cairnobs/docs/phase-4-runbook.md

Phase 4 runbook

Extends /docs/phase-0-runbook.md through /docs/phase-3-runbook.md with SSO plumbing, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, and a Kubernetes deployment path. Read those first.

Verification status — read this before the rest of this doc

Docker daemon access became available partway through this phase's work, and the rest of this runbook (§§1–10, 10a, 13, 14, most of §8) has now genuinely been run against a real docker-compose stack — real ClickHouse (clickhouse/clickhouse-server:24.8), real Postgres, real enterprise-auth/enterprise-api/enterprise-ingest containers, two real provisioned tenants (acme, globex). This closed every previously-disclosed "written but never run" gap for the ClickHouse side, and along the way found and fixed six real bugs no amount of Docker-free testing could have caught:

1. enterprise/Dockerfile used a context: enterprise build context too narrow for enterprise/go.mod's replace ../api directive once enterprise-auth started importing api/httpserver and (transitively) api/dashboards -- fixed to build from the repo root, matching enterprise-api/enterprise-ingest's Dockerfiles.
2. api/dashboards.Store.AddPanel/UpdatePanel didn't call validatePanel the way CreateDashboard's inline panel-creation path already did, so a panel added via those two methods could hit a viz_config NOT NULL constraint violation instead of getting the same default-empty-JSON treatment every other panel-creation path gets -- fixed by calling validatePanel in both.
3. enterprise/internal/rbacstore.SetDataSourceClickHouseCredentials let a malformed (non-UUID) id leak Postgres's raw 22P02 error past the store's ErrNotFound boundary instead of treating "can't possibly match a row" the same as "no such row" -- fixed by translating that specific Postgres error code to ErrNotFound.
4. enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api/main.go registered GET /healthz twice -- once explicitly, once already covered by queryapi.Handler.RegisterRoutes -- which panics net/http's ServeMux on startup. This meant enterprise-api could never actually start; every previous "built" claim for this binary had only ever been a successful go build, never a successful process start. Fixed by deleting the redundant registration.
5. ClickHouse's default admin user genuinely lacked CREATE USER privilege in docker-compose.yml -- the official image needs CLICKHOUSE_DEFAULT_ACCESS_MANAGEMENT=1 (not the more obvious-looking CLICKHOUSE_ACCESS_MANAGEMENT, confirmed by reading the image's own /entrypoint.sh after the wrong name silently did nothing), which this compose file never set. Every tenant-provisioning code path was correct Go that had simply never been able to authenticate its own admin connection strongly enough to run.
6. enterprise/internal/tenantprovision.ProvisionClickHouse relied on ClickHouse RBAC's assumed "default-deny for a freshly created user" for system.* access -- verified live to be false on ClickHouse 24.8: a fresh tenant user could read system.tables (though not, it turns out, system.query_log, which is genuinely access-checked). Fixed with an explicit REVOKE SELECT ON system.* FROM <user>, and TestProvisionedUserCannotReadSystemTables was corrected to check what each system table actually does under a proper revoke (hard deny for query_log, verified-empty for tables) instead of assuming both hard-deny identically. See /docs/security/threat-model.md's "Read this first" section for the full account.

What's still not verified, and why: §3a (OIDC), §3b (SAML), and §12 (tenant picker, both single- and multi-membership paths) are now all closed -- verified against a real Auth0 developer tenant acting as both an OIDC and a SAML IdP, full browser round trips, real session cookies authorizing correctly, including selecting between two real tenant memberships and getting back the right tenant/role each time (see §3a, §3b, and §12 below). That pass found and fixed two real bugs:

1. web/Dockerfile only declared ARG/ENV for VITE_API_BASE_URL, so docker-compose.yml's build args for VITE_ALERTING_API_BASE_URL/VITE_ENTERPRISE_AUTH_BASE_URL were silently dropped by Docker (an undeclared --build-arg is dropped, not an error) -- enterpriseAuthBase came out undefined in the built bundle, so the tenant-picker page threw "enterprise-auth is not configured" against a real running container even though docker-compose.yml looked correct.
2. enterprise/internal/loginhandler.go decided every cookie's Secure attribute from r.TLS != nil alone -- wrong for the deployment shape this handler actually runs in, since enterprise-auth never terminates TLS itself. Closing SAML's real-IdP gap required a genuine TLS-terminating proxy in front of it (SAML's request cookie is SameSite=None, which the cookie spec requires to be paired with Secure, and Chrome silently drops it otherwise), which is exactly what surfaced this: r.TLS was nil at the Go process even over a real HTTPS client connection, so the cookie came back non-Secure and Chrome dropped it, breaking the flow. Fixed with an isSecureRequest(r) helper that also honors X-Forwarded-Proto: https -- affects every cookie this handler sets, not just SAML's, so this would have hit any real reverse-proxied deployment, not just this test.

