jcoffey-dev
4b5dae5879
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
sentryctl
Sentry's control CLI.
sentryctl ping # checks http://localhost:8080/healthz
sentryctl ping --api http://api.internal:8080
SENTRYCTL_API_URL=http://api.internal:8080 sentryctl ping
Exits 0 and prints ok if /api's /healthz responds 200; exits 1 with an
error on stderr otherwise.
sentryctl query 'service=api | where status>=500 | stats count by host'
sentryctl query 'SELECT * FROM logs LIMIT 10' --language sql
sentryctl query 'message:"connection refused"' --json
Quote the query in your shell — pipe syntax uses |, which your shell
interprets as an actual pipe if you don't. Hits the exact same POST /query endpoint the web UI does (internal/querylang in /api does the
compiling; there's no separate query logic here to drift out of sync —
see /docs/query-language-reference.md). --language overrides
auto-detection, same optional override the HTTP API itself exposes.
Prints a table by default (stdlib text/tabwriter, no new dependency);
--json prints the raw {columns, rows} response instead.
sentryctl dashboards list
sentryctl dashboards get <id>
sentryctl dashboards apply dashboard.json # imports a dashboard exported via the web UI's "Export JSON" button
sentryctl dashboards permissions list <dashboard-id>
sentryctl dashboards permissions grant <dashboard-id> <user-id> viewer|editor
sentryctl dashboards permissions revoke <dashboard-id> <user-id>
sentryctl alerts list
sentryctl alerts get <id>
sentryctl alerts apply rule.json # creates a rule from a JSON file shaped like POST /rules's body
dashboards permissions is Phase 4's per-resource dashboard grant
(api/dashboards.PermissionStore) — additive-only, raises someone to
viewer or editor on one specific dashboard (Admin/Owner already have
tenant-wide access, so the server rejects any other role). On plain
api (no enterprise-api, no permission service wired in) every
permissions call fails with a 501 whose message says so explicitly —
that's the deployment telling you this feature isn't available, not a
CLI bug.
dashboards talks to /api (--api, same override as query/ping).
alerts talks to /alerting, a separate service with its own base URL
(--alerting-api, or $SENTRYCTL_ALERTING_API_URL, default
http://localhost:8081) — see /docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md's
component boundary for why alerting isn't just another /api route.
apply in both cases sends the file's JSON as-is to the corresponding
create/import endpoint — no reshaping, since the file's shape already
matches what the endpoint expects (the same JSON the web UI's export
button downloads, or the same shape GET /rules/{id} returns). This is
deliberately the seed of a future Terraform provider: one JSON contract,
multiple callers (web export, CLI apply, eventually a provider), not
three different formats to keep in sync.
No CLI framework (cobra/urfave-cli/etc.) — six commands split across a
few files (cmd_ping.go, cmd_query.go, cmd_dashboards.go,
cmd_alerts.go) is still boring enough not to need one; stdlib
os.Args handling plus a hand-rolled switch in main.go covers it.
Revisit once there's a real command tree (nested subcommands, nontrivial
flag parsing) to justify a dependency.
Building & testing
go build ./...
go vet ./...
go test ./...
docker build -f Dockerfile -t sentryctl . # context is cli/, not the repo root