api/dashboards' handler previously enforced only tenant-baseline role
(RoleEditor+), so any Editor could edit/delete any dashboard in their
tenant -- the matrix's "(own/granted)" qualifier was explicitly named
as unbuilt in this handler's own doc comment. This closes that gap.
New core interface api/dashboards.PermissionStore (nil-safe, same "not
wired == no-op" shape as authz.Authorizer) resolves a per-resource
dashboard_permissions grant. canEditDashboard now requires the
identity be Admin/Owner, the dashboard's creator, or hold a grant of at
least Editor; canManageGrants is deliberately stricter (creator or
Admin/Owner only, never grant-derived access) so a user who can edit a
dashboard only because of a grant can't extend or re-grant that access
to themselves or others. Wired handlers: PUT/DELETE
/dashboards/{id}/permissions/{userId}, GET .../permissions.
Two real bugs found and fixed while wiring this up, before any of it
touched a live database:
- handleCreate/handleImport never stamped created_by from the
authenticated identity, so every dashboard was owned by "anonymous"
regardless of who made it -- the ownership check would have been
meaningless. Also fixed: ImportDashboard trusted the exported JSON's
created_by verbatim, so re-importing someone else's export would
leave the actual importer unable to edit their own copy.
- metadata/migrations/0024_create_dashboard_permissions.sql's CHECK
constraint diverged from /docs/phase-4-rbac-design.md's schema
(allowed role='admin', nullable granted_by). Reconciled via
0033_restrict_dashboard_permissions_role.sql: Admin/Owner already
have tenant-wide access so a resource-level "admin" grant is
meaningless, and every real grant now always has an attributable
granter.
enterprise/internal/rbacstore gets the storage side: raw CRUD
(dashboard_permissions.go) plus DashboardPermissions
(dashboards_adapter.go), an adapter implementing
api/dashboards.PermissionStore -- same pattern as audit.QueryAPILogger
over queryapi.AuditLogger. Wired into enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api
only; plain api/cmd/api passes nil (ownership/Admin checks still work
via the nil-permissions fallback, just without the "granted" bonus).
Verified: the full own/granted/admin/creator matrix, including the
granted-editor-cannot-manage-grants regression, passes against a fake
PermissionStore (api/dashboards/handler_test.go, all existing tests
also still pass unmodified in behavior). Real integration tests exist
in enterprise/internal/rbacstore/rbacstore_test.go (skip-gated on
RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR, same convention as every other
Postgres-backed piece this phase) but have not run against a live
database in this environment -- disclosed in threat-model.md,
phase-4-runbook.md, and enterprise/README.md alongside every other
piece carrying the same gap. Also fixed a stale path in
phase-4-runbook.md's dashboards-tenant-scoping section
(./internal/dashboards/... -> ./dashboards/..., stale since that
package moved out of api/internal/ earlier in this phase).
metadata
PostgreSQL schema and migration tooling for Sentry's control-plane
config: dashboards, alert rules, and everything else that isn't log data.
See /docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md and
/docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md for why this is a separate database
from /storage (ClickHouse) rather than new ClickHouse tables — short
version: dashboards and alert state need real row-level locking and
transactional read-modify-write, which ClickHouse's MergeTree family
doesn't provide.
Schema
Seven tables across three features, one shared database (sentry_metadata):
dashboards,dashboard_panels— owned by/api(api/internal/dashboards)notification_targets,alert_rules,alert_state,delivery_log— owned by/alertingaudit_log— owned byenterprise/internal/audit(Phase 4). Unlike every other table here, this one is not written through the sharedsentryrole/pool — see "Theaudit_writerrole" below.
"Owned" here is a documentation convention, not a technical boundary —
both services connect to the same Postgres instance/database, each with
its own hand-written SQL for the tables it's responsible for. Nothing is
shared across service internal/ trees for this, matching the existing
repo convention that only /proto is shared code (and even that isn't
shared logic, just generated bindings).
The audit_writer role: a second, more restricted credential
audit_log is append-only by design (see
/docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's audit-logging section) — a
compliance requirement, not just a convention, so it's backed by two
independent defenses, both verified against a live Postgres, not just
written:
- A dedicated
audit_writerPostgres role (migrations/0012-0014) with onlyINSERT/SELECTgrants onaudit_log— noUPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE, ever.enterprise/internal/audit.Storeconnects using this role's credentials via its ownpgxpool.Pool, never the sharedsentrypoolapi/alerting's other stores use — reusing the shared pool for audit writes would give audit_log's application-level credential the sameUPDATE/DELETEgrants every other metadata table has, silently defeating the whole point. - A
BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETEtrigger (migrations/0015-0016) that rejects the operation for any role, including the table owner (sentry) — confirmed live: evensentryneeds to explicitlyALTER TABLE audit_log DISABLE TRIGGER audit_log_immutable(a privileged, distinct-from-normal-access operation) before it can modify a row. This is redundant defense-in-depth independent of the grant, protecting against a future migration accidentally re-grantingUPDATEtoaudit_writer.
AUDIT_WRITER_PASSWORD (default audit-writer-dev-only, matching every
other dev-only credential in this repo) sets the role's password at
creation time via psql -v audit_writer_password=... substitution in
migrate.sh — not hardcoded in the migration SQL file itself. One
real gotcha found while building this: psql's :'var' substitution does
not apply inside a DO $$ ... $$ dollar-quoted block (by design, so
client-side substitution can't corrupt a function/procedure body) — the
role-creation migration is a plain CREATE ROLE, not wrapped in an
IF NOT EXISTS check, relying on schema_migrations tracking for
idempotency instead (the same pattern Phase 1's non-idempotent
ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN migration in /storage already used).
Migration tooling: mirrors /storage/migrate.sh, not a framework
Same reasoning as /storage/README.md: pulling in golang-migrate for
what's currently six CREATE TABLE statements is premature machinery.
migrate.sh applies migrations/*.sql in filename order over psql,
tracking what's applied in a schema_migrations table, one DDL object
per file (kept for repo-wide consistency of what a migration "version"
means, even though Postgres itself supports multi-statement transactions
unlike ClickHouse's HTTP interface).
Running
docker compose up -d # starts a standalone Postgres for local work
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only ./migrate.sh # applies migrations/*.sql
Environment variables migrate.sh reads (all optional except
POSTGRES_PASSWORD, matching the root docker-compose.yml's
metadata-postgres service):
| Var | Default |
|---|---|
POSTGRES_HOST |
localhost |
POSTGRES_PORT |
5432 |
POSTGRES_USER |
sentry |
POSTGRES_PASSWORD |
(empty — must be set) |
POSTGRES_DATABASE |
sentry_metadata |
AUDIT_WRITER_PASSWORD |
audit-writer-dev-only |
The database itself isn't created by migrate.sh — the postgres:16-alpine
image auto-creates POSTGRES_DB on first startup, unlike ClickHouse where
migrate.sh has to issue CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS itself.
There's also a Dockerfile (bash + the postgresql16-client package
baked in, migrations/ copied in at build time) used by the root-level
docker-compose.yml as a one-shot init service (metadata-migrate) —
no runtime package install, no host volume mount needed.
Adding a migration
Add migrations/000N_description.sql with the next sequential number and
a single DDL statement. migrate.sh picks it up automatically — no
registration step.