§7 and §11's live-cluster steps still need kind/kubectl, which aren't installed in this environment -- their offline-only checks (go build/go vet/go test, helm lint, helm template + parsing the rendered YAML) all pass and are documented as such below. That's the only remaining gap in this entire runbook that isn't already closed.

If you're reading this to decide whether Phase 4 is production-ready: closer than before, but not yet -- see /docs/security/threat-model.md's "Read this first" section for the current, precise state of every control, including the ones still gated on a real IdP or a real cluster.

1. Bring up the stack

docker compose build enterprise-auth api alerting web
docker compose up -d
docker compose ps

New service beyond Phase 3: enterprise-auth (port 8082) — see enterprise/README.md. Not wired into api/alerting's enforcement by default (docker-compose.yml's comment on why: no OIDC/SAML login flow exists yet, so turning on enforcement by default would break the web UI and sentryctl with no way to log in).

2. Confirm Phase 0-3 behavior is unchanged

Every existing single-tenant flow must still work exactly as before — this is the regression check for the nil-authorizer no-op design running through every piece of Phase 4 auth wiring:

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/query -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"stats count"}'
sentryctl dashboards list
curl -s http://localhost:8081/healthz

All three should behave exactly as in the Phase 3 runbook — no auth required, since ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL/API_SERVICE_TOKEN aren't set.

3. enterprise-auth: mint and validate a service token

curl -s http://localhost:8082/healthz && echo " <- OK"

TOKEN=$(docker compose run --rm enterprise-auth -mint-service-token=alerting)
echo "$TOKEN"

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8082/internal/authorize -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# expect: {"tenant_id":"","user_id":"","role":"service"}

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "invalid token -> %{http_code}\n" \
  -X POST http://localhost:8082/internal/authorize -H "Authorization: Bearer garbage"
# expect: 401

curl -s http://localhost:8082/auth/features
# expect: {"sso_configured":false,"oidc_enabled":false,"saml_enabled":false}
# (no OIDC_ISSUER_URL/SAML_IDP_METADATA_URL set in this compose file)

3a. enterprise-auth: human login via OIDC (now genuinely verified

against a real external IdP, not just a real fake one)

enterprise/internal/loginhandler's tests already prove the mechanism works end to end against a real fake IdP (go test ./internal/loginhandler/... -v from enterprise/, no Docker needed -- see enterprise/README.md). Closed for real in this pass: a free Auth0 developer tenant was created, wired into a local-only docker-compose.override.yml (never committed -- see .gitignore), and the full human login flow was driven through a real browser end to end: GET /auth/oidc/login redirected to Auth0's real hosted login page; the first attempt (before any tenant_memberships row existed) correctly failed closed with "this identity has no tenant membership" while still creating the users row via UpsertUserBySSO, exactly as designed; after -grant-membership-* granted that real Auth0 identity ([email protected]) an admin role on acme, a second login completed the full OAuth code exchange, consent screen, and redirect to web, landing a real sentry_session cookie; POST /internal/authorize with that cookie returned {"tenant_id":"acme","user_id":"...","role":"admin"} -- the exact membership granted, round-tripped through a real external IdP, not a stand-in. To reproduce, point docker-compose.yml's enterprise-auth service at a real OIDC IdP (a free Auth0/Okta developer tenant, or any IdP you control):

# Add to enterprise-auth's environment in docker-compose.yml (or a
# docker-compose.override.yml):
#   OIDC_ISSUER_URL: "https://your-tenant.example.com/"
#   OIDC_CLIENT_ID: "..."
#   OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET: "..."
#   OIDC_REDIRECT_URL: "http://localhost:8082/auth/oidc/callback"
# Register that same redirect URL with the IdP's application config.

docker compose up -d --build enterprise-auth
curl -s http://localhost:8082/auth/features
# expect: {"sso_configured":true,"oidc_enabled":true,"saml_enabled":false}

Before a login can succeed, the logging-in identity needs a tenant_memberships row. There's still no admin UI for this, but as of this runbook revision there's no manual SQL either -- enterprise-auth's -create-tenant/-grant-membership-* operator flags replace the old psql dance:

docker compose run --rm enterprise-auth -create-tenant=acme -display-name="Acme Corp"
# Log in once at http://localhost:8082/auth/oidc/login -- it'll fail
# with "no tenant membership" (403), but UpsertUserBySSO already created
# the users row by that point, which -grant-membership-user-email needs.
docker compose run --rm enterprise-auth \
  -grant-membership-tenant=acme -grant-membership-user-email=<the email you logged in with> -grant-membership-role=viewer

Then visit http://localhost:8082/auth/oidc/login again in a real browser, complete the IdP's login, and confirm you land on POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL (http://localhost:3000 by default) with a sentry_session cookie set. -create-tenant only touches rbacstore (control-plane/RBAC) -- it's independent of enterprise-api -provision-tenant's ClickHouse/Tantivy data-plane provisioning (§8), so a tenant created this way can log users in immediately but can't yet serve their queries until that's run too, the same "two separate operator actions" gap named in "Known gaps" below. -revoke-membership-*/-list-memberships-tenant/-transfer-owner-* cover revoking, listing, and reassigning ownership the same way -grant-membership-* covers granting (all offline operator flags, same shape as -create-tenant) -- dashboard_permissions grants (§5a) are the one thing here still only reachable via the HTTP endpoints directly, no operator flag, since sentryctl dashboards permissions list|grant|revoke already exists as that surface instead (§5a).

