This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
alerting
Alert rule CRUD, the ticker-driven evaluator, and webhook/Slack/PagerDuty
delivery. See /docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md for the full design
(data model, the ok/pending/firing state machine, and the four
correctness properties this implementation follows exactly).
Running
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only API_QUERY_URL=http://localhost:8080 go run ./cmd/alerting
Talks to the same sentry_metadata Postgres database as /api
(different tables — see /metadata/README.md), and to /api's
POST /query over plain HTTP for rule evaluation. Never connects to
ClickHouse or Tantivy directly.
HTTP API
POST /rules create a rule
GET /rules list rules (with current state)
GET /rules/{id} get a rule (with current state)
DELETE /rules/{id}
GET /rules/{id}/deliveries delivery log for a rule, most recent first
POST /targets create a notification target
GET /targets
GET /targets/{id}
DELETE /targets/{id}
GET /healthz
A rule's condition_type is "threshold" (requires comparator +
threshold_value, and the query must resolve to exactly one row) or
"absence" (fires when the query returns zero rows in its own
earliest=/latest= window — no separate window field). A notification
target's kind is "webhook", "slack", or "pagerduty" — all three
deliver via the same HTTP POST + retry/backoff mechanism
(internal/delivery/webhook.go); slack/pagerduty are payload formatters
only, not separate delivery paths.
Environment variables
| Var | Default |
|---|---|
HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR |
:8081 |
POSTGRES_ADDR |
localhost:5432 |
POSTGRES_DATABASE |
sentry_metadata |
POSTGRES_USERNAME |
sentry |
POSTGRES_PASSWORD |
(empty — must be set) |
API_QUERY_URL |
http://localhost:8080 |
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN |
* |
EVALUATOR_TICK_SECONDS |
5 — how often the scheduler checks for due rules |
EVALUATOR_CLAIM_BATCH_SIZE |
1000 — how many due rules one tick can pull off the queue |
EVALUATOR_WORKER_POOL_SIZE |
20 — bounded concurrency for /query calls within a claimed batch |
EVALUATOR_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS |
30 — per-evaluation POST /query timeout |
EVALUATOR_CLAIM_BATCH_SIZE and EVALUATOR_WORKER_POOL_SIZE are
deliberately separate knobs, not the same number — see
internal/config/config.go's doc comment for the real bug this
separation fixes (found by hack/alert-load-test, see
/docs/phase-3-runbook.md): with both capped at 20, 500 rules due at
once took 125s to cycle through instead of the configured 60s.
Package layout
cmd/alerting/ wires config, Postgres pool, api client; runs the
HTTP server + evaluator + delivery worker concurrently (errgroup)
internal/httpapi/ REST handlers -- Handler/RegisterRoutes, same shape as api/internal/dashboards
internal/rulestore/ pgx CRUD for alert_rules + alert_state; ClaimDueRules
(fix 1's atomic claim) and ApplyTransition (fix 2's transactional outbox)
internal/notifystore/ pgx CRUD for notification_targets
internal/queryclient/ thin HTTP client to api's POST /query -- no querylang import here
internal/evaluator/ the ticker + worker pool; transitions.go is the pure,
exhaustively-tested ok/pending/firing state machine;
condition.go implements fixes 3/4 (errors never
coerced to "condition false"; threshold zero-rows
is an error, not a 0)
internal/delivery/ webhook.go is the claim-and-send worker (all three
kinds go through it); slack.go/pagerduty.go are
payload formatters only
Building & testing
go build ./...
go vet ./...
go test ./...
docker build -f Dockerfile -t sentry-alerting . # context is alerting/, not the repo root -- no /proto needed