Files
ihasmail/server/src/app.ts
T
jcoffey-dev 4a9c0c1c55 Make the AGPL's source offer point at the source being run
Three things a licence audit turned up. None of them is a conflict --
every one of the 182 installed packages is permissive, and the relicence
was within the copyright holder's gift -- but all three are ways the
AGPL fails to stick.

The offer was hard-coded to this repository. Section 13 asks whoever
runs a modified version to offer *that* version's source, so every
deployment with a patch in it was pointing at the wrong tree, and would
have gone on doing so unless its operator noticed and edited the About
page. SOURCE_URL now sets it, alongside APP_NAME, and both the sign-in
page and About read it.

The offer was also only visible after signing in. Whoever is looking at
the sign-in form is interacting with the program over a network too, so
the footer carries it now.

And the two workspace packages declared no licence at all. Private, so
npm never minded, but anything reading the tree saw a blank where the
rest of the project says AGPL-3.0-or-later.

Checked both ways round: with SOURCE_URL set to a fork, the sign-in page
and About both point at the fork; with it unset, both fall back to this
repository.
2026-08-25 13:42:11 -07:00

645 lines
24 KiB
TypeScript

import { Hono } from "hono";
import type { Context, MiddlewareHandler } from "hono";
import { getCookie, setCookie, deleteCookie } from "hono/cookie";
import { getConnInfo } from "@hono/node-server/conninfo";
import { config } from "./config.js";
import { SessionStore, type LiveSession } from "./sessions.js";
import { RateLimiter } from "./ratelimit.js";
import { resolveClientIp } from "./clientip.js";
import {
type AccountInfo,
UpstreamError,
absoluteUpstream,
expandTemplate,
fetchUpstreamSession,
forgetUpstreamSession,
getAccountInfo,
getUpstreamSession,
localizeSession,
} from "./upstream.js";
import {
AccountError,
assertEnrolmentCode,
beginOtpEnrolment,
changePassword,
createAppPassword,
disableOtp,
enableOtp,
forgetBackend,
getState,
revokeAppPassword,
} from "./account.js";
import { imageProxyHandler } from "./imageproxy.js";
import { staticHandler } from "./static.js";
type Env = { Variables: { session: LiveSession } };
export const sessions = new SessionStore(config.sessionFile);
const loginLimiter = new RateLimiter(config.loginRateLimit, 15 * 60_000);
/**
* Credential changes verify the current password upstream, and Stalwart's
* fail2ban counts those failures against the *caller's* IP — which for a proxy
* is shared by every user. Keep our own lid on it so one person guessing
* cannot get the whole deployment banned.
*/
const accountLimiter = new RateLimiter(10, 15 * 60_000);
const HOP_BY_HOP = new Set([
"connection",
"keep-alive",
"proxy-authenticate",
"proxy-authorization",
"te",
"trailer",
"transfer-encoding",
"upgrade",
"content-encoding",
"content-length",
]);
export function clientIp(c: Context): string {
let peer = "unknown";
try {
peer = getConnInfo(c).remote.address ?? "unknown";
} catch {
/* no socket information available */
}
return resolveClientIp(peer, { forwardedFor: c.req.header("x-forwarded-for"), realIp: c.req.header("x-real-ip") }, config);
}
function isSecureRequest(c: Context): boolean {
if (config.secureCookies === "1" || config.secureCookies === "true") return true;
if (config.secureCookies === "0" || config.secureCookies === "false") return false;
if (config.trustProxy) {
const proto = c.req.header("x-forwarded-proto");
if (proto) return proto.split(",")[0]!.trim() === "https";
}
return new URL(c.req.url).protocol === "https:";
}