3b. enterprise-auth: human login via SAML (now genuinely verified

against a real external IdP, over real HTTPS)

enterprise/internal/loginhandler's SAML tests already prove the mechanism works end to end against a real fake SAML IdP (go test ./internal/loginhandler/... -run SAML -v from enterprise/, no Docker needed). Closed for real in this pass, using the same Auth0 developer tenant §3a used, via that app's SAML2 Web App addon (Auth0 acting as a real SAML IdP, not just OIDC). This is where SAML's SameSite=None request cookie (which the cookie spec requires to be paired with Secure) made the plain-HTTP setup this environment otherwise defaults to a hard blocker -- getting a real assertion back required standing up a genuine (self-signed, dev-only) TLS-terminating nginx proxy in front of enterprise-auth. Doing that surfaced a real, previously-undiscovered bug: every cookie loginhandler.go sets decided Secure from r.TLS != nil alone, which is wrong for the deployment shape this handler actually runs in -- enterprise-auth never terminates TLS itself, so in any real deployment (behind an ingress/load balancer, exactly what the proxy here stands in for) r.TLS is nil even over a genuinely HTTPS client connection. The Secure attribute was silently missing behind the proxy, and Chrome dropped the cookie outright -- fixed with a new isSecureRequest(r) helper that also honors X-Forwarded-Proto: https, with its own regression test (TestHandleSAMLLoginSetsSecureCookieBehindATLSProxy). This bug affects every cookie this handler sets, not just SAML's, and would have hit production the same way, so this generalizes well beyond closing this one section.

With that fixed, the full flow completed for real: login redirected to Auth0's real SAML SSO endpoint, Auth0 posted back a real signed assertion, enterprise/internal/saml validated it (audience, destination, signature) and extracted the email attribute, and the identity landed on the real /select-tenant page with both real tenant memberships, exactly like §12's OIDC walkthrough -- confirmed via POST /internal/authorize returning the selected tenant/role.

To try this yourself, point docker-compose.yml's enterprise-auth service at a real SAML IdP (many identity providers, including Auth0, offer a free developer/trial tenant with SAML app support):

# Add to enterprise-auth's environment in docker-compose.yml (or a
# docker-compose.override.yml):
#   SAML_ENTITY_ID: "https://<your-https-host>/saml/metadata"
#   SAML_ACS_URL: "https://<your-https-host>/auth/saml/acs"
#   SAML_IDP_METADATA_URL: "https://your-idp.example.com/metadata"
# Register SAML_ENTITY_ID (as "audience")/SAML_ACS_URL (as the
# "Application Callback URL") with the IdP's application config -- the
# IdP needs Sentry's ACS URL to know where to POST the assertion, and
# the two must actually agree or the SP-side validation fails with a
# generic "Authentication failed" (found the hard way -- crewjam/saml's
# error here doesn't distinguish audience mismatch from other causes).
# <your-https-host> must be real HTTPS, not plain HTTP -- see above.

docker compose up -d --build enterprise-auth
curl -s https://<your-https-host>/auth/features
# expect: {"sso_configured":true,"oidc_enabled":false,"saml_enabled":true}

Bootstrapping the first tenant_memberships row uses the same -create-tenant/-grant-membership-* flags as §3a (log in once, it fails with 403, grant the membership using the email you logged in with, log in again). Then visit /auth/saml/login on your HTTPS host in a real browser, complete the IdP's login, and confirm a sentry_session cookie lands after redirect to POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL.

4. Turn on RBAC enforcement and prove it actually blocks/allows

Without touching the main stack's api container (so step 2's baseline keeps working):

docker compose run --rm -d --name sentry-api-enforced -p 8090:8080 \
  -e ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL=http://enterprise-auth:8082 api

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "no auth -> %{http_code} (want 401)\n" \
  -X POST http://localhost:8090/query -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"stats count"}'
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "with service token -> %{http_code} (want 200)\n" \
  -X POST http://localhost:8090/query -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"stats count"}'

docker stop sentry-api-enforced

GET /dashboards on the same enforced instance should return 401 without a token — this section only demonstrates the service-token path (§3/§3a/§3b cover minting a real human session via OIDC or SAML); walking that session cookie through this same enforced instance to get a 200 is left as the natural next verification step once real Docker/K8s access exists, not yet done in this runbook.

