Files
cairnobs/cli/cmd/sentryctl/main.go
T
jcoffey-dev 3eb0f4c589 Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.

Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.

Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).
2026-08-13 22:16:59 -07:00

139 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

// Command sentryctl is Sentry's control CLI. Six subcommands now
// (ping, query, dashboards, alerts) clearly justify splitting dispatch
// across files -- see cli/README.md's "revisit once there's a real
// command tree" note -- while keeping the same hand-rolled switch on
// os.Args, no CLI framework, per that same README.
package main
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"strings"
"text/tabwriter"
)
const (
defaultAPIURL = "http://localhost:8080"
defaultAlertingURL = "http://localhost:8081"
)
func main() {
os.Exit(run(os.Args[1:], os.Stdout, os.Stderr))
}
func run(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
if len(args) == 0 {
usage(stderr)
return 1
}
switch args[0] {
case "ping":
return cmdPing(args[1:], stdout, stderr)
case "query":
return cmdQuery(args[1:], stdout, stderr)
case "dashboards":
return cmdDashboards(args[1:], stdout, stderr)
case "alerts":
return cmdAlerts(args[1:], stdout, stderr)
case "-h", "--help", "help":
usage(stdout)
return 0
default:
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "sentryctl: unknown command %q\n", args[0])
usage(stderr)
return 1
}
}
func usage(w io.Writer) {
fmt.Fprintln(w, `sentryctl: Sentry control CLI
Usage:
sentryctl ping [--api <url>]
sentryctl query "<query>" [--api <url>] [--language sql|spl] [--json]
sentryctl dashboards list|get <id>|apply <file> [--api <url>]
sentryctl alerts list|get <id>|apply <file> [--alerting-api <url>]
Commands:
ping Checks that the api service is reachable via GET /healthz.
query Runs a query (pipe syntax or SQL) against POST /query and
prints the result as a table, or as JSON with --json. Quote
the query in your shell -- pipe syntax uses "|", which your
shell will otherwise interpret itself.
dashboards list/get/apply against api's dashboard CRUD endpoints.
"apply <file>" imports a dashboard exported via the web
UI's Export JSON button or GET /dashboards/{id}/export --
the same JSON shape both places, Terraform-friendly.
alerts list/get/apply against alerting's rule CRUD endpoints.
"apply <file>" creates a rule from a JSON file with the
same shape POST /rules accepts.
--api defaults to $SENTRYCTL_API_URL, or `+defaultAPIURL+` if unset.
--alerting-api defaults to $SENTRYCTL_ALERTING_API_URL, or `+defaultAlertingURL+` if unset.
--language overrides auto-detection; omit it for the common case.
$SENTRYCTL_TOKEN, if set, is sent as "Authorization: Bearer <token>" on
every request -- required once a deployment configures enterprise-auth
(see /docs/phase-4-rbac-design.md). No flag equivalent, deliberately:
unlike --api, a credential shouldn't be typed where shell history or
`+"`ps`"+` output can capture it.`)
}
func resolveAPIURL(env func(string) string) string {
if v := env("SENTRYCTL_API_URL"); v != "" {
return v
}
return defaultAPIURL
}
func resolveAlertingURL(env func(string) string) string {
if v := env("SENTRYCTL_ALERTING_API_URL"); v != "" {
return v
}
return defaultAlertingURL
}
// resolveToken reads the RoleService/human bearer credential sentryctl
// presents to api/alerting once enterprise-auth enforcement is turned
// on (api/internal/authz.RequireRole*) -- empty by default, matching
// every other Phase 0-3 client's nil-authorizer no-op behavior.
func resolveToken(env func(string) string) string {
return env("SENTRYCTL_TOKEN")
}
type errorResponseBody struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
}
func printTable(w io.Writer, columns []string, rows [][]any) {
tw := tabwriter.NewWriter(w, 0, 4, 2, ' ', 0)
fmt.Fprintln(tw, strings.Join(columns, "\t"))
for _, row := range rows {
cells := make([]string, len(row))
for i, v := range row {
cells[i] = formatCell(v)
}
fmt.Fprintln(tw, strings.Join(cells, "\t"))
}
_ = tw.Flush()
fmt.Fprintf(w, "(%d row(s))\n", len(rows))
}
func formatCell(v any) string {
switch t := v.(type) {
case nil:
return ""
case map[string]any, []any:
b, err := json.Marshal(t)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Sprintf("%v", t)
}
return string(b)
default:
return fmt.Sprintf("%v", t)
}
}