Fix two defects a production-clone dress rehearsal exposed

Streamed a clone of a production store into the smoke VM - 3.6 GB, 12,361
settings, 6 accounts across 9 domains - and migrated it 0.15.5 -> 0.16.14
with the tool's own phases. The migration succeeded. Two defects surfaced
that no smaller instance could have shown, plus one finding worth recording.

1. Account roles broke on production-shaped names. v0.16 stores an account
   as a local part plus a domain reference: a v0.15 account named
   "[email protected]" becomes name "john" with a domainId. The generator
   passed the full address and the server rejected it outright ("Invalid
   email local part"), failing the apply. The smoke instance used bare
   usernames - alice, bob - and never exercised this.

   Fixed to use the local part. And because local parts are unique only
   within a domain - [email protected] and [email protected] both become
   "postmaster" - an ambiguous one is now refused with a warning rather
   than risking an upsert that grants Admin to the wrong account. Verified
   on the clone: the one admin came out with roles {"@type": "Admin"} and
   the other five accounts untouched.

2. Cutover's health check conflated liveness with credentials. A config
   fallback-admin does not survive the migration - v0.16's config is a
   store pointer, so the old [authentication.fallback-admin] block simply
   ceases to exist - so the credentials supplied for the pre-migration
   instance came back 401 on the migrated one, and the check reported the
   service as never having answered. It had answered; it was up and serving
   on all ten ports. Liveness and credentials are now separate: any
   response proves the service is up, and credentials that stopped working
   are a warning that names this cause.

Also recorded: a failed apply leaves the store in bootstrap mode, where
only Bootstrap objects are accessible. A half-applied plan is not a
partially configured server but an unusable one.

Timing, which is the other reason to rehearse: the recovery-mode conversion
of that 3.6 GB store took 2 seconds. A migration window is dominated by
waiting and verification, not data volume.

