This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.
Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.
Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
(HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
(golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
side-channel.
Phase 4 added a NOT NULL tenant_id column to both tables (migrations
0022/0023, backfilled via a join through alert_rules.id), but Store's
Create and ApplyTransition were never updated to populate it on new
inserts -- every existing row already had a value from the backfill,
which is exactly why this went uncaught: nothing created a *new* rule
against a Phase-4-or-later database until now. Every alert rule
creation since those migrations landed was silently broken.
Create's alert_state insert now passes rule.TenantID explicitly.
ApplyTransition only receives a rule ID, not a full Rule, so its
delivery_log insert resolves tenant_id via a subquery against
alert_rules. Confirmed against a live stack: rule creation, evaluation,
firing, and a real delivery attempt all completed end to end.
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.
Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.
Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).
Saved, shareable multi-panel dashboards (table/line/bar/single-stat
panels via gridstack + uPlot, global + per-panel time range, JSON
export/import) and threshold/absence alert rules with an
ok/pending/firing evaluator and webhook/Slack/PagerDuty delivery.
- New /metadata component: Postgres control-plane store for dashboards,
panels, notification targets, alert rules/state, and delivery log --
see docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md for why ClickHouse's MergeTree
family isn't a fit for this access pattern (needs real row-level
locking and read-your-writes consistency).
- api/internal/dashboards: dashboard/panel CRUD, pure -- panel query
execution stays client-side, reusing the existing /query endpoint.
- New /alerting service: rule/target CRUD, a ticker-driven evaluator
(claim-then-evaluate concurrency control, transactional-outbox
delivery, query errors and threshold zero-rows never coerced into a
false transition) and webhook/Slack/PagerDuty delivery with
retry/backoff. See docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md for the full
state-machine design and the four correctness properties it
implements.
- web: /dashboards and /alerts UIs; cli: sentryctl dashboards/alerts
list/get/apply, seeding a future Terraform provider's JSON contract.
- hack/alert-load-test: 500 rules against real ClickHouse data, real
measured results in docs/phase-3-runbook.md.
Five real bugs found by actually running this against a live stack
(documented in the runbook, not just fixed silently): a latent Phase 2
bug where ClickHouse rejected the timestamp format used for
earliest=/latest= queries; a "now" literal token injected into query
text; a GridStack/uPlot layout-timing race; JS's Date.parse being too
lenient to use as a timestamp-detection heuristic; a rule's "enabled"
field silently defaulting to false when omitted; and the evaluator's
claim-batch-size and worker-pool-concurrency defaulting to the same
value, causing 500 concurrently-due rules to take 125s to cycle through
instead of the configured 60s.
jcoffey-dev