5. Dashboards tenant scoping

This is the fix from Phase 4 task 7/8 (see /docs/security/threat-model.md) — every dashboards query is now scoped to the authenticated identity's tenant. Verify the real SQL, not just the fake-store unit tests:

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd)/api:/src -w /src \
  -e DASHBOARDS_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR=metadata-postgres:5432 \
  -e DASHBOARDS_TEST_POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./dashboards/... -run Integration -v

(Path fixed from an earlier ./internal/dashboards/... -- stale since dashboards moved from api/internal/dashboards to api/dashboards earlier in Phase 4, once enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api needed to import it: Go's compiler-enforced internal/ visibility rule meant a separate module like enterprise/ could never import anything under api/internal/..., regardless of the AGPL/commercial licensing boundary, which only forbids the reverse direction.)

Expect all TestIntegration* tests to pass, including TestIntegrationDashboardTenantForeignKeyRejectsUnknownTenant (the tenant_id foreign key added in metadata/migrations/0027_add_dashboards_tenant_fk.sql rejecting a dashboard for a tenant that doesn't exist).

5a. Per-resource dashboard grants (new -- built and unit-tested, not yet run live)

enterprise/internal/rbacstore's dashboard_permissions CRUD and its DashboardPermissions adapter (implementing api/dashboards. PermissionStore) have real integration tests, same skip-gated shape as §6 below:

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd):/src -w /src/enterprise \
  -e RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR=metadata-postgres:5432 \
  -e RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./internal/rbacstore/... -run DashboardPermission -v

(Mount the repo root, not just enterprise/, with -w /src/enterprise as the workdir -- same reason as enterprise/Dockerfile's doc comment: dashboards_adapter.go imports api/dashboards, and enterprise/go.mod's replace ../api directive needs that sibling directory actually present in the build context, not just the package being tested.)

Expect all TestDashboardPermission*/TestSetDashboardPermission*/ TestGetDashboardPermission*/TestRevokeDashboardPermission*/ TestListDashboardPermissions tests to pass. This only takes effect when enterprise-api (not plain api) is serving traffic -- see §8/§10.

6. enterprise/internal/rbacstore and internal/audit (already verified — reconfirm here)

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd):/src -w /src/enterprise \
  -e RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR=metadata-postgres:5432 \
  -e RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./internal/rbacstore/... -v

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd):/src -w /src/enterprise \
  -e AUDIT_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR=metadata-postgres:5432 \
  -e AUDIT_TEST_POSTGRES_PASSWORD=audit-writer-dev-only \
  -e AUDIT_TEST_ADMIN_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./internal/audit/... -v

(Same repo-root-mount reasoning as §5a above -- internal/rbacstore imports api/dashboards unconditionally via dashboards_adapter.go, so even running the whole package's tests, not just the DashboardPermission subset, needs api/ present. internal/audit has the same shape via queryapi_adapter.go.)

7. deploy: Helm chart and Operator (offline-only so far — see /deploy/README.md)

No live cluster was available to kubectl apply any of this. What can be checked without one:

cd deploy/operator && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...

cd ../helm/sentry
helm lint .
helm template sentry . --include-crds > /tmp/default.yaml
helm template sentry . --include-crds \
  --set enterprise.enabled=true --set tenantOperator.enabled=true \
  --set 'tenants[0].name=acme' --set 'tenants[0].displayName=Acme Corp' \
  --set 'tenants[1].name=globex' --set 'tenants[1].displayName=Globex Corporation' \
  > /tmp/multitenant.yaml

With a real cluster reachable (kind create cluster, or similar):

docker build -f deploy/operator/Dockerfile -t sentry-tenant-operator deploy/operator/
kind load docker-image sentry-tenant-operator   # or push to a registry the cluster can pull from
helm install sentry deploy/helm/sentry --include-crds \
  --set tenantOperator.enabled=true --set enterprise.enabled=true \
  --set 'tenants[0].name=acme' --set 'tenants[0].displayName=Acme Corp'
kubectl get tenants
kubectl get secret sentry-tenant-acme-clickhouse -o yaml

Expect kubectl get tenants to show acme reach status.phase: Active and the Secret to contain a generated username/password/database. This proves the K8s-side half of a real two-tenant deployment — it does not provision a working ClickHouse database itself (the Operator manages the K8s Secret only); §8 below is the piece that actually provisions ClickHouse.

