Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates (smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not silently left half-done. New pieces: - metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed, not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/ ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out. - enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/ -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all. - ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import, same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path. PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it. Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed: rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver (real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing token). Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate, separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be refused outright, so it must not default on just because enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml leaves it unset, same as ever. Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
metadata
PostgreSQL schema and migration tooling for Sentry's control-plane
config: dashboards, alert rules, and everything else that isn't log data.
See /docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md and
/docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md for why this is a separate database
from /storage (ClickHouse) rather than new ClickHouse tables — short
version: dashboards and alert state need real row-level locking and
transactional read-modify-write, which ClickHouse's MergeTree family
doesn't provide.
Schema
Seven tables across three features, one shared database (sentry_metadata):
dashboards,dashboard_panels— owned by/api(api/internal/dashboards)notification_targets,alert_rules,alert_state,delivery_log— owned by/alertingaudit_log— owned byenterprise/internal/audit(Phase 4). Unlike every other table here, this one is not written through the sharedsentryrole/pool — see "Theaudit_writerrole" below.
"Owned" here is a documentation convention, not a technical boundary —
both services connect to the same Postgres instance/database, each with
its own hand-written SQL for the tables it's responsible for. Nothing is
shared across service internal/ trees for this, matching the existing
repo convention that only /proto is shared code (and even that isn't
shared logic, just generated bindings).
The audit_writer role: a second, more restricted credential
audit_log is append-only by design (see
/docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's audit-logging section) — a
compliance requirement, not just a convention, so it's backed by two
independent defenses, both verified against a live Postgres, not just
written:
- A dedicated
audit_writerPostgres role (migrations/0012-0014) with onlyINSERT/SELECTgrants onaudit_log— noUPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE, ever.enterprise/internal/audit.Storeconnects using this role's credentials via its ownpgxpool.Pool, never the sharedsentrypoolapi/alerting's other stores use — reusing the shared pool for audit writes would give audit_log's application-level credential the sameUPDATE/DELETEgrants every other metadata table has, silently defeating the whole point. - A
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETEtrigger (migrations/0015-0016) that rejects the operation for any role, including the table owner (sentry) — confirmed live: evensentryneeds to explicitlyALTER TABLE audit_log DISABLE TRIGGER audit_log_immutable(a privileged, distinct-from-normal-access operation) before it can modify a row. This is redundant defense-in-depth independent of the grant, protecting against a future migration accidentally re-grantingUPDATEtoaudit_writer.
AUDIT_WRITER_PASSWORD (default audit-writer-dev-only, matching every
other dev-only credential in this repo) sets the role's password at
creation time via psql -v audit_writer_password=... substitution in
migrate.sh — not hardcoded in the migration SQL file itself. One
real gotcha found while building this: psql's :'var' substitution does
not apply inside a DO $$ ... $$ dollar-quoted block (by design, so
client-side substitution can't corrupt a function/procedure body) — the
role-creation migration is a plain CREATE ROLE, not wrapped in an
IF NOT EXISTS check, relying on schema_migrations tracking for
idempotency instead (the same pattern Phase 1's non-idempotent
ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN migration in /storage already used).
Migration tooling: mirrors /storage/migrate.sh, not a framework
Same reasoning as /storage/README.md: pulling in golang-migrate for
what's currently six CREATE TABLE statements is premature machinery.
migrate.sh applies migrations/*.sql in filename order over psql,
tracking what's applied in a schema_migrations table, one DDL object
per file (kept for repo-wide consistency of what a migration "version"
means, even though Postgres itself supports multi-statement transactions
unlike ClickHouse's HTTP interface).
Running
docker compose up -d # starts a standalone Postgres for local work
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only ./migrate.sh # applies migrations/*.sql
Environment variables migrate.sh reads (all optional except
POSTGRES_PASSWORD, matching the root docker-compose.yml's
metadata-postgres service):
| Var | Default |
|---|---|
POSTGRES_HOST |
localhost |
POSTGRES_PORT |
5432 |
POSTGRES_USER |
sentry |
POSTGRES_PASSWORD |
(empty — must be set) |
POSTGRES_DATABASE |
sentry_metadata |
AUDIT_WRITER_PASSWORD |
audit-writer-dev-only |
The database itself isn't created by migrate.sh — the postgres:16-alpine
image auto-creates POSTGRES_DB on first startup, unlike ClickHouse where
migrate.sh has to issue CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS itself.
There's also a Dockerfile (bash + the postgresql16-client package
baked in, migrations/ copied in at build time) used by the root-level
docker-compose.yml as a one-shot init service (metadata-migrate) —
no runtime package install, no host volume mount needed.
Adding a migration
Add migrations/000N_description.sql with the next sequential number and
a single DDL statement. migrate.sh picks it up automatically — no
registration step.