Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates (smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not silently left half-done. New pieces: - metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed, not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/ ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out. - enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/ -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all. - ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import, same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path. PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it. Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed: rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver (real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing token). Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate, separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be refused outright, so it must not default on just because enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml leaves it unset, same as ever. Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
deploy
Kubernetes deployment for Sentry, added in Phase 4 (/deploy was
deliberately stubbed through Phase 3 -- see /CLAUDE.md's Phase 3
non-goals). Two pieces:
operator/-- a small Go controller-runtime Operator managing one CRD (Tenant). Seeoperator/README.md.helm/sentry/-- a Helm chart covering everydocker-compose.ymlservice, plus the operator andTenantCRs whenenterprise.enabled=true. Seehelm/sentry/README.md.
What "multi-tenant-aware" means here, precisely
Per /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md, tenant isolation itself lives at
the application layer inside enterprise/ (enterprise-api holds a
map of per-tenant ClickHouse connection pools via internal/chrunner;
search holds a map of per-tenant Tantivy indices via
src/registry.rs) -- not at the Kubernetes layer. This directory is
not "one Deployment per tenant" or a general multi-cluster system;
that's an explicit Phase 4 non-goal (see /CLAUDE.md). What it does
add:
- A
TenantCRD + controller (operator/internal/controller) that reflects real provisioning state ontostatus.phase/aReadycondition, derived from whetherenterprise-api -provision-tenanthas reported real ClickHouse provisioning. - A Helm chart that can install zero-or-more
TenantCRs (values.tenants) alongside the rest of the stack, and swapsapi's Deployment forenterprise-api's wheneverenterprise.enabledis true, so which query binary actually serves traffic is no longer a separately-forgettable decision (seehelm/sentry/README.md's "apivsenterprise-api" section).
Now unified, in a deliberately lightweight way: enterprise-api -provision-tenant=<id> stays the sole real actor — it's the only thing
that calls ClickHouse (CREATE DATABASE/CREATE USER/GRANT, via
enterprise/internal/tenantprovision) and writes rbacstore. What
changed: once it succeeds, it also syncs the result into the Tenant
CRD (enterprise/internal/tenantcrd) — creating the Secret with real
credentials (the controller no longer generates a placeholder one that
authenticated against nothing) and setting the status fields the
controller reads to compute Phase/Ready. The controller itself
gained no new credentials and still never touches ClickHouse/Postgres --
it's a pure function of spec.suspended and whatever
-provision-tenant has reported, never an independent second guess at
"is this tenant really provisioned." A Tenant reaching
status.phase: Active now means the same thing rbacstore.tenants. status='active' does, not two different claims — see
enterprise/internal/tenantcrd's and operator/internal/controller/ tenant_controller.go's doc comments for the full split, and
enterprise-api -provision-tenant's TENANT_CRD_NAMESPACE env var
(set automatically by the Helm chart when tenantOperator.enabled) to
turn this on. Deliberately not built: the operator's reconcile loop
itself calling ClickHouse/rbacstore directly (a "full unification"
option considered and set aside — it would give the operator two new
credential sets and require real reconcile-loop idempotency design for
an inherently one-shot external side effect, a bigger and riskier
change than this repo's provisioning story needed to close the actual
gap, which was two disconnected sources of truth, not two actors).
Verification status -- read before trusting this against a real cluster
Not verified against a live Kubernetes cluster. This environment has
no kubectl/kind/minikube/kubebuilder/cluster reachable, so
nothing here has been kubectl apply'd or helm install'd for real.
Same disclosed-limitation shape as /agent/README.md's "Windows-specific
agent code remains unverified on real Windows" from Phase 1 -- a real gap
to close before shipping, not swept under the rug.
What was actually verified, offline, in this environment (network access was available to fetch these tools, but no cluster):
deploy/operator:go build/go vet/go test ./...all pass, including reconciler tests against controller-runtime's fake client (internal/controller/tenant_controller_test.go) -- real reconcile logic exercised, but not against a real apiserver (noenvtestbinaries available; see that test file's doc comment).enterprise/internal/tenantcrd(the "lightweight unification" half-provision-tenantruns):go testpasses againstk8s.io/client-go's fake dynamic and typed clientsets -- real client library, fake transport, same shape asenterprise/internal/ searchclient's in-process gRPC tests. What this doesn't prove: thatsentry.io/v1alpha1.Tenant's real CRD schema (a real apiserver's OpenAPI validation) accepts exactly what this package writes -- thehelm template/kubeconform check below covers the schema shape, not a live write against it.deploy/operator/config/crd/sentry.io_tenants.yaml: parsed withsigs.k8s.io/yaml+ strict-unmarshaled into the realk8s.io/apiextensions-apiserverCustomResourceDefinitionGo type -- catches YAML syntax errors and structural mistakes, not a live-cluster admission check.deploy/helm/sentry:helm lintpasses;helm templaterenders cleanly under both default values and aenterprise.enabled: true+ two-tenant override; the rendered output was checked withkubeconform -strictagainst the real Kubernetes 1.31 OpenAPI schema for every built-in resource kind (22-31 resources depending on values, 0 invalid) -- this catches schema mistakes (wrong field names, wrong types) but not whether the resources actually reconcile correctly together on a live cluster (Job/StatefulSet startup ordering, PVC provisioning, actual pod scheduling). Specifically confirmed by parsing the rendered YAML (not just eyeballing it): exactly oneDeployment/Servicenamedsentry-apirenders in each mode, with theenterprise.enabled: truerender using theenterprise-apiimage and the default render using plainapi's. Also confirmed for thetenantOperator.enabled: truecase:enterprise-apigets its own ServiceAccount/Role/RoleBinding (exactlytenants/tenants/status/secrets, no more),tenant-operator's own ClusterRole no longer grantssecretsat all, andTENANT_CRD_NAMESPACEis set onenterprise-api's container only whentenantOperator.enabledis true.- Docker image builds (
operator/Dockerfileand every otherDockerfilethis chart references) were not verified in this session -- Docker's daemon wasn't reachable here either (see the Phase 4 task 5 conversation for why). Build and push every image this chart'svalues.yamlreferences before installing it.
Before relying on this in production: kind create cluster, helm install with --include-crds, and walk through
helm/sentry/README.md's two-tenant example end to end.