No production data in this commit; fixtures use example.net and the shapes
involved.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-23 22:32:17 -07:00
parent 0d83283caa
commit 2ca9522f9a
6 changed files with 245 additions and 21 deletions
+69 -14
View File
@@ -32,11 +32,27 @@ import (
// own "@type" as well.
func AccountRoleOperations(principals []backup.Principal) (ops []Operation, covered []string, warnings []string, err error) {
type change struct {
name string
variant string
localPart string
domain string
variant string
source string
}
var changes []change
// v0.16 stores an account as a local part plus a domain reference, not
// as the full address v0.15 uses for its principal name: a v0.15
// account named "[email protected]" becomes name "john" with a domainId.
// Passing the full address is rejected outright ("Invalid email local
// part"), which is how this was found - on a production clone, where
// accounts are named by address. The smoke instance used bare names and
// never exercised it.
localPartCount := map[string]int{}
for _, p := range principals {
if strings.EqualFold(p.Type, "individual") {
localPartCount[localPart(p)]++
}
}
for _, p := range principals {
if !strings.EqualFold(p.Type, "individual") {
continue // domains and groups don't carry these roles
@@ -50,30 +66,69 @@ func AccountRoleOperations(principals []backup.Principal) (ops []Operation, cove
// touch every account to no effect.
continue
}
changes = append(changes, change{name: p.Name, variant: variant})
local := localPart(p)
// Local parts are unique only within a domain, so an upsert matched
// on name alone could land on a different account that happens to
// share it - [email protected] and [email protected] both become
// "postmaster". Granting Admin to the wrong account is worse than
// granting it to none, so an ambiguous name is refused and
// reported rather than guessed at.
if localPartCount[local] > 1 {
warnings = append(warnings, fmt.Sprintf(
"account %q: %d accounts share the local part %q, so this role cannot be restored unambiguously - grant it by hand after migrating",
p.Name, localPartCount[local], local))
continue
}
changes = append(changes, change{localPart: local, domain: domainOf(p), variant: variant, source: p.Name})
}
sort.Slice(changes, func(i, j int) bool { return changes[i].name < changes[j].name })
sort.Slice(changes, func(i, j int) bool { return changes[i].localPart < changes[j].localPart })
for _, c := range changes {
value := map[string]any{
// Account is a multi-variant object: without its own @type the
// upsert is rejected outright.
"@type": "User",
"name": c.localPart,
"roles": map[string]any{"@type": c.variant},
}
ops = append(ops, Operation{
Type: "upsert",
Object: "Account",
MatchOn: []string{"name"},
Value: map[string]map[string]any{
"role-" + c.name: {
// Account is a multi-variant object: without its own
// @type the upsert is rejected outright.
"@type": "User",
"name": c.name,
"roles": map[string]any{"@type": c.variant},
},
},
Value: map[string]map[string]any{"role-" + c.localPart: value},
})
covered = append(covered, "principal:"+c.name+":roles")
covered = append(covered, "principal:"+c.source+":roles")
}
return ops, covered, warnings, nil
}
// localPart is the account name v0.16 will hold: the part before "@" when
// the v0.15 principal is named by address, otherwise the name as-is.
func localPart(p backup.Principal) string {
name := p.Name
if name == "" && len(p.Emails) > 0 {
name = p.Emails[0]
}
if at := strings.Index(name, "@"); at > 0 {
return name[:at]
}
return name
}
// domainOf reports the domain an account belongs to, for messages.
func domainOf(p backup.Principal) string {
name := p.Name
if at := strings.Index(name, "@"); at > 0 && at+1 < len(name) {
return name[at+1:]
}
if len(p.Emails) > 0 {
if at := strings.Index(p.Emails[0], "@"); at > 0 && at+1 < len(p.Emails[0]) {
return p.Emails[0][at+1:]
}
}
return ""
}
// roleVariant maps a v0.15 role list onto v0.16's x:UserRoles variant.
//
// v0.15 carries a list of role names; v0.16 carries one variant. Where an
+50
View File
@@ -111,3 +111,53 @@ func TestAccountRolesReportsRolesItCannotMap(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("warnings = %v, want the unmappable role named", warnings)
}
}
// Found by a dress rehearsal against a clone of production, where accounts
// are named by address. v0.16 stores an account as a local part plus a
// domain reference, and rejects a full address outright ("Invalid email
// local part"). The smoke instance used bare names and never exercised it.
func TestAccountRolesUsesTheLocalPartOfAnEmailStyleName(t *testing.T) {
ops, _, warnings, err := AccountRoleOperations([]backup.Principal{
{Type: "individual", Name: "[email protected]", Emails: []string{"[email protected]"}, Roles: []string{"admin"}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(ops) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("generated %d op(s), want 1", len(ops))
}
v := ops[0].Value["role-john"]
if v == nil {
t.Fatalf("operation not keyed by local part: %+v", ops[0].Value)
}
if v["name"] != "john" {
t.Errorf("name = %v, want the local part \"john\" - the full address is rejected by the server", v["name"])
}
if len(warnings) != 0 {
t.Errorf("unexpected warnings: %v", warnings)
}
}
// Local parts are unique only within a domain. Granting Admin to the wrong
// account is worse than granting it to none.
func TestAccountRolesRefusesAnAmbiguousLocalPart(t *testing.T) {
ops, covered, warnings, err := AccountRoleOperations([]backup.Principal{
{Type: "individual", Name: "[email protected]", Roles: []string{"admin"}},
{Type: "individual", Name: "[email protected]", Roles: []string{"user"}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(ops) != 0 {
t.Errorf("generated %d op(s) for an ambiguous local part, want 0 - it could land on the wrong account", len(ops))