/** Security headers for every response. */
const securityHeaders: MiddlewareHandler = async (c, next) => {
await next();
const h = c.res.headers;
h.set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
h.set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY");
h.set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer");
h.set("Permissions-Policy", "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()");
h.set("Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy", "same-origin");
if (!h.has("Cache-Control")) h.set("Cache-Control", "no-store");
if (isSecureRequest(c)) h.set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains");
};
/** CSRF: require our custom header on all API calls; reject cross-site fetches. */
const csrfGuard: MiddlewareHandler = async (c, next) => {
const site = c.req.header("sec-fetch-site");
if (site && site !== "same-origin" && site !== "none") {
return c.json({ error: "cross_site_request" }, 403);
}
if (c.req.method !== "GET" && c.req.method !== "HEAD") {
if (c.req.header("x-requested-with") !== "ihasmail") {
return c.json({ error: "missing_csrf_header" }, 403);
}
}
await next();
};
const requireSession: MiddlewareHandler<Env> = async (c, next) => {
const cookie = getCookie(c, config.cookieName);
const session = sessions.resolve(cookie);
if (!session) {
return c.json({ error: "unauthenticated" }, 401);
}
c.set("session", session);
await next();
};
function setSessionCookie(c: Context, value: string, remember: boolean) {
setCookie(c, config.cookieName, value, {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: "Lax",
secure: isSecureRequest(c),
path: "/",
...(remember ? { maxAge: config.sessionRememberTtl } : {}),
});
}
function upstreamFailure(c: Context, err: unknown) {
if (err instanceof UpstreamError) {
return c.json({ error: err.status === 401 ? "invalid_credentials" : "upstream_error", message: err.message }, err.status as 401 | 502);
}
const name = (err as Error)?.name ?? "";
if (name === "TimeoutError" || name === "AbortError") {
return c.json({ error: "upstream_timeout", message: "The mail server did not respond in time" }, 504);
}
console.error("[ihasmail] upstream failure:", err);
return c.json({ error: "upstream_error", message: "Could not reach the mail server" }, 502);
}
export function createApp(): Hono<Env> {
const app = new Hono<Env>();
app.use("*", securityHeaders);
const api = new Hono<Env>();
api.use("*", csrfGuard);
api.get("/health", (c) => c.json({ ok: true, name: config.appName, version: "2.0.0" }));
api.get("/config", (c) =>
c.json({
appName: config.appName,
sourceUrl: config.sourceUrl,
imageProxy: config.imageProxy,
maxUploadBytes: config.maxUploadBytes,
}),
);
// ---------- Auth ----------
api.post("/auth/login", async (c) => {
const ip = clientIp(c);
let body: { username?: string; password?: string; totp?: string; remember?: boolean };
try {
body = await c.req.json();
} catch {
return c.json({ error: "bad_request" }, 400);
}
const username = (body.username ?? "").trim();
const password = body.password ?? "";
const totp = (body.totp ?? "").trim();
if (!username || !password) return c.json({ error: "missing_credentials" }, 400);
if (username.length > 320 || password.length > 1024) return c.json({ error: "bad_request" }, 400);
const limitKey = `${ip}|${username.toLowerCase()}`;
if (!loginLimiter.check(limitKey) || !loginLimiter.check(ip)) {
c.header("Retry-After", String(loginLimiter.retryAfterSeconds(limitKey)));
return c.json({ error: "rate_limited", message: "Too many login attempts. Please wait and try again." }, 429);
}
// Stalwart accepts TOTP codes appended to the password as "password$123456".
