Closes the threat model's headline finding for the SQL query path:
enterprise/internal/tenantprovision does real CREATE DATABASE/USER/GRANT
against ClickHouse, and enterprise/internal/chrunner is a per-tenant
connection registry implementing api's SQLRunner interface, resolving
the tenant from the authenticated request identity -- never a
caller-suppliable parameter. Both are wired into a new binary,
enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api, alongside the unchanged single-tenant
api/cmd/api, since AGPL core can never import enterprise/ and Go's own
internal/ package visibility rules meant enterprise/ couldn't implement
core's SQLRunner interface without importing the package that defines
it. That required moving api/internal/{authz,queryapi,dashboards,
querylang/executor,searchclient,httpserver} out of internal/ -- the
minimal set enterprise-api needs to import; querylang's compiler
internals (planner/lexer/parser/ast/ir) and api's own config stay
internal, since nothing outside api needs them directly.
Also finally wires enterprise/internal/audit into queryapi.AuditLogger
(nil since Phase 4 task 4) via a new adapter, and adds live-ClickHouse
integration tests for two of the four adversarial probes named in
docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan.
Corrected several overclaims in the docs while writing this up: an
earlier claim that rbacstore's CRUD was "verified against a live
Postgres" was never actually true in this environment (only
internal/audit was, earlier in this phase, before Docker access was
lost) -- threat-model.md, phase-4-runbook.md, CLAUDE.md, and
enterprise/README.md all now distinguish "a real integration test
exists" from "this was confirmed against a live database."
Still not built: Tantivy/free-text tenant isolation
(enterprise/internal/searchclient), and any deployment-topology
mechanism that actually routes traffic to enterprise-api instead of
plain api -- both binaries exist side by side today with nothing
enforcing or flagging which one a deployment runs.
187 lines
6.8 KiB
Go
187 lines
6.8 KiB
Go
// Package queryapi is Sentry's query API: a single POST /query endpoint
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// accepting either the pipe syntax or raw SQL, compiled by
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// querylang/planner and executed by querylang/executor. Replaces Phase
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// 0/1's two separate placeholder endpoints (raw-SQL-only /query,
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// free-text-only /search) -- see /docs/query-language-design.md.
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//
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// Still plain net/http, not the pinned gRPC+REST-gateway pattern, for
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// the same reason as Phase 0/1: this is one endpoint, and the
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// proto/annotations/codegen machinery doesn't buy much at that size.
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// `/api` does speak gRPC internally (to /search) — this simplification
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// is about the public-facing surface only.
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package queryapi
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/authz"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/internal/querylang/planner"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/querylang/executor"
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)
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// AuditLogger is core's extension point for query audit logging --
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// deliberately minimal and tenant-agnostic, since core has no concept of
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// tenants (see /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md: that mechanism lives
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// entirely in enterprise/). enterprise/internal/audit implements this
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// against the real hash-chained, append-only store; a nil AuditLogger
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// (the default for a single-tenant deployment without enterprise/
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// configured) means no audit logging happens and core behaves exactly
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// as it did in Phases 0-3.
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//
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// Tenant/user identity is deliberately NOT a field on QueryAuditEntry --
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// once Phase 4 task 5's auth middleware wraps this handler, it attaches
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// that identity to the request's context.Context via
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// enterprise/internal/tenant, and LogQuery's ctx parameter is the same
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// context the request carried, so an enterprise-side implementation
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// reads identity from ctx rather than this interface growing
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// tenant-awareness. Per /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's audit
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// section, this is a fail-open path: a LogQuery error is logged but
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// never fails the HTTP response for a routine read query.
