This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
206 lines
6.8 KiB
Go
206 lines
6.8 KiB
Go
// Command surface for api/localauth -- single-tenant mode's local
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// username/password login and user manager (see /docs -- deployment
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// runbook, and api/localauth's package doc comment for the full
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// feature). Same list/create/delete shape as agents/dashboards, plus a
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// "login" subcommand: unlike every other resource this CLI manages,
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// there's no way to get a first SENTRYCTL_TOKEN without one.
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package main
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import (
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"bufio"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"strings"
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)
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func cmdUsers(args []string, stdin io.Reader, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
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if len(args) == 0 {
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fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "sentryctl users: expected a subcommand (login, list, create, delete, reset-password)")
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return 1
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}
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apiURL, rest := extractAPIFlag(args[1:], os.Getenv)
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token := resolveToken(os.Getenv)
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switch args[0] {
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case "login":
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if len(rest) == 0 {
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fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "sentryctl users login: missing username")
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return 1
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}
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return cmdUsersLogin(rest[0], rest[1:], apiURL, stdin, stdout, stderr)
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case "list":
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return httpGetJSON(apiURL, "/auth/users", token, stdout, stderr)
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case "create":
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if len(rest) == 0 {
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fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "sentryctl users create: missing username")
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return 1
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}
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return cmdUsersCreate(rest[0], rest[1:], apiURL, token, stdin, stdout, stderr)
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case "delete":
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if len(rest) == 0 {
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fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "sentryctl users delete: missing user id")
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return 1
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}
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return httpMutateNoBody(http.MethodDelete, apiURL, "/auth/users/"+rest[0], token, "", "user deleted", stdout, stderr)
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case "reset-password":
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if len(rest) == 0 {
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fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "sentryctl users reset-password: missing user id")
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return 1
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}
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return cmdUsersResetPassword(rest[0], rest[1:], apiURL, token, stdin, stdout, stderr)
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default:
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "sentryctl users: unknown subcommand %q (want login, list, create, delete, reset-password)\n", args[0])
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return 1
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}
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}
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// extractPasswordStdinFlag pulls the boolean --password-stdin flag out
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// of args if present -- same "walk args, splice out the one flag this
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// caller cares about" shape extractAPIFlag already uses at the
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// top-level dispatch layer. Unlike the --password <value> flag this
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// replaced (security-audit finding L-4), this flag never carries the
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// secret itself -- only readPasswordFromStdin's caller decides to
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// actually read one, same "docker login --password-stdin" convention,
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// chosen over inventing a new one: a plaintext password passed as a CLI
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// argument is visible to any other local user via `ps`/
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// `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and typically lands in shell history too.
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func extractPasswordStdinFlag(args []string) (useStdin bool, rest []string) {
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for _, a := range args {
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if a == "--password-stdin" {
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useStdin = true
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continue
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}
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rest = append(rest, a)
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}
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return useStdin, rest
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}
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// readPasswordFromStdin reads a single line from stdin. Not masked
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// (this codebase has no terminal/raw-mode dependency to draw on -- see
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// resolveToken's doc comment for the same tradeoff already accepted for
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// SENTRYCTL_TOKEN); pipe the value in (`echo "$PW" | sentryctl users
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// login admin`) rather than typing it at an interactive terminal where
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// that matters.
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func readPasswordFromStdin(stdin io.Reader) (string, error) {
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line, err := bufio.NewReader(stdin).ReadString('\n')
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if err != nil && line == "" {
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return "", err
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}
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return strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\n"), "\r"), nil
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}
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type loginRequestBody struct {
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Username string `json:"username"`
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Password string `json:"password"`
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}
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type loginResponseBody struct {
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Token string `json:"token"`
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Error string `json:"error"`
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}
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// cmdUsersLogin prints only the raw token to stdout on success (nothing
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// else) -- deliberately pipeable: `export SENTRYCTL_TOKEN=$(sentryctl
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// users login admin)`.
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func cmdUsersLogin(username string, _ []string, apiURL string, stdin io.Reader, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
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password, err := readPasswordFromStdin(stdin)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "reading password: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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body, err := json.Marshal(loginRequestBody{Username: username, Password: password})
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "encoding request: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, apiURL+"/auth/login", strings.NewReader(string(body)))
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "building request: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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respBody, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "reading response: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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var login loginResponseBody
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_ = json.Unmarshal(respBody, &login)
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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if login.Error != "" {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "login failed: %s\n", login.Error)
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} else {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "login failed: status %d\n", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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return 1
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}
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fmt.Fprintln(stdout, login.Token)
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return 0
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}
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func cmdUsersCreate(username string, flagArgs []string, apiURL, token string, stdin io.Reader, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
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role := "editor"
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for i := 0; i < len(flagArgs); i++ {
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if flagArgs[i] == "--role" && i+1 < len(flagArgs) {
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role = flagArgs[i+1]
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i++
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continue
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}
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}
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password, err := readPasswordFromStdin(stdin)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "reading password: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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body, err := json.Marshal(struct {
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Username string `json:"username"`
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Password string `json:"password"`
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Role string `json:"role"`
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}{Username: username, Password: password, Role: role})
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "encoding request: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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return httpPostJSON(apiURL, "/auth/users", token, string(body), stdout, stderr)
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}
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// cmdUsersResetPassword defaults to requesting a server-generated
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// random password (empty body -- see api/localauth's handleResetPassword
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// doc comment): pass --password-stdin to instead set a specific password
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// read from stdin. There is deliberately no --password <value> flag (see
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// extractPasswordStdinFlag's doc comment) -- a specific password chosen
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// this way must be piped in, never typed as a bare CLI argument.
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func cmdUsersResetPassword(id string, flagArgs []string, apiURL, token string, stdin io.Reader, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
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useStdin, _ := extractPasswordStdinFlag(flagArgs)
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body := "{}"
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if useStdin {
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password, err := readPasswordFromStdin(stdin)
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "reading password: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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encoded, err := json.Marshal(struct {
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Password string `json:"password"`
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}{Password: password})
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "encoding request: %v\n", err)
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return 1
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}
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body = string(encoded)
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}
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return httpPostJSON(apiURL, "/auth/users/"+id+"/reset-password", token, body, stdout, stderr)
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}
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