const effectivePassword = totp ? `${password}$${totp}` : password;
const authorization = `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${username}:${effectivePassword}`, "utf8").toString("base64")}`;
try {
const upstream = await fetchUpstreamSession(authorization);
loginLimiter.reset(limitKey);
const { cookie, session } = sessions.create({
username,
password: effectivePassword,
remember: Boolean(body.remember),
userAgent: c.req.header("user-agent") ?? "",
ip,
});
setSessionCookie(c, cookie, session.remember);
const info = await getAccountInfo(session.id, session.authorization, upstream);
return c.json(localizeSession(upstream, sessionExtras(session, info)));
} catch (err) {
return upstreamFailure(c, err);
}
});
api.get("/auth/session", requireSession, async (c) => {
const session = c.get("session");
try {
const upstream = await getUpstreamSession(session.id, session.authorization, c.req.query("refresh") === "1");
const info = await getAccountInfo(session.id, session.authorization, upstream);
return c.json(localizeSession(upstream, sessionExtras(session, info)));
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof UpstreamError && err.status === 401) {
sessions.destroy(session.id);
deleteCookie(c, config.cookieName, { path: "/" });
}
return upstreamFailure(c, err);
}
});
api.post("/auth/logout", async (c) => {
const cookie = getCookie(c, config.cookieName);
const session = sessions.resolve(cookie);
if (session) {
sessions.destroy(session.id);
forgetUpstreamSession(session.id);
}
deleteCookie(c, config.cookieName, { path: "/" });
return c.json({ ok: true });
});
api.get("/auth/sessions", requireSession, (c) => {
const session = c.get("session");
return c.json({ current: session.id, sessions: sessions.listForUser(session.username) });
});
api.post("/auth/sessions/revoke-others", requireSession, (c) => {
const session = c.get("session");
const n = sessions.destroyAllForUser(session.username, session.id);
return c.json({ revoked: n });
});
// ---------- Self-service credentials ----------
/**
* Password, app passwords and 2FA. These live on the server rather than in
* the browser because the pre-0.16 API is REST rather than JMAP (the browser
* only ever sees /api/jmap), and because changing a credential means
* re-sealing the session cookie that holds it.
*/
const accountCtx = async (c: Context<Env>) => {
const session = c.get("session");
const upstream = await getUpstreamSession(session.id, session.authorization);
return { authorization: session.authorization, session: upstream, username: session.username };
};
const accountFailure = (c: Context, err: unknown) => {
if (err instanceof AccountError) {
return c.json({ error: err.code, message: err.message }, err.status as 400);
}
return upstreamFailure(c, err);
};
/** Guard the endpoints that check a password against brute-forcing. */
const guarded = (c: Context<Env>): Response | null => {
const key = `account|${c.get("session").username.toLowerCase()}`;
if (accountLimiter.check(key)) return null;
c.header("Retry-After", String(accountLimiter.retryAfterSeconds(key)));
return c.json({ error: "rate_limited", message: "Too many attempts. Please wait and try again." }, 429);
};
api.get("/account/security", requireSession, async (c) => {
const session = c.get("session");
try {
return c.json(await getState(session.id, await accountCtx(c)));
} catch (err) {
return accountFailure(c, err);
}
});
api.post("/account/password", requireSession, async (c) => {
const limited = guarded(c);
if (limited) return limited;
const session = c.get("session");
const body = await readJson<{ current?: string; next?: string; otpCode?: string }>(c);
if (!body) return c.json({ error: "bad_request" }, 400);
const current = body.current ?? "";
const next = body.next ?? "";
if (!current || !next) return c.json({ error: "missing_fields", message: "Both passwords are required." }, 400);
if (next.length > 1024) return c.json({ error: "bad_request" }, 400);
if (next === current) {
return c.json({ error: "unchanged", message: "The new password matches the old one." }, 400);
}
try {
await changePassword(session.id, await accountCtx(c), { current, next, otpCode: body.otpCode?.trim() || undefined });
} catch (err) {
return accountFailure(c, err);
}
// The old password is now dead: re-seal this session with the new one and
// drop the others, whose sealed copies would fail on their next call.