8. enterprise-api: real per-tenant ClickHouse isolation

enterprise/internal/tenantprovision and enterprise/internal/chrunner close the ClickHouse half of the headline gap §"Known gaps" below used to describe as completely unbuilt. It's still a second binary you have to choose to run, though — see /docs/security/threat-model.md's "Read this first" section. With OIDC login now built (§3a), a real curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/query walkthrough as a logged-in tenant is possible now, but still needs the manual tenant_memberships bootstrap from §3a — a full end-to-end curl walkthrough isn't included here yet.

api/enterprise-api are now mutually exclusive via COMPOSE_PROFILES (checked in as single-tenant in .env, i.e. plain api runs by default) — see §10a below for why, and confirmation that it actually holds. -provision-tenant itself doesn't bind a port, so it runs fine regardless of the active profile; actually serving traffic on enterprise-api needs the enterprise profile active, since it now binds the same host port (8080) plain api does:

COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose build enterprise-api
COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose run --rm enterprise-api -provision-tenant=acme -display-name="Acme Corp"
COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose run --rm enterprise-api -provision-tenant=globex -display-name="Globex Corporation"
COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose up -d enterprise-api
curl -s http://localhost:8080/healthz

Confirm isolation end to end against the live stack (this is the same assertion enterprise/internal/chrunner/chrunner_test.go's TestRegistryTenantCannotReadOtherTenantEvenViaRawSQL makes, run here as an integration test instead of a curl walkthrough since a full login walkthrough isn't scripted yet):

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd)/enterprise:/src -w /src \
  -e CHRUNNER_TEST_CLICKHOUSE_ADDR=clickhouse:9000 \
  -e CHRUNNER_TEST_CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./internal/chrunner/... -v

docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd)/enterprise:/src -w /src \
  -e TENANTPROVISION_TEST_CLICKHOUSE_ADDR=clickhouse:9000 \
  -e TENANTPROVISION_TEST_CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
  golang:1.25-alpine go test ./internal/tenantprovision/... -v

Expect all tests to pass, including TestProvisionedUserCannotReadSystemTables (item 2 of /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan, closed this pass) and TestRegistryTenantCannotReadOtherTenantEvenViaRawSQL (item 1, closed through the actual production code path, not just tenantprovision's raw grants).

9. Tantivy per-tenant isolation — no Docker needed, actually run this one

Unlike everything above, this one doesn't need a live stack at all — Tantivy is an embedded library, not a networked service, so both halves (the Rust index registry and the Go client that talks to it) can be verified with nothing but a local toolchain:

cd search
cargo build
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test
# expect 24 tests passing, including
# registry::tests::tenant_index_is_isolated_from_default_and_other_tenants
# -- item 3 of /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan --
# and, since §14's write-routing pass, registry::tests::
# commit_all_commits_default_and_every_opened_tenant_index and the
# tenants:: module's real-TCP-server tests for ActiveTenantTracker
# (start_fetches_and_serves_the_initial_list,
# start_fails_closed_when_the_first_fetch_fails, etc. -- see §14).

cd ../enterprise
go test ./internal/searchclient/... -v
# real in-process gRPC server, confirms SearchRequest.tenant_id is set
# correctly, that a request with no/invalid tenant identity is refused,
# and (since TenantChecker was added to close verification-plan item 4)
# that a tenant which exists but isn't active yet -- e.g. right after
# enterprise-auth -create-tenant but before enterprise-api
# -provision-tenant -- is refused too, not silently searched against a
# freshly-created empty index.

go test ./internal/chrunner/... -run MidProvisioning -v
# the ClickHouse half of the same item-4 probe -- also Docker-free,
# since an empty DataSource list never dials out.

This is the one piece of Phase 4's tenant isolation work that has actually been run and confirmed passing in an environment without Docker access, alongside enterprise/internal/loginhandler's OIDC/SAML tests (§3a/§3b) — both are unusually strong evidence precisely because they needed no infrastructure this environment lacked. Writing the TenantChecker test here is also what found the Tantivy mid- provisioning gap in the first place, not just what closed it after the fact -- see api/queryapi/tenant_isolation_gap_test.go's item 4 for the full story.

10. Confirm the Helm chart actually enforces the binary swap

No live cluster needed for this either — helm template's output is plain YAML, parseable without a cluster:

cd deploy/helm/sentry
helm template sentry . --include-crds > /tmp/default.yaml
helm template sentry . --include-crds --set enterprise.enabled=true \
  --set 'tenants[0].name=acme' --set 'tenants[0].displayName=Acme Corp' \
  > /tmp/enterprise.yaml

python3 -c "
import yaml
for f in ['/tmp/default.yaml', '/tmp/enterprise.yaml']:
    docs = list(yaml.safe_load_all(open(f)))
    deploys = [d for d in docs if d and d.get('kind')=='Deployment' and d.get('metadata',{}).get('name')=='sentry-api']
    print(f, '->', [d['spec']['template']['spec']['containers'][0]['image'] for d in deploys])
"
# expect: default.yaml -> ['sentry-api:latest'], enterprise.yaml -> ['sentry-enterprise-api:latest']
# and exactly one Deployment named sentry-api in each file.

Real cluster (kind create cluster, or similar): helm install with each set of values and confirm kubectl get deploy sentry-api -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}' matches, and that kubectl get svc sentry-api routes to whichever one is actually running.

