
+// configured) is grpcserver.Server's documented no-op default --
+// single-tenant deployments never construct one, and every record's
+// TenantID stays empty, exactly like before per-tenant ingest
+// credentials existed.
+package tenantresolver
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type HTTPResolver struct {
+	baseURL string
+	http    *http.Client
+}
+
+func New(baseURL string) *HTTPResolver {
+	return &HTTPResolver{baseURL: baseURL, http: &http.Client{Timeout: 3 * time.Second}}
+}
+
+type authorizeIngestResponse struct {
+	TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
+}
+
+// ResolveTenant implements grpcserver.TenantResolver. Forwards only the
+// bearer token itself, nothing else about the caller's request -- same
+// "forward exactly the credential, never the rest of the request"
+// discipline api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already follows.
+func (r *HTTPResolver) ResolveTenant(ctx context.Context, token string) (string, error) {
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, r.baseURL+"/internal/authorize-ingest", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("tenantresolver: building request: %w", err)
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
+
+	resp, err := r.http.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("tenantresolver: calling enterprise-auth: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("tenantresolver: enterprise-auth returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+
+	var body authorizeIngestResponse
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("tenantresolver: decoding response: %w", err)
+	}
+	if body.TenantID == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("tenantresolver: enterprise-auth returned an empty tenant_id")
+	}
+	return body.TenantID, nil
+}

ingest/internal/tenantresolver/tenantresolver_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+package tenantresolver
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestResolveTenantForwardsTokenAndParsesTenantID(t *testing.T) {
+	var gotAuth string
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeIngestResponse{TenantID: "acme"})
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	res := New(srv.URL)
+	tenantID, err := res.ResolveTenant(context.Background(), "real-token")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveTenant: %v", err)
+	}
+	if tenantID != "acme" {
+		t.Fatalf("tenantID = %q, want acme", tenantID)
+	}
+	if gotAuth != "Bearer real-token" {
+		t.Fatalf("Authorization header = %q, want Bearer real-token", gotAuth)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveTenantNon2xxIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	res := New(srv.URL)
+	if _, err := res.ResolveTenant(context.Background(), "bad-token"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected an error for a 401 response from enterprise-auth")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveTenantRejectsEmptyTenantID(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeIngestResponse{})
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	res := New(srv.URL)
+	if _, err := res.ResolveTenant(context.Background(), "some-token"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected an error when enterprise-auth returns an empty tenant_id despite a 200")
+	}
+}

metadata/migrations/0034_create_ingest_credentials.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+-- Per-tenant bearer credentials an agent presents to `ingest` (see
+-- ingest/internal/grpcserver's TenantResolver) so a record can be
+-- attributed to a tenant at the point it enters the system, rather than
+-- landing in the one shared ClickHouse database/Tantivy index every
+-- record lands in today. Only the SHA-256 hash of the token is stored --
+-- same reasoning a password gets hashed, not stored raw: enterprise-auth
+-- only ever needs to check "does the presented token match," never to
+-- recover the plaintext, so there's no reason to keep it recoverable.
+-- Losing the plaintext means issuing a new credential, not resetting
+-- this one -- the plaintext is returned exactly once, at creation.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ingest_credentials
+(
+    id         UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+    tenant_id  TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    token_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+)