const otpCode = body.otpCode?.trim();
sessions.reseal(getCookie(c, config.cookieName), otpCode ? `${next}$${otpCode}` : next);
forgetUpstreamSession(session.id);
const revoked = sessions.destroyAllForUser(session.username, session.id);
return c.json({ ok: true, revokedSessions: revoked });
});
api.get("/account/app-passwords", requireSession, async (c) => {
const session = c.get("session");
try {
const state = await getState(session.id, await accountCtx(c));
return c.json({ appPasswords: state.appPasswords, keyedByName: state.appPasswordsKeyedByName });
} catch (err) {
return accountFailure(c, err);
}
});
api.post("/account/app-passwords", requireSession, async (c) => {
const session = c.get("session");
const body = await readJson<{ description?: string }>(c);
if (!body) return c.json({ error: "bad_request" }, 400);
const description = (body.description ?? "").trim().slice(0, 120);
if (!description) return c.json({ error: "missing_fields", message: "Give the app password a name." }, 400);
try {
return c.json(await createAppPassword(session.id, await accountCtx(c), { description }));
} catch (err) {
return accountFailure(c, err);
}
});
api.post("/account/app-passwords/revoke", requireSession, async (c) => {
const session = c.get("session");
const body = await readJson<{ id?: string }>(c);
if (!body?.id) return c.json({ error: "bad_request" }, 400);
try {
await revokeAppPassword(session.id, await accountCtx(c), body.id);
return c.json({ ok: true });
} catch (err) {
return accountFailure(c, err);
}
});
api.post("/account/2fa/begin", requireSession, async (c) => {
try {
// Nothing is stored yet; the client hands the URL back to confirm.
return c.json(beginOtpEnrolment(await accountCtx(c)));
} catch (err) {
return accountFailure(c, err);
}
});
api.post("/account/2fa/enable", requireSession, async (c) => {
const limited = guarded(c);
if (limited) return limited;
const session = c.get("session");
const body = await readJson<{ url?: string; code?: string; current?: string }>(c);
if (!body?.url || !body.code || !body.current) return c.json({ error: "bad_request" }, 400);
const ctx = await accountCtx(c);
const code = body.code.trim();
/*
* Every proxied call re-authenticates with the stored password, and once
* 2FA is on the server wants a fresh TOTP code alongside it — which we
* cannot produce between requests. An app password authenticates without
* one, so the session moves onto a dedicated app password rather than
* being signed out the moment 2FA is switched on.
*
* Order matters: mint it while the current credential still works, since
* the moment 2FA is enabled this session can no longer authenticate at all.
*/
try {
assertEnrolmentCode(body.url, code);
} catch (err) {
return accountFailure(c, err);
}
let app: { id: string; secret: string } | null = null;
try {
app = await createAppPassword(session.id, ctx, { description: appPasswordName(c) });
} catch (err) {
// Out of app-password quota, say. 2FA is still worth having; the user
// just has to sign in again afterwards.
console.warn("[ihasmail] could not mint a session app password:", (err as Error).message);
}
try {
await enableOtp(session.id, ctx, { url: body.url, code, current: body.current });
} catch (err) {
if (app) {
// Don't leave a credential behind for a change that never happened.
await revokeAppPassword(session.id, ctx, app.id).catch(() => {});
}
return accountFailure(c, err);
}
let sessionKept = false;
if (app) {
sessionKept = sessions.reseal(getCookie(c, config.cookieName), app.secret);
if (sessionKept) forgetUpstreamSession(session.id);
}
// Other sessions still hold the bare password and will be refused.
const revoked = sessions.destroyAllForUser(session.username, session.id);
return c.json({ ok: true, sessionKept, revokedSessions: revoked });
});
api.post("/account/2fa/disable", requireSession, async (c) => {
const limited = guarded(c);
if (limited) return limited;
const session = c.get("session");
const body = await readJson<{ current?: string; code?: string }>(c);
if (!body?.current || !body.code) return c.json({ error: "bad_request" }, 400);
try {
await disableOtp(session.id, await accountCtx(c), { current: body.current, code: body.code.trim() });
} catch (err) {
return accountFailure(c, err);
}
// This session may be running on the app password minted when 2FA went on;
// the plain password works again now, so put it back.
