api/agents.ConfigOverride gains LogRetentionDays: a per-agent setting edited on the same remote-config page as extra_file_paths, but unlike every other field there it's central-policy metadata api/logretention reads, never something the agent process itself sees. Any change to it -- setting, raising, lowering, or clearing -- requires RoleOwner, not just RoleAdmin: the whole point of the field is a floor an admin can't move, so an admin able to freely edit it would defeat that. api/logretention now checks the largest LogRetentionDays configured across any agent (AgentRetentionStore, new) before every preview/delete: a non-owner's request is rejected with a clear 403 if it would reach into that protected window. An owner always bypasses it, matching "make the log retention override any attempts to delete logs by anyone other than owner role." Verified live end-to-end: owner sets a 90-day floor on an agent, admin is blocked deleting anything newer than that (both preview and delete), allowed beyond it, and owner bypasses it entirely -- confirmed against real ClickHouse data, not just the fake-backed unit tests. Also caught and fixed a real pre-existing latent bug while verifying in-browser: a type="number" Input's bind:value becomes an actual JS number once a user types into it (only the initial value is a string), which broke a bare .trim() call on the new field.
api
Sentry's query API: a single POST /query endpoint accepting either the
pipe syntax or raw SQL, compiled and routed across ClickHouse and Tantivy
by internal/querylang. Replaces Phase 0/1's two separate placeholder
endpoints (raw-SQL-only /query, free-text-only /search) — see
/docs/query-language-design.md for the grammar, IR, and routing design,
and /docs/query-language-reference.md for the user-facing syntax.
Why plain REST, not gRPC + REST gateway
CLAUDE.md pins the control plane to "Go, gRPC + REST gateway." This
service is plain net/http instead — a deliberate simplification, not a
change to the pinned stack. Wiring up a .proto service,
google.api.http annotations, and protoc-gen-grpc-gateway codegen for
one endpoint doesn't buy much at this size. api does speak gRPC
internally — to /search — this simplification is about the
public-facing surface only.
Endpoint
POST /query — body {"query": "...", "language": ""}, response
{"columns": [...], "rows": [[...], ...]} or {"error": "..."}.
queryis either pipe syntax (service=api | where status>=500 | stats count by host) or raw SQL (SELECT ...). Auto-detected by whether the query starts withSELECT(case-insensitive).languageoptionally overrides detection:"sql"or"spl". Exists for the rare case a pipe query legitimately starts with the literal word "select" as a bare search term.- Both syntaxes compile to the same
querylang/ir.Planand execute through the same code path — seeinternal/querylang/executorfor the four routing cases (pure ClickHouse; Tantivy prefilter + ClickHouse rows; Tantivy prefilter + ClickHouse aggregation; raw SQL passthrough).
GET /healthz — for docker-compose/k8s liveness checks.
No auth. Not scoped yet — don't expose this beyond a trusted dev/homelab network.
Configuration
Environment variables (see internal/config/config.go):
| Var | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR |
:8080 |
|
CLICKHOUSE_ADDR |
localhost:9000 |
Native protocol port |
CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE / _USERNAME / _PASSWORD |
sentry / default / `` |
|
SEARCH_GRPC_ADDR |
localhost:50052 |
Must match /search's GRPC_LISTEN_ADDR |
QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS |
30 |
Per-request timeout |
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN |
* |
Wide open by default since there's no auth yet; tighten together |
searchclient.Dial connects to /search over plain TCP, no TLS — same
trust boundary as api's existing plain-TCP connection to ClickHouse.
mTLS in this project is specifically the agent↔ingest edge boundary, not
every internal hop.
Building & testing
go build ./...
go vet ./...
go test ./...
# from the repo root, not api/
docker build -f api/Dockerfile -t sentry-api .
Testing notes
internal/queryapi's HTTP handler depends on ClickHouse and /search
only through the narrow interfaces querylang/executor defines
(SQLRunner, SearchClient), so routing, compilation, JSON encoding,
and error-status mapping are all unit-tested against fakes — no live
ClickHouse or /search instance needed, and the real lexer/parser/
planner run unmocked in these tests, only the backends are faked. See
internal/querylang's own package docs for how compilation and
execution are tested independently of each other. executor.ChRunner
(the reflection-based row scanning against ClickHouse's driver.Rows)
and internal/searchclient's actual gRPC dial are not unit-tested — the
former because faking driver.Rows fully would be significant
test-only scaffolding the driver's own docs say isn't meant to be
implemented by adopters; the latter because it's a thin wrapper with
nothing but wiring to test. Both are exercised end-to-end via the
docker-compose flow in /docs/phase-2-runbook.md.