10a. Confirm docker-compose.yml now enforces the same binary swap

Local/dev parity with §10 above was a named gap ("docker-compose.yml still runs plain api unconditionally") -- closed via COMPOSE_PROFILES (api/enterprise-api are each gated behind a profile, .env checks in single-tenant as the zero-config default) plus the same "same host port, enterprise-api gets a default.aliases: [api] network alias" trick §10's Helm chart uses at the Service-name level. Verified in this environment via docker compose config (no daemon needed -- it renders and validates the merged YAML without starting anything):

docker compose config --quiet && echo "config is valid"

# exactly one of api/enterprise-api per profile, never both or neither:
docker compose config --services
# expect: ... api ... (no enterprise-api)
COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose config --services
# expect: ... enterprise-api ... (no api)

# enterprise-api really does take over api's name/port when active:
COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose config \
  | python3 -c "import yaml,sys,json; d=yaml.safe_load(sys.stdin)['services']['enterprise-api']; print(json.dumps({'ports': d['ports'], 'aliases': d['networks']['default']['aliases'], 'HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR': d['environment']['HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR']}, indent=2))"
# expect port 8080 (not enterprise-api's own default 8083), alias
# ["api"], and HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR ":8080"

docker compose run/build enterprise-api (§8's provisioning steps) work regardless of the active profile -- explicit service references on the command line bypass profile filtering, confirmed in this environment (the commands got past client-side profile resolution and failed only on permission denied ... docker.sock, this environment's already-disclosed no-Docker-daemon-access limitation, not a profile-related error). Not verified: an actual docker compose up against a real daemon in this environment — the config rendering above proves the compose file's shape is correct, not that containers actually start and route traffic correctly end to end.

11. Tenant CRD unified with -provision-tenant

deploy/helm/sentry/README.md's "Trying the two-tenant example" section has the full helm install → -provision-tenant → kubectl get tenants walkthrough. What was actually run in this environment (no live cluster, same limitation as §10):

cd enterprise && go test ./internal/tenantcrd/... -v
# real k8s.io/client-go fake dynamic + typed clientsets, no cluster
# needed -- proves Sync() creates/updates the Tenant object and Secret
# correctly, is idempotent, never overwrites a pre-existing
# spec.displayName, and never rotates a credential across a re-sync.

cd deploy/operator && go test ./... -v
# tenant_controller_test.go rewritten for the new split: proves an
# unprovisioned tenant reports Provisioning (not Active -- the
# regression test for the pre-unification bug where this controller
# claimed Active on its own say-so), that setting
# status.clickHouseDatabaseName (simulating what -provision-tenant
# writes) flips it to Active, and that un-suspending an
# already-provisioned tenant returns straight to Active rather than
# being demoted to Provisioning.

Helm-side wiring confirmed via helm template + parsing the rendered YAML (not eyeballing it): with tenantOperator.enabled=true, enterprise-api gets its own ServiceAccount/Role/RoleBinding scoped to exactly tenants/tenants/status/secrets, tenant-operator's own ClusterRole no longer grants secrets at all, and TENANT_CRD_NAMESPACE is only set on enterprise-api's container when tenantOperator.enabled is true (absent, and the ServiceAccount/Role absent too, with just enterprise.enabled=true). Not verified: an actual -provision-tenant run against a real cluster with the operator watching -- everything above proves each half's logic and the chart's shape independently, not the full loop (does the operator's watch actually re-trigger a reconcile after -provision-tenant's external status write the way controller- runtime's default predicate is expected to).

12. Tenant-picker, backend and frontend

Backend -- like §9, this needs nothing but a local Go toolchain -- the real fake-IdP tests already exercise the full login → pending-login cookie → GET /auth/memberships → POST /auth/select-tenant → real session round trip:

cd enterprise
go test ./internal/session/... -run PendingLogin -v
# real JWT signing/verification: issues a pending-login token, validates
# it, and proves the two negative regressions that matter most --
# a real session token must not validate as a pending login (they share
# a signing key but PendingLoginClaims uses a disjoint json field name,
# see that type's doc comment for the bug this caught in its own tests),
# and a pending-login token must not validate as a real session either.

go test ./internal/loginhandler/... -run 'Memberships|SelectTenant|MultipleMemberships' -v
# full round trip against the real fake OIDC/SAML IdPs: multi-membership
# login sets a pending cookie and redirects (not a 501 anymore), GET
# /auth/memberships lists the real tenant options with display names,
# POST /auth/select-tenant re-derives role server-side and refuses a
# tenant_id outside the identity's actual memberships.