sessions.reseal(getCookie(c, config.cookieName), body.current);
forgetUpstreamSession(session.id);
forgetBackend(session.id);
return c.json({ ok: true });
});
// ---------- JMAP API proxy ----------
api.post("/jmap", requireSession, async (c) => {
const session = c.get("session");
const ct = c.req.header("content-type") ?? "";
if (!ct.toLowerCase().startsWith("application/json")) {
return c.json({ error: "unsupported_media_type" }, 415);
}
try {
const upstream = await getUpstreamSession(session.id, session.authorization);
const res = await fetch(absoluteUpstream(upstream.apiUrl), {
method: "POST",
headers: {
authorization: session.authorization,
"content-type": "application/json",
accept: "application/json",
},
body: c.req.raw.body,
duplex: "half",
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(config.upstreamTimeout),
});
if (res.status === 401) {
sessions.destroy(session.id);
forgetUpstreamSession(session.id);
deleteCookie(c, config.cookieName, { path: "/" });
return c.json({ error: "unauthenticated" }, 401);
}
return passthrough(res);
} catch (err) {
return upstreamFailure(c, err);
}
});
// ---------- Blob upload ----------
api.post("/upload/:accountId", requireSession, async (c) => {
const session = c.get("session");
const accountId = c.req.param("accountId");
const len = Number(c.req.header("content-length") ?? "0");
if (len > config.maxUploadBytes) return c.json({ error: "too_large" }, 413);
// content-length is absent on a chunked request, so the header alone is a
// suggestion; count the bytes as they go past.
const body = c.req.raw.body ? c.req.raw.body.pipeThrough(byteCap(config.maxUploadBytes)) : null;
try {
const upstream = await getUpstreamSession(session.id, session.authorization);
const url = absoluteUpstream(expandTemplate(upstream.uploadUrl, { accountId }));
const res = await fetch(url, {
method: "POST",
headers: {
authorization: session.authorization,
"content-type": c.req.header("content-type") ?? "application/octet-stream",
accept: "application/json",
},
body,
duplex: "half",
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(Math.max(config.upstreamTimeout, 5 * 60_000)),
});
return passthrough(res);
} catch (err) {
return upstreamFailure(c, err);
}
});
// ---------- Blob download ----------
api.get("/blob/:accountId/:blobId/:name", requireSession, async (c) => {
const session = c.get("session");
const { accountId, blobId, name } = c.req.param();
const accept = c.req.query("accept") ?? "application/octet-stream";
const inline = c.req.query("inline") === "1";
try {
const upstream = await getUpstreamSession(session.id, session.authorization);
const url = absoluteUpstream(expandTemplate(upstream.downloadUrl, { accountId, blobId, name, type: accept }));
const res = await fetch(url, {
headers: { authorization: session.authorization },
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(Math.max(config.upstreamTimeout, 5 * 60_000)),
});
if (!res.ok) return c.json({ error: "not_found" }, res.status === 404 ? 404 : 502);
const headers = new Headers();
const type = sanitizeContentType(res.headers.get("content-type") ?? accept);
headers.set("Content-Type", type);
const cl = res.headers.get("content-length");
if (cl) headers.set("Content-Length", cl);
const safeInline = inline && isInlineSafe(type);
headers.set(
"Content-Disposition",
`${safeInline ? "inline" : "attachment"}; filename*=UTF-8''${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,
);
headers.set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
// Sandbox everything except the browser's built-in PDF viewer (which needs scripts to render).
