Rollback was the one phase gating everything else: `run` without --dry-run refused because this tool could not undo a cutover it had committed to. That reason is now gone, and the refusal has narrowed to the fact that there is no real cutover to undo yet. internal/rollback implements ARCHITECTURE.md 4.8 as eight checkpointed steps under PhaseRollback: verify-backup, stop-service, preserve-failed-state, restore-data, restore-binary, restore-service-config, start-service, verify-rollback. Three things depart from what 4.8 specified, each for a reason: - The backup is re-verified against its manifest *before* the service is stopped, which the design didn't call out. Finding a corrupt backup is survivable while the failed instance is still up, and unsurvivable once its data directory has been moved aside. - BuildPlan is separate from Run, so every reason to refuse (closed rollback window, FoundationDB, no recorded backup, unknown deployment kind, missing database credentials) is found before anything is touched. The CLI prints that resolved plan and acts only with --yes. - The restore is re-verified against the same manifest after writing. A restore that put back truncated bytes and reported success would be worse than one that failed outright. Nothing from the failed attempt is deleted: the half-migrated data directory and the displaced binary are moved to .failed-<run-id> names, so a retry after the underlying issue is fixed still has both the evidence and the artifacts. Afterwards a reduced validation suite runs against the *restored* instance (version, reachability, directory counts) rather than assuming the restore worked. internal/service is a new package holding the systemd/Docker control this needs. It's separate rather than living inside internal/rollback because cutover will need the identical operations, and because the commands that can take mail delivery down belong in one auditable place - the same reasoning that makes stalwartapi the only thing speaking JMAP. preflight.DeploymentKind is now a type alias for service.Kind so detection and control can't drift apart. Its Active() reads `systemctl is-active`'s output rather than its exit status: systemctl exits non-zero for every non-active state, so exit-status logic would make "inactive" - the answer a rollback most needs - look like a failure to read the state at all. Also fixes a pre-existing bug in `status`: Go's flag package stops parsing at the first positional argument, so `status <run-id> --state-dir X` looked the run up in the default directory and reported it missing. `rollback` would have inherited the same footgun on a command whose flags decide what gets overwritten. Still open: `confirm` cannot set RollbackWindowClosed. Rollback honours the flag and refuses when it's set, but closing the window is the point of no return for the backups this restores from, so it should land with the retention policy 6 describes rather than before it. Verified end to end against a fake systemd deployment: half-migrated data restored to its original contents, failed state preserved, old binary reinstalled and reporting 0.15.5, unit restarted, and a re-run of the completed rollback inert.
5.5 KiB
stalwart-migrator
In-place upgrade tool for Stalwart Mail Server, 0.15.5 → latest: no data loss, a checkpoint at every step so a failure can be undone, and automated validation that the server still works afterwards.
Go, standard library only — no external dependencies.
Status
Partially implemented. Roughly 8,400 lines of tested code across backup, preflight, checkpointing, validation, recovery and rollback. What's missing now is the real cutover phase — the step that actually swaps the binary and switches the live service over.
| Command | State |
|---|---|
stalwart-migrate preflight |
Works — read-only checks and a migration plan |
stalwart-migrate run --dry-run |
Works — preflight, real backup, sandboxed trial conversion |
stalwart-migrate run |
Refuses on purpose — see below |
stalwart-migrate status <id> |
Works |
stalwart-migrate rollback <id> |
Works — prints its plan; acts only with --yes |
stalwart-migrate confirm <id> |
Not implemented |
stalwart-migrate report <id> |
Not implemented |
run without --dry-run deliberately refuses to proceed. Rollback and
service control now exist, so the reason has narrowed: what's still missing
is cutover itself (ARCHITECTURE.md §4.5) — installing the new binary,
rewriting the service definition, and starting the migrated instance for
real. run stops rather than going partway. That refusal is the correct
behaviour today, not a bug.
Rollback was built before cutover on purpose: this tool should never be able
to commit to a change it can't undo. stalwart-migrate rollback <run-id>
resolves what it would do from the run's own checkpoint, prints that plan,
and touches nothing without --yes.
Package state:
| Package | Lines | Tests |
|---|---|---|
internal/rollback |
1807 | yes |
internal/backup |
1805 | yes |
internal/preflight |
1329 | yes |
internal/validate |
792 | yes |
internal/stalwartapi |
716 | yes |
internal/recovery |
702 | yes |
internal/checkpoint |
559 | yes |
internal/service |
467 | yes |
internal/plan |
196 | yes |
internal/config |
stub | — |
Why not a shell script
Stalwart's 0.15 → 0.16 boundary is not a drop-in binary swap: settings move, and the data directory has to be migrated rather than merely copied. The failure mode that matters is a half-migrated mail store with no way back — which is why backup verification, checkpointing, and rollback are the design centre rather than conveniences bolted on afterwards.
ARCHITECTURE.md covers this in full: §1 on why a thin
wrapper is insufficient, §4 on the migration phases, §5 on the checkpoint
state machine, §6 on the CLI surface, and §8 on what is still open.
Build and test
go build ./...
go test ./...
Requires Go 1.26 or newer.
Trying it safely
preflight is the sensible starting point — its checks against the Stalwart
installation are read-only:
sudo go run ./cmd/stalwart-migrate preflight
It still needs write access, because it records the run as a checkpoint before doing anything else:
create run: checkpoint: create run directory:
mkdir /var/lib/stalwart-migrator: permission denied
That path is checkpoint.DefaultBaseDir, a compile-time constant with no
flag or environment override — so preflight needs either root or a
pre-created writable /var/lib/stalwart-migrator. (run takes --work-dir
for its scratch space, but that is a different directory and does not move
the checkpoint store.)
run --dry-run performs a real backup, which touches the live data
directory — read the caveat the command prints before using it on anything
you care about. Where the plan crosses the 0.15/0.16 boundary it clones that
verified backup into a disposable sandbox and converts the copy, leaving the
original untouched.
Rolling back
rollback is the one command that stops a running mail server and
overwrites a live data directory, so it never acts on its own reading of the
situation without showing you that reading first:
stalwart-migrate rollback <run-id> # prints the plan, touches nothing
stalwart-migrate rollback <run-id> --yes # performs it
Everything in the plan — which backup, which manifest, which preserved binary — comes from that run's own checkpoint, so rolling back days later doesn't depend on remembering any of it. What the checkpoint deliberately doesn't store (database credentials for an external SQL backend) is what the flags are for.
The order matters and is not negotiable: the backup is re-verified against
its manifest before the service is stopped, because a corrupt backup is
survivable while the failed instance is still up and unsurvivable once its
data directory has been moved aside. Nothing from the failed attempt is
deleted — the half-migrated data directory and the displaced binary are
moved to .failed-<run-id> names. Afterwards a reduced validation suite runs
against the restored instance (version, reachability, directory counts)
rather than assuming the restore worked; pass --admin-url to get the last
two, which are skipped without it.
Every step is checkpointed, so a rollback interrupted partway — which is exactly when a machine is most likely to be rebooted out from under it — resumes where it stopped instead of restarting a destructive sequence from the top. Re-running a completed rollback is inert.
FoundationDB installs are refused rather than attempted: the backup phase
only starts an fdbbackup job, and restoring one needs fdbrestore
against a quiesced cluster.