Frontend -- web/src/routes/select-tenant (new), calling the endpoints above via fetch(..., {credentials: 'include'}) ($lib/api.ts's listMemberships/selectTenant), needed a CORS posture enterprise-auth didn't have: api/httpserver.WithCORS's wildcard-friendly default can't be combined with a credentialed request at all (browsers refuse it outright), so this needed a new WithCredentialedCORS (same package, literal-origin-only) wired in via a new CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN env var, defaulting to POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL (web's own origin). Type-checked and built for real:

cd web
npm run check   # svelte-check -- 0 errors
npm run build    # adapter-static -- confirms select-tenant.html is
                  # actually produced (it wasn't, at first: adapter-
                  # static only crawls routes reachable from a link or an
                  # explicit prerender entry, and nothing in the app
                  # links to this route since it's only ever reached via
                  # enterprise-auth's redirect -- fixed by adding
                  # select-tenant/+page.ts's `export const prerender =
                  # true`, the same declaration every other route here
                  # already has)

Genuinely verified in a real browser in this environment -- not just type-checked, the actual cross-origin fetch/CORS/cookie behavior, driven through mcp__claude-in-chrome:

1. A throwaway Node HTTP server (no dependencies) stood in for enterprise-auth, implementing the exact wire contract this section's Go tests already prove server-side: GET /auth/memberships and POST /auth/select-tenant, the sentry_pending_login cookie (Path=/auth), the credentialed CORS headers, and critically the plain-text http.Error response bodies the real handler sends on failure (not JSON -- enterpriseAuthRequest in $lib/api.ts reads res.text() specifically because of this, unlike every other request helper in that file).
2. npm run dev (SvelteKit dev server) pointed at that fake server via VITE_ENTERPRISE_AUTH_BASE_URL, both on localhost but different ports -- different origins, the same cross-origin shape a real deployment has.
3. The browser navigated to the fake server's /debug/start-pending- login (mimics loginhandler.startTenantSelection: sets the pending cookie, redirects to /select-tenant) -- confirmed the redirect landed on the real page, which then genuinely fetched GET /auth/memberships cross-origin with the cookie attached and rendered both fake tenants with their display names and roles.
4. Clicked a tenant in the real UI -- confirmed the real POST /auth/select-tenant fired (with preflight), succeeded, and the page navigated to the response's redirect_url via a real full page load.
5. Reloaded /select-tenant directly (no pending cookie present anymore -- the fake server clears it exactly like the real handler does) -- confirmed the page's error state renders the backend's actual plain-text message ("missing or expired pending login...") rather than a generic fetch-failure string.

No console errors at any point. This is the first frontend-only piece in this entire phase that's been exercised in a real browser rather than only type-checked or unit-tested against fakes -- everything else frontend-adjacent (getAuthFeatures on the settings page, existing Phase 0-3 routes) predates this runbook and was never re-verified here either.

Since closed for real against the actual running containers, not a stand-in: docker-compose.override.yml (local-only, gitignored) pointed enterprise-auth at the same real Auth0 developer tenant §3a used. Two real tenants (acme, globex) each got a real tenant_memberships row for the same Auth0 identity (admin and viewer respectively, via -grant-membership-*). Logging in through /auth/oidc/login against the real IdP landed on the real /select-tenant page, which rendered both real memberships with their real display names and roles ("Acme Corp -- Admin", "Globex Corporation -- Viewer") -- fetched via a real credentialed cross-origin request to the real enterprise-auth container, not the fake Node stand-in. Selecting "Globex Corporation" fired a real POST /auth/select-tenant, redirected to web, and POST /internal/authorize with the resulting cookie returned {"tenant_id":"globex","user_id":"...","role":"viewer"} -- proving the picker's selection genuinely determines the issued session's tenant, not just that the UI renders correctly. This run is also what found and fixed the web/Dockerfile build-arg bug described in this doc's top "Verification status" section -- the picker was unreachable against the real container until that fix landed.

13. Ingest tenant identity

The identity mechanism was chosen deliberately (config-supplied tenant_id + a shared-secret token ingest validates, not per-tenant mTLS certs -- smaller real implementation, no new PKI). Verified in this environment without Docker or a live enterprise-auth, using the same fake-client-at-every-layer discipline as everything else in this runbook that doesn't need a live stack:

cd enterprise
go test ./internal/rbacstore/... -run IngestCredential -v
# skip-gated (RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR) -- CreateIngestCredential/
# ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential round trip, and the
# regression test that only a SHA-256 hash is ever persisted, never the
# plaintext token.

go test ./internal/authhandler/... -run AuthorizeIngest -v
# real HTTP round trip against POST /internal/authorize-ingest with a
# fake credential validator -- proves a session token (service or
# human) does NOT work as an ingest credential, since this endpoint
# never calls session.Manager.Validate at all.

cd ../ingest
go test ./internal/tenantresolver/... -v
# real HTTP round trip (httptest), same shape as api/authz.
# HTTPAuthorizer's own tests -- forwards the bearer token, parses
# tenant_id, treats a non-2xx or an empty tenant_id as an error.

go test ./internal/grpcserver/... -run 'Resolver|TenantHeader' -v
# PushBatch with a fake TenantResolver: no resolver configured ->
# unchanged behavior, no tenant_id header at all; resolver configured ->
# every produced Kafka message carries a tenant_id header matching the
# resolved tenant; missing or invalid bearer token -> the whole batch is
# refused (codes.Unauthenticated), fail-closed, never falls back to "no
# tenant."