}
if len(covered) != 0 {
t.Errorf("covered = %v, want none", covered)
}
if len(warnings) != 1 || !strings.Contains(warnings[0], "share the local part") {
t.Errorf("warnings = %v, want one explaining the ambiguity", warnings)
}
if !strings.Contains(warnings[0], "by hand") {
t.Errorf("warning %q should tell the operator what to do instead", warnings[0])
}
}
+17 -1
View File
@@ -340,9 +340,25 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, store *checkpoint.Store, rs *checkpoint.RunState,
}, nil
}
client := newClient(opts)
if err := client.WaitForPing(ctx, healthTimeout); err != nil {
// Liveness first, and on its own. Any response - 401 included -
// proves the service is up and routing.
if err := client.WaitForResponse(ctx, healthTimeout); err != nil {
return checkpoint.StepOutcome{}, fmt.Errorf("the migrated service started but never answered at %s within %s: %w", opts.AdminURL, healthTimeout, err)
}
// Credentials are a separate question, and failing them is not a
// failed cutover. A config fallback-admin does not survive into
// v0.16 - its config is just a store pointer, so the old
// [authentication.fallback-admin] block is gone - so the
// credentials that worked before the migration routinely stop
// working after it, on an instance that is otherwise fine.
if err := client.Ping(ctx); err != nil {
return checkpoint.StepOutcome{
Verdict: string(StatusWarn),
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("migrated instance is up and answering at %s, but these admin credentials no longer work: %v. "+
"If they were a config fallback-admin, that does not survive the migration - v0.16 keeps its config in the store. "+
"Authenticate as an account that exists in the directory instead", opts.AdminURL, err),
}, nil
}
return checkpoint.StepOutcome{Detail: fmt.Sprintf("migrated instance answered an authenticated JMAP session request at %s", opts.AdminURL)}, nil
}); err != nil {
return report, err
+34 -6
View File
@@ -231,16 +231,13 @@ func TestRunResumesWithoutRedoingCompletedSteps(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunFailsWhenTheMigratedServiceNeverAnswers(t *testing.T) {
store, rs, opts := migratedRun(t)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadGateway)
}))
defer srv.Close()
opts.AdminURL = srv.URL
// Nothing listening at all: a closed port, not an error response.
opts.AdminURL = "http://127.0.0.1:1"
opts.HealthTimeout = 300 * time.Millisecond
report, err := Run(context.Background(), store, rs, opts)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Run: want failure when the started service never answers, got nil")
t.Fatal("Run: want failure when nothing answers at all, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "never answered") {
t.Errorf("error %q should distinguish 'started but not answering' from 'failed to start'", err)
@@ -250,6 +247,37 @@ func TestRunFailsWhenTheMigratedServiceNeverAnswers(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// A 401 proves the service is up and routing. Treating it as unhealthy
// failed a cutover that had actually succeeded: the credentials supplied
// for the pre-migration instance were a config fallback-admin, which does
// not survive into v0.16.
func TestRunWarnsRatherThanFailsWhenCredentialsStopWorking(t *testing.T) {
store, rs, opts := migratedRun(t)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
}))
defer srv.Close()
opts.AdminURL = srv.URL
opts.HealthTimeout = 2 * time.Second
report, err := Run(context.Background(), store, rs, opts)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a service that is up but rejects these credentials is not a failed cutover: %v\n%s", err, report)
}
var warned bool
for _, res := range report.Results {
if res.Name == "wait-healthy" {
warned = res.Status == StatusWarn
if !strings.Contains(res.Detail, "fallback-admin") {
t.Errorf("warning %q should name the likely cause", res.Detail)
}
}
}
if !warned {
t.Errorf("wait-healthy should warn, not fail or pass silently:\n%s", report)
}
}
// Rolling back a migration that completed successfully, because a counter
// didn't get rebuilt, would be worse than a stale counter.
func TestRunWarnsRatherThanFailsWhenQuotaRecalculationFails(t *testing.T) {
+40
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"sort"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -287,3 +288,42 @@ func (c *Client) WaitForPing(ctx context.Context, timeout time.Duration) error {
}
}
}
// WaitForResponse polls until the instance answers an HTTP request at all,
// whatever the status, or timeout elapses.
//
// This is the liveness question, and it is deliberately separate from
// WaitForPing's "and my credentials work". A 401 proves the server is up,
// listening and routing - which is exactly what a caller waiting for a
// restarted service needs to know. Conflating the two failed a cutover
// that had in fact succeeded: the credentials supplied for the
// pre-migration instance were a config fallback-admin, which does not
// survive into v0.16 (its config is a store pointer, so the old
// [authentication.fallback-admin] block is simply gone), so every poll came
// back 401 and the phase reported the service as never having answered.
func (c *Client) WaitForResponse(ctx context.Context, timeout time.Duration) error {
url := strings.TrimRight(c.BaseURL, "/") + "/.well-known/jmap"
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
var lastErr error
for {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
req.SetBasicAuth(c.Username, c.Password)
resp, err := c.httpClient().Do(req)
if err == nil {
resp.Body.Close()
return nil
}
lastErr = err
if !time.Now().Before(deadline) {
return fmt.Errorf("stalwartapi: %s did not respond within %s: %w", url, timeout, lastErr)
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case <-time.After(500 * time.Millisecond):
}
}
}