Full rebrand across cosmetic branding, code identifiers, and infrastructure/data-plane naming, using the supplied Cairn OBS logo package. Cosmetic: favicon/logo swap (also closes a stale license-audit finding -- the old favicon was SvelteKit's unreplaced scaffold logo), new centered welcome landing page, larger/legible sidebar logo, page titles, CLAUDE.md/README/docs prose. Code identifiers: Go module path github.com/sentry/sentry -> github.com/cairnobs/cairnobs across all 13 modules and ~91 files (protoc regenerated); Rust crates sentry-agent/sentry-parser/sentry-search -> cairnobs-*; CLI sentryctl -> cairnobsctl; Terraform provider fully renamed (sentry_dashboard etc. -> cairnobs_dashboard, provider type, env vars); every session/auth cookie name; agent config paths and Windows service identity. Deliberately preserved: the gRPC wire protocol's protobuf packages (sentry.logs.v1, sentry.agent.v1) and their Go import directory (proto/sentry/...) -- renaming the wire-level package would break every currently-deployed agent binary (confirmed two real hosts, including mail.inbuxa.com, are actively streaming through this exact contract) until rebuilt and redeployed in lockstep with an ingest cutover. Only the Go module path wrapping the generated code changes. Infrastructure: every docker-compose container name (root and three component-level compose files); the Helm chart (directory, Chart.yaml, named-template helpers, all templates, values.yaml image repos); Kubernetes Operator (CRD group sentry.io -> cairnobs.io, both CRD YAML files, Go identifiers, RBAC markers); the coupled enterprise/tenantcrd package. Caught and fixed real path-coupling bugs along the way: the Helm chart's search/ingest volume mounts and the dev-only-credential detection constant vs. docker-compose.yml's literal values had to move together or a security warning would have silently stopped firing. Data plane: Postgres database sentry_metadata -> cairnobs_metadata and role sentry -> cairnobs; ClickHouse database sentry -> cairnobs; Kafka topic sentry.logs.raw -> cairnobs.logs.raw and its consumer groups. Source-level defaults, docker-compose.yml, and every migrate.sh/ provision script default updated together; already-applied migration files left untouched per this repo's immutable-migration convention. Verified at every layer: all 13 Go modules build/vet/test clean, both Rust workspaces (agent, search) build/clippy/test clean, npm run check/ build clean, docker compose config validates on all four compose files. Live-verified against a real docker stack multiple times through this work, including a final fresh-volume run confirming the actual renamed Postgres database/role, ClickHouse database, and Kafka topic all work end to end with a real login and query, zero console errors.
117 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
117 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
// Package oidc wires coreos/go-oidc into a small relying-party client:
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// discovery, the login redirect, and code exchange + ID token
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// verification. Deliberately thin -- this package answers "is this
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// person who they say they are, and what's their email/subject" and
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// nothing about tenants/roles; internal/session maps a verified identity
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// to a tenant.ID via tenant.TrustFromValidatedSession, kept as a
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// separate concern per /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md.
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package oidc
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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goidc "github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
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"golang.org/x/oauth2"
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)
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type Config struct {
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IssuerURL string
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ClientID string
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ClientSecret string
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RedirectURL string
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// Scopes beyond the mandatory "openid" -- "email" and "profile" are
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// the common additions IdPs support without extra configuration.
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Scopes []string
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}
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// Provider wraps a discovered OIDC issuer and the oauth2 config derived
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// from it. Construction does real network discovery (GET
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// {issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration) -- see New's doc comment.
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type Provider struct {
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verifier *goidc.IDTokenVerifier
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oauth2 oauth2.Config
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}
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// Claims is the subset of ID token claims Cairn OBS actually uses. Extend
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// deliberately, not by passing the raw claim map further up the stack --
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// every field added here is a field internal/session has to decide how
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// to trust.
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type Claims struct {
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Subject string `json:"sub"`
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Email string `json:"email"`
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EmailVerified bool `json:"email_verified"`
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}
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// New performs OIDC discovery against cfg.IssuerURL. Real network I/O --
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// call once at startup (or lazily, cached), not per request.
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func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config) (*Provider, error) {
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if cfg.IssuerURL == "" || cfg.ClientID == "" || cfg.RedirectURL == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc: IssuerURL, ClientID, and RedirectURL are required")
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}
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issuer, err := goidc.NewProvider(ctx, cfg.IssuerURL)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc: discovering issuer %q: %w", cfg.IssuerURL, err)
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}
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scopes := append([]string{goidc.ScopeOpenID}, cfg.Scopes...)
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return &Provider{
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verifier: issuer.Verifier(&goidc.Config{ClientID: cfg.ClientID}),
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oauth2: oauth2.Config{
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ClientID: cfg.ClientID,
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ClientSecret: cfg.ClientSecret,
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RedirectURL: cfg.RedirectURL,
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Endpoint: issuer.Endpoint(),
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Scopes: scopes,
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},
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}, nil
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}
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// NewState generates a CSRF-protection state value for the login
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// redirect. The caller is responsible for storing it (session/cookie)
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// and comparing it against what comes back to the callback endpoint --
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// this package doesn't hold any server-side state itself.
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func NewState() (string, error) {
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buf := make([]byte, 32)
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if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("oidc: generating state: %w", err)
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}
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(buf), nil
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}
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// AuthCodeURL is where the browser gets redirected to start login.
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func (p *Provider) AuthCodeURL(state string) string {
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return p.oauth2.AuthCodeURL(state)
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}
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// Exchange trades an authorization code for tokens and returns the
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// verified ID token's claims. Verification (signature, issuer,
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// audience, expiry) happens inside p.verifier.Verify -- this is the
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// step that actually establishes trust, not just "we got a token back."
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func (p *Provider) Exchange(ctx context.Context, code string) (*Claims, error) {
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token, err := p.oauth2.Exchange(ctx, code)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc: exchanging code: %w", err)
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}
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rawIDToken, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
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if !ok || rawIDToken == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc: token response had no id_token")
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}
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idToken, err := p.verifier.Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc: verifying id_token: %w", err)
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}
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var claims Claims
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if err := idToken.Claims(&claims); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc: decoding claims: %w", err)
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}
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return &claims, nil
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}
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