jcoffey-dev
4b5dae5879
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
49 lines
1.9 KiB
Go
49 lines
1.9 KiB
Go
package notifystore
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import "testing"
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// Uses literal IP addresses throughout, not real hostnames -- net.LookupIP
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// resolves a literal IP without a network round trip, so these tests stay
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// deterministic and fast in any environment, including one with no DNS/
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// network access.
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func TestValidateWebhookURLRejectsInternalAndMetadataAddresses(t *testing.T) {
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disallowed := []string{
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"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", // cloud instance metadata
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"http://127.0.0.1:8123/", // loopback -- e.g. ClickHouse
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"http://10.0.0.5:5432/", // RFC1918
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"http://172.17.0.2:9092/", // RFC1918 (default docker bridge range)
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"http://192.168.1.1/", // RFC1918
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"http://[::1]/", // IPv6 loopback
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"http://[fe80::1]/", // IPv6 link-local
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"http://[fc00::1]/", // IPv6 unique local (RFC4193)
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"http://0.0.0.0/", // unspecified
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}
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for _, u := range disallowed {
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if err := ValidateWebhookURL(u); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("ValidateWebhookURL(%q): want error, got nil", u)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestValidateWebhookURLAllowsPublicAddress(t *testing.T) {
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// A real-looking public IP literal, not a hostname needing DNS.
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if err := ValidateWebhookURL("https://8.8.8.8/webhook"); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("ValidateWebhookURL on a public IP: err = %v, want nil", err)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateWebhookURLRejectsBadScheme(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []string{"ftp://8.8.8.8/", "file:///etc/passwd", "not-a-url"}
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for _, u := range cases {
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if err := ValidateWebhookURL(u); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("ValidateWebhookURL(%q): want error, got nil", u)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestValidateWebhookURLRejectsEmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
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if err := ValidateWebhookURL("http:///path"); err == nil {
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t.Error("ValidateWebhookURL with no host: want error, got nil")
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}
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}
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