Files
stalwart-migrator/README.md
T
jcoffey-dev ade9906275 Implement internal/rollback and the service control it needs
Rollback was the one phase gating everything else: `run` without --dry-run
refused because this tool could not undo a cutover it had committed to.
That reason is now gone, and the refusal has narrowed to the fact that
there is no real cutover to undo yet.

internal/rollback implements ARCHITECTURE.md 4.8 as eight checkpointed
steps under PhaseRollback: verify-backup, stop-service,
preserve-failed-state, restore-data, restore-binary,
restore-service-config, start-service, verify-rollback.

Three things depart from what 4.8 specified, each for a reason:

- The backup is re-verified against its manifest *before* the service is
  stopped, which the design didn't call out. Finding a corrupt backup is
  survivable while the failed instance is still up, and unsurvivable once
  its data directory has been moved aside.
- BuildPlan is separate from Run, so every reason to refuse (closed
  rollback window, FoundationDB, no recorded backup, unknown deployment
  kind, missing database credentials) is found before anything is touched.
  The CLI prints that resolved plan and acts only with --yes.
- The restore is re-verified against the same manifest after writing. A
  restore that put back truncated bytes and reported success would be
  worse than one that failed outright.

Nothing from the failed attempt is deleted: the half-migrated data
directory and the displaced binary are moved to .failed-<run-id> names, so
a retry after the underlying issue is fixed still has both the evidence and
the artifacts. Afterwards a reduced validation suite runs against the
*restored* instance (version, reachability, directory counts) rather than
assuming the restore worked.

internal/service is a new package holding the systemd/Docker control this
needs. It's separate rather than living inside internal/rollback because
cutover will need the identical operations, and because the commands that
can take mail delivery down belong in one auditable place - the same
reasoning that makes stalwartapi the only thing speaking JMAP.
preflight.DeploymentKind is now a type alias for service.Kind so detection
and control can't drift apart. Its Active() reads `systemctl is-active`'s
output rather than its exit status: systemctl exits non-zero for every
non-active state, so exit-status logic would make "inactive" - the answer a
rollback most needs - look like a failure to read the state at all.

Also fixes a pre-existing bug in `status`: Go's flag package stops parsing
at the first positional argument, so `status <run-id> --state-dir X` looked
the run up in the default directory and reported it missing. `rollback`
would have inherited the same footgun on a command whose flags decide what
gets overwritten.

Still open: `confirm` cannot set RollbackWindowClosed. Rollback honours the
flag and refuses when it's set, but closing the window is the point of no
return for the backups this restores from, so it should land with the
retention policy 6 describes rather than before it.

Verified end to end against a fake systemd deployment: half-migrated data
restored to its original contents, failed state preserved, old binary
reinstalled and reporting 0.15.5, unit restarted, and a re-run of the
completed rollback inert.
2026-08-23 15:54:48 -07:00

5.5 KiB

stalwart-migrator

In-place upgrade tool for Stalwart Mail Server, 0.15.5 → latest: no data loss, a checkpoint at every step so a failure can be undone, and automated validation that the server still works afterwards.

Go, standard library only — no external dependencies.

Status

Partially implemented. Roughly 8,400 lines of tested code across backup, preflight, checkpointing, validation, recovery and rollback. What's missing now is the real cutover phase — the step that actually swaps the binary and switches the live service over.

Command State
stalwart-migrate preflight Works — read-only checks and a migration plan
stalwart-migrate run --dry-run Works — preflight, real backup, sandboxed trial conversion
stalwart-migrate run Refuses on purpose — see below
stalwart-migrate status <id> Works
stalwart-migrate rollback <id> Works — prints its plan; acts only with --yes
stalwart-migrate confirm <id> Not implemented
stalwart-migrate report <id> Not implemented

run without --dry-run deliberately refuses to proceed. Rollback and service control now exist, so the reason has narrowed: what's still missing is cutover itself (ARCHITECTURE.md §4.5) — installing the new binary, rewriting the service definition, and starting the migrated instance for real. run stops rather than going partway. That refusal is the correct behaviour today, not a bug.

Rollback was built before cutover on purpose: this tool should never be able to commit to a change it can't undo. stalwart-migrate rollback <run-id> resolves what it would do from the run's own checkpoint, prints that plan, and touches nothing without --yes.

Package state:

Package Lines Tests
internal/rollback 1807 yes
internal/backup 1805 yes
internal/preflight 1329 yes
internal/validate 792 yes
internal/stalwartapi 716 yes
internal/recovery 702 yes
internal/checkpoint 559 yes
internal/service 467 yes
internal/plan 196 yes
internal/config stub

Why not a shell script

Stalwart's 0.15 → 0.16 boundary is not a drop-in binary swap: settings move, and the data directory has to be migrated rather than merely copied. The failure mode that matters is a half-migrated mail store with no way back — which is why backup verification, checkpointing, and rollback are the design centre rather than conveniences bolted on afterwards.

ARCHITECTURE.md covers this in full: §1 on why a thin wrapper is insufficient, §4 on the migration phases, §5 on the checkpoint state machine, §6 on the CLI surface, and §8 on what is still open.

Build and test

go build ./...
go test ./...

Requires Go 1.26 or newer.

Trying it safely

preflight is the sensible starting point — its checks against the Stalwart installation are read-only:

sudo go run ./cmd/stalwart-migrate preflight

It still needs write access, because it records the run as a checkpoint before doing anything else:

create run: checkpoint: create run directory:
mkdir /var/lib/stalwart-migrator: permission denied

That path is checkpoint.DefaultBaseDir, a compile-time constant with no flag or environment override — so preflight needs either root or a pre-created writable /var/lib/stalwart-migrator. (run takes --work-dir for its scratch space, but that is a different directory and does not move the checkpoint store.)

run --dry-run performs a real backup, which touches the live data directory — read the caveat the command prints before using it on anything you care about. Where the plan crosses the 0.15/0.16 boundary it clones that verified backup into a disposable sandbox and converts the copy, leaving the original untouched.

Rolling back

rollback is the one command that stops a running mail server and overwrites a live data directory, so it never acts on its own reading of the situation without showing you that reading first:

stalwart-migrate rollback <run-id>          # prints the plan, touches nothing
stalwart-migrate rollback <run-id> --yes    # performs it

Everything in the plan — which backup, which manifest, which preserved binary — comes from that run's own checkpoint, so rolling back days later doesn't depend on remembering any of it. What the checkpoint deliberately doesn't store (database credentials for an external SQL backend) is what the flags are for.

The order matters and is not negotiable: the backup is re-verified against its manifest before the service is stopped, because a corrupt backup is survivable while the failed instance is still up and unsurvivable once its data directory has been moved aside. Nothing from the failed attempt is deleted — the half-migrated data directory and the displaced binary are moved to .failed-<run-id> names. Afterwards a reduced validation suite runs against the restored instance (version, reachability, directory counts) rather than assuming the restore worked; pass --admin-url to get the last two, which are skipped without it.

Every step is checkpointed, so a rollback interrupted partway — which is exactly when a machine is most likely to be rebooted out from under it — resumes where it stopped instead of restarting a destructive sequence from the top. Re-running a completed rollback is inert.

FoundationDB installs are refused rather than attempted: the backup phase only starts an fdbbackup job, and restoring one needs fdbrestore against a quiesced cluster.