if (!(safeInline && type === "application/pdf")) {
headers.set("Content-Security-Policy", "sandbox; default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src data:");
}
headers.set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=3600");
return new Response(res.body, { status: 200, headers });
} catch (err) {
return upstreamFailure(c, err);
}
});
// ---------- Push (Server-Sent Events) ----------
api.get("/events", requireSession, async (c) => {
const session = c.get("session");
const types = c.req.query("types") ?? "*";
const closeafter = c.req.query("closeafter") ?? "no";
const ping = c.req.query("ping") ?? "30";
try {
const upstream = await getUpstreamSession(session.id, session.authorization);
const url = absoluteUpstream(expandTemplate(upstream.eventSourceUrl, { types, closeafter, ping }));
const controller = new AbortController();
c.req.raw.signal.addEventListener("abort", () => controller.abort());
const res = await fetch(url, {
headers: { authorization: session.authorization, accept: "text/event-stream" },
signal: controller.signal,
});
if (!res.ok || !res.body) return c.json({ error: "upstream_error" }, 502);
const headers = new Headers({
"Content-Type": "text/event-stream",
"Cache-Control": "no-cache, no-transform",
Connection: "keep-alive",
"X-Accel-Buffering": "no",
});
return new Response(res.body, { status: 200, headers });
} catch (err) {
return upstreamFailure(c, err);
}
});
// ---------- Remote image privacy proxy ----------
api.get("/image", requireSession, imageProxyHandler);
api.notFound((c) => c.json({ error: "not_found" }, 404));
api.onError((err, c) => {
console.error("[ihasmail] api error:", err);
return c.json({ error: "internal_error" }, 500);
});
app.route("/api", api);
// ---------- Static SPA ----------
app.get("*", staticHandler(config.staticDir));
return app;
}
/** Fail a stream that runs past `max` bytes, whatever its headers claimed. */
function byteCap(max: number): TransformStream<Uint8Array, Uint8Array> {
let total = 0;
return new TransformStream<Uint8Array, Uint8Array>({
transform(chunk, controller) {
total += chunk.byteLength;
if (total > max) controller.error(new Error("upload too large"));
else controller.enqueue(chunk);
},
});
}
async function readJson<T>(c: Context): Promise<T | null> {
try {
return (await c.req.json()) as T;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** Name the app password after the browser it will live in. */
function appPasswordName(c: Context): string {
const ua = c.req.header("user-agent") ?? "";
const browser = /Firefox\//.test(ua) ? "Firefox" : /Edg\//.test(ua) ? "Edge" : /Chrome\//.test(ua) ? "Chrome" : /Safari\//.test(ua) ? "Safari" : "browser";
return `${config.appName} (${browser})`;
}
function sessionExtras(session: LiveSession, info: AccountInfo = { locale: null, generation: null, edition: null }) {
return {
ihasmail: {
appName: config.appName,
sourceUrl: config.sourceUrl,
imageProxy: config.imageProxy,
maxUploadBytes: config.maxUploadBytes,
sessionId: session.id,
loginName: session.username,
remember: session.remember,
/** Locale configured for the account in Stalwart's directory, if readable. */
userLocale: info.locale,
/** What the upstream server would tell us about itself. */
server: { generation: info.generation, edition: info.edition },
},
};
}
/**
* Headers worth relaying from the mail server. An allowlist rather than a
* denylist: everything else it might set — cookies, auth challenges, CORS
* grants — would be landing on *our* origin, where it means something else.
*/
const PASSTHROUGH_HEADERS = new Set(["content-type", "content-disposition", "content-language", "etag", "last-modified", "retry-after"]);
function passthrough(res: Response): Response {
const headers = new Headers();
res.headers.forEach((v, k) => {
if (PASSTHROUGH_HEADERS.has(k.toLowerCase())) headers.set(k, v);
});
if (!headers.has("content-type")) headers.set("content-type", "application/json");
headers.set("Cache-Control", "no-store");
return new Response(res.body, { status: res.status, headers });
}
function sanitizeContentType(ct: string): string {
const lower = ct.split(";")[0]!.trim().toLowerCase();
// Never let the browser render HTML/SVG/XML/JS served from the blob endpoint.
if (
lower === "text/html" ||
lower === "application/xhtml+xml" ||
lower === "image/svg+xml" ||
lower.includes("javascript") ||
lower === "text/xml" ||
lower === "application/xml"
) {
return "application/octet-stream";
}
if (lower.startsWith("text/")) return `${lower}; charset=utf-8`;
return lower || "application/octet-stream";
}
function isInlineSafe(type: string): boolean {
const t = type.split(";")[0]!.trim();
return (
(t.startsWith("image/") && t !== "image/svg+xml") ||
t.startsWith("video/") ||
t.startsWith("audio/") ||
t === "application/pdf" ||
t === "text/plain" ||
t === "text/calendar" ||
t === "text/vcard"
);
}