RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
hack
Local developer tooling that isn't part of any shipped component — scripts
you run against your own machine/dev stack, not code that ends up in a
container image (except dev-certs' output, which mounts into the
ingest container).
Not one of the top-level directories in the original monorepo scaffold —
added because dev-only mTLS cert generation didn't have a natural home in
/deploy (real deployment manifests), /transport, or any other existing
component. /hack is the conventional name for this in a lot of larger Go
monorepos (Kubernetes among them).
dev-certs/— generates a throwaway CA + server/client cert pair for local mTLS between the agent and ingest. See/docs/phase-0-runbook.mdfor when to run it.windows-fixture/— sends synthetic Windows Event Log-shaped records directly toingest, bypassing the real Windows agent. Tests whether the pipeline handles Windows-shaped data; doesn't test the realEvtSubscribe/ETW integration, which needs actual Windows. See/docs/phase-1-runbook.md.