Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates (smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not silently left half-done. New pieces: - metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed, not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/ ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out. - enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/ -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all. - ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import, same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path. PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it. Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed: rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver (real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing token). Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate, separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be refused outright, so it must not default on just because enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml leaves it unset, same as ever. Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
156 lines
5.7 KiB
Go
156 lines
5.7 KiB
Go
// Package authhandler implements enterprise-auth's POST /internal/authorize
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// endpoint -- the HTTP side of the "network boundary, not import boundary"
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// pattern api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer calls into (see that package's
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// doc comment). It resolves a caller's credentials (session cookie or
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// service-token Bearer header) to an identity, using session.Manager for
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// both -- a human session and /alerting's service token are both just
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// signed tokens with a different Role claim, so one validation path
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// handles both, and the Role claim (not which header carried it) is what
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// determines whether the result looks like a human or a service identity.
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//
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// POST /internal/authorize-ingest is a sibling endpoint, same network-
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// boundary shape but for a different caller (`ingest`, core/AGPL, not
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// api/authz) and a different credential type (an ingest bearer token
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// checked against rbacstore's ingest_credentials table, not a
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// session.Manager JWT) -- see ingestCredentialValidator's doc comment.
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package authhandler
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/session"
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)
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// SessionCookieName matches the name api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer's
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// tests and doc comments already assume ("sentry_session").
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const SessionCookieName = "sentry_session"
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// Features reports which SSO mechanisms are configured -- the response
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// shape /docs/phase-4-rbac-design.md's "Web UI boundary" section commits
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// to ({"sso_configured", "oidc_enabled", "saml_enabled"}), so web can
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// show/hide enterprise settings sections as a runtime capability check
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// rather than a conditional import.
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type Features struct {
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OIDCEnabled bool
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SAMLEnabled bool
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}
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// ingestCredentialValidator is the narrow interface POST
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// /internal/authorize-ingest needs -- *rbacstore.Store is the production
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// implementation. Unlike session-backed /internal/authorize, this
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// endpoint validates a completely different credential type (an ingest
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// bearer token, checked against enterprise/internal/rbacstore's
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// ingest_credentials table, never a session.Manager-signed JWT), so it
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// needs a dependency session.Manager alone can't supply.
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type ingestCredentialValidator interface {
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ValidateIngestCredential(ctx context.Context, token string) (tenantID string, err error)
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}
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type Handler struct {
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logger *slog.Logger
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manager *session.Manager
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features Features
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ingestCredentials ingestCredentialValidator
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}
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func New(logger *slog.Logger, manager *session.Manager, features Features, ingestCredentials ingestCredentialValidator) *Handler {
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return &Handler{logger: logger, manager: manager, features: features, ingestCredentials: ingestCredentials}
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}
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func (h *Handler) RegisterRoutes(mux *http.ServeMux) {
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /internal/authorize", h.handleAuthorize)
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /auth/features", h.handleFeatures)
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /internal/authorize-ingest", h.handleAuthorizeIngest)
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}
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type featuresResponse struct {
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SSOConfigured bool `json:"sso_configured"`
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OIDCEnabled bool `json:"oidc_enabled"`
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SAMLEnabled bool `json:"saml_enabled"`
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}
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func (h *Handler) handleFeatures(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(featuresResponse{
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SSOConfigured: h.features.OIDCEnabled || h.features.SAMLEnabled,
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OIDCEnabled: h.features.OIDCEnabled,
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SAMLEnabled: h.features.SAMLEnabled,
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})
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}
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type authorizeResponse struct {
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TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
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UserID string `json:"user_id"`
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Role string `json:"role"`
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}
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// handleAuthorize checks the Authorization Bearer header first (the
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// service-token path /alerting uses), falling back to the session
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// cookie (the human path a browser sends). Both resolve through the same
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// session.Manager.Validate -- see the package doc comment for why that's
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// safe: the Role claim inside the token is what determines the result,
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// not which header it arrived on.
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func (h *Handler) handleAuthorize(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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token := bearerToken(r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
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if token == "" {
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if c, err := r.Cookie(SessionCookieName); err == nil {
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token = c.Value
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}
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}
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if token == "" {
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http.Error(w, "no credentials presented", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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claims, err := h.manager.Validate(token)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "invalid or expired credentials", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeResponse{
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TenantID: claims.TenantID,
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UserID: claims.UserID,
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Role: claims.Role,
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})
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}
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type authorizeIngestResponse struct {
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TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
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}
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// handleAuthorizeIngest is ingest/internal/grpcserver.HTTPTenantResolver's
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// server side -- ingest calls this once per PushBatch (with the bearer
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// token the agent presented) to resolve which tenant the batch belongs
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// to, the network-boundary equivalent of api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer
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// calling /internal/authorize, for a different credential type.
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func (h *Handler) handleAuthorizeIngest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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token := bearerToken(r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
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if token == "" {
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http.Error(w, "no credentials presented", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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tenantID, err := h.ingestCredentials.ValidateIngestCredential(r.Context(), token)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "invalid ingest credential", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(authorizeIngestResponse{TenantID: tenantID})
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}
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func bearerToken(header string) string {
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const prefix = "Bearer "
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if !strings.HasPrefix(header, prefix) {
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return ""
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}
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return strings.TrimPrefix(header, prefix)
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}
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