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type AuditLogger interface {
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LogQuery(ctx context.Context, entry QueryAuditEntry) error
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}
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type QueryAuditEntry struct {
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Query string
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Language string
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RowCount int
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Duration time.Duration
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Success bool
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Error string
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}
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type Handler struct {
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logger *slog.Logger
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sqlRunner executor.SQLRunner
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search executor.SearchClient
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queryTimeout time.Duration
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audit AuditLogger
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authorizer authz.Authorizer
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}
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// audit and authorizer may both be nil -- see AuditLogger's doc comment
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// and authz.RequireRoleOrService's nil-safety. /query allows RoleViewer
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// (human sessions) or the alerting service identity (RoleService) --
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// it's the one endpoint /alerting's evaluator legitimately calls, per
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// /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's alerting service-identity design.
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func NewHandler(logger *slog.Logger, sqlRunner executor.SQLRunner, search executor.SearchClient, queryTimeout time.Duration, audit AuditLogger, authorizer authz.Authorizer) *Handler {
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return &Handler{logger: logger, sqlRunner: sqlRunner, search: search, queryTimeout: queryTimeout, audit: audit, authorizer: authorizer}
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}
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// RegisterRoutes adds this handler's routes onto a shared mux. Phase 3
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// introduced a second handler package (dashboards), so CORS is
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// now applied once, by main.go, around the fully-assembled mux rather
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// than by each handler wrapping itself individually -- see
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// httpserver.WithCORS.
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func (h *Handler) RegisterRoutes(mux *http.ServeMux) {
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /query", authz.RequireRoleOrService(h.authorizer, authz.RoleViewer, h.handleQuery))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", h.handleHealthz)
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}
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func (h *Handler) handleHealthz(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}
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type queryRequest struct {
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Query string `json:"query"`
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// Language overrides auto-detection ("" / omitted). "sql" or "spl" --
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// see planner.Language and /docs/query-language-design.md's
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// "Detection" section for why this exists: the rare case a pipe
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// query legitimately starts with the literal word "select".
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Language string `json:"language"`
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}
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type queryResponse struct {
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Columns []string `json:"columns"`
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Rows [][]any `json:"rows"`
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}
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type errorResponse struct {
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Error string `json:"error"`
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}
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// maxBodyBytes caps the request body: a query string has no legitimate
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// reason to be larger than this.
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const maxBodyBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
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func (h *Handler) handleQuery(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBodyBytes)
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var req queryRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON body: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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if strings.TrimSpace(req.Query) == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "query must not be empty")
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return
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}
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lang := planner.Language(req.Language)
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if lang != planner.Auto && lang != planner.SQL && lang != planner.SPL {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, `language must be "sql", "spl", or omitted`)
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return
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}
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plan, err := planner.Compile(req.Query, lang, time.Now())
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
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return
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}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), h.queryTimeout)
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defer cancel()
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start := time.Now()
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result, err := executor.Execute(ctx, plan, h.sqlRunner, h.search)
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duration := time.Since(start)
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Error("query execution failed", "query", req.Query, "error", err)
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h.logAudit(r.Context(), req, 0, duration, err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "query failed: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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h.logAudit(r.Context(), req, len(result.Rows), duration, nil)
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writeJSON(w, queryResponse{Columns: result.Columns, Rows: result.Rows})
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}
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// logAudit is fail-open by design (see AuditLogger's doc comment): a
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// write failure here is logged and otherwise ignored, never surfaced to
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// the HTTP caller. Uses r.Context() (the original request context, not
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// the query-execution one with its own deadline) so a slow/cancelled
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// query's context.WithTimeout expiring doesn't also cancel the audit
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// write for it.
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func (h *Handler) logAudit(ctx context.Context, req queryRequest, rowCount int, duration time.Duration, execErr error) {
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if h.audit == nil {
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return
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}
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entry := QueryAuditEntry{
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Query: req.Query, Language: req.Language, RowCount: rowCount,
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Duration: duration, Success: execErr == nil,
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}
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if execErr != nil {
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entry.Error = execErr.Error()
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}
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if err := h.audit.LogQuery(ctx, entry); err != nil {
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h.logger.Error("audit log write failed", "error", err)
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}
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}
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func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, v any) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
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}
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func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(errorResponse{Error: msg})
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}
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