Files
cairnobs/api
jcoffey-dev ba2276aa1a Phase 4: real Tantivy per-tenant isolation (search/src/registry.rs, enterprise/internal/searchclient)
Closes the last named "isolation mechanism" gap: search.proto gains a
tenant_id field on SearchRequest; search/src/registry.rs's IndexRegistry
resolves it to an on-demand-opened, per-tenant Tantivy index (empty
tenant_id keeps today's single default index, so this is purely
additive); enterprise/internal/searchclient sets that field from the
authenticated request identity in ctx, mirroring chrunner's exact
fail-closed "never a parameter" shape. Wired into enterprise-api in
place of the shared api/searchclient.

Unlike the ClickHouse pieces from the previous two commits, this one is
genuinely verified end to end in this environment: Tantivy is an
embedded library, not a networked service, so both the Rust index
registry (cargo test, cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings, both
clean) and the Go client (a real in-process gRPC server) could actually
run. registry.rs's tenant_index_is_isolated_from_default_and_other_tenants
seeds three real indices with the same term and confirms a tenant-scoped
search returns only that tenant's document -- item 3 of the isolation
design doc's verification plan, closed for real, not just written.

With both ClickHouse and Tantivy isolation now built, the single largest
remaining gap is no longer a missing mechanism: it's that nothing forces
or flags whether a deployment actually runs enterprise-api instead of
plain api, and that ingest itself has no tenant concept for either
storage engine (every record still lands in the one shared database/
index no matter what -- undesigned, not just unbuilt). Updated the
threat model, architecture doc, CLAUDE.md, and both READMEs accordingly.
2026-08-13 23:16:22 -07:00
..
2026-08-13 17:29:38 -07:00
2026-08-13 17:29:38 -07:00

api

Sentry's query API: a single POST /query endpoint accepting either the pipe syntax or raw SQL, compiled and routed across ClickHouse and Tantivy by internal/querylang. Replaces Phase 0/1's two separate placeholder endpoints (raw-SQL-only /query, free-text-only /search) — see /docs/query-language-design.md for the grammar, IR, and routing design, and /docs/query-language-reference.md for the user-facing syntax.

Why plain REST, not gRPC + REST gateway

CLAUDE.md pins the control plane to "Go, gRPC + REST gateway." This service is plain net/http instead — a deliberate simplification, not a change to the pinned stack. Wiring up a .proto service, google.api.http annotations, and protoc-gen-grpc-gateway codegen for one endpoint doesn't buy much at this size. api does speak gRPC internally — to /search — this simplification is about the public-facing surface only.

Endpoint

POST /query — body {"query": "...", "language": ""}, response {"columns": [...], "rows": [[...], ...]} or {"error": "..."}.

  • query is either pipe syntax (service=api | where status>=500 | stats count by host) or raw SQL (SELECT ...). Auto-detected by whether the query starts with SELECT (case-insensitive).
  • language optionally overrides detection: "sql" or "spl". Exists for the rare case a pipe query legitimately starts with the literal word "select" as a bare search term.
  • Both syntaxes compile to the same querylang/ir.Plan and execute through the same code path — see internal/querylang/executor for the four routing cases (pure ClickHouse; Tantivy prefilter + ClickHouse rows; Tantivy prefilter + ClickHouse aggregation; raw SQL passthrough).

GET /healthz — for docker-compose/k8s liveness checks.

No auth. Not scoped yet — don't expose this beyond a trusted dev/homelab network.

Configuration

Environment variables (see internal/config/config.go):

Var Default Purpose
HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR :8080
CLICKHOUSE_ADDR localhost:9000 Native protocol port
CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE / _USERNAME / _PASSWORD sentry / default / ``
SEARCH_GRPC_ADDR localhost:50052 Must match /search's GRPC_LISTEN_ADDR
QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS 30 Per-request timeout
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN * Wide open by default since there's no auth yet; tighten together

searchclient.Dial connects to /search over plain TCP, no TLS — same trust boundary as api's existing plain-TCP connection to ClickHouse. mTLS in this project is specifically the agent↔ingest edge boundary, not every internal hop.

Building & testing

go build ./...
go vet ./...
go test ./...
# from the repo root, not api/
docker build -f api/Dockerfile -t sentry-api .

Testing notes

internal/queryapi's HTTP handler depends on ClickHouse and /search only through the narrow interfaces querylang/executor defines (SQLRunner, SearchClient), so routing, compilation, JSON encoding, and error-status mapping are all unit-tested against fakes — no live ClickHouse or /search instance needed, and the real lexer/parser/ planner run unmocked in these tests, only the backends are faked. See internal/querylang's own package docs for how compilation and execution are tested independently of each other. executor.ChRunner (the reflection-based row scanning against ClickHouse's driver.Rows) and internal/searchclient's actual gRPC dial are not unit-tested — the former because faking driver.Rows fully would be significant test-only scaffolding the driver's own docs say isn't meant to be implemented by adopters; the latter because it's a thin wrapper with nothing but wiring to test. Both are exercised end-to-end via the docker-compose flow in /docs/phase-2-runbook.md.