Also not built as part of the identity mechanism itself: any Helm/ docker-compose.yml wiring that issues an agent a real ingest credential automatically (enterprise-auth -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id> is, like every other credential-minting flag in this codebase, a manual operator action) -- deploy/helm/sentry/values.yaml's ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) only turns on validation, deliberately not folded into enterprise.enabled directly, since flipping that flag with no agents holding a credential yet would refuse all ingest traffic outright rather than degrading gracefully. See §14 below for what the identity is actually used for on the write path.

14. Ingest write-routing (both storage engines)

enterprise/cmd/enterprise-ingest (mirrors enterprise-api's "second binary" shape) consumes the tenant_id Kafka header §13 attaches and routes each record's ClickHouse write into that tenant's own database, via enterprise/internal/chwriter.Registry -- a per-tenant *ingest/clickhousewriter.Writer registry that reuses ingest/ consumer's own flush loop unchanged. Verified in this environment without Docker, using the same fake-transport discipline as §13:

cd enterprise
go test ./internal/chwriter/... -run 'TestWriteBatchRefuses' -v
# Docker-free: constructs a Registry directly (bypassing New(), the only
# part that dials ClickHouse) to prove the fail-closed paths -- an empty
# TenantID, or a TenantID with no registered writer, refuses the WHOLE
# batch rather than silently dropping just those records or falling back
# to a default destination. (Note: -run TestRegistry, an earlier version
# of this command, actually matches TestRegistryWritesEachTenantToItsOwnDatabase/
# TestRegistryRefusesUnprovisionedTenant instead -- the live-ClickHouse
# tests below, which just skip -- not the Docker-free ones this
# paragraph is about; caught by actually running this command while
# revisiting the runbook.)

go test ./internal/tenantprovision/... -run TestProvisionedUserCanInsertIntoOwnDatabase -v
# skip-gated (needs a live ClickHouse) -- regression test for the bug
# found while building this: the per-tenant credential chwriter reuses
# from chrunner only had SELECT granted, which would make every real
# write fail with a permission error. Fixed by granting SELECT, INSERT
# (tenantprovision.go). This test proves the fix, not just documents it,
# whenever a real ClickHouse is available to run it against.

go test ./internal/chwriter/... -run TestRegistryWritesEachTenantToItsOwnDatabase -v
# skip-gated (CHWRITER_TEST_CLICKHOUSE_ADDR) -- writes a mixed batch
# spanning two tenants in one WriteBatch call and confirms each row
# lands in its own tenant's database, none in the other's. (Fixed from a
# stale `-run TestRegistryRoutesToCorrectTenant` -- that name never
# existed in this package; caught by actually running this command while
# closing out the live verification pass, same class of stale--run
# mistake §6's `TestRegistry` note already flagged once in this doc.)

Now genuinely run against a live ClickHouse (previously only skip-gated, correct Go that had never executed): all 7 internal/chwriter tests pass, including TestRegistryWritesEachTenantToItsOwnDatabase, TestRegistryRefusesUnprovisionedTenant, TestRefreshAddsNewlyActiveTenant, and TestRefreshRemovesNoLongerActiveTenant -- write-routing is confirmed, not just written, as of this pass.

Tantivy's side is built too, and genuinely verified. search/src/consumer.rs reads the same tenant_id Kafka header and resolves it through search/src/registry.rs's IndexRegistry -- the same registry the read side (§9) already uses -- routing each record's write into its own tenant's Tantivy index instead of the single default one. No "second binary" was needed here the way ClickHouse needed enterprise-ingest: Tantivy has no grant system to gate a commercially-licensed credential behind, so IndexRegistry already lives directly in AGPL-core search, and read/write just share it. Because Tantivy is an embedded library (no Docker/broker needed to exercise real logic), this actually ran in this environment:

cd search
cargo test --quiet
# registry.rs: commit_all_commits_default_and_every_opened_tenant_index
# writes into the default index plus two tenant indices, confirms
# nothing is searchable before commit_all(), then confirms all three ARE
# searchable after -- the write-routing + periodic-commit path
# end-to-end, for real, using the same real-Tantivy-index discipline as
# every other registry.rs/index.rs test. consumer.rs:
# tenant_id_from_headers_* cover the header-extraction helper
# (missing/present/unrelated-header cases) and
# test_tenant_id_header_key_matches_go guards the "tenant_id" literal
# against drifting from ingest/consumer.TenantIDHeaderKey /
# ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantIDHeaderKey the same way
# ingest/cmd/ingest's own guard test does on the Go side.

Tantivy's write path is now active-tenant-gated too. search/src/tenants.rs's ActiveTenantTracker polls a new GET /internal/active-tenants endpoint on enterprise-auth (Go side: rbacstore.ListActiveTenantIDs + authhandler.handleActiveTenants, RoleService-credentialed -- mint one with enterprise-auth -mint-service-token search, the same generic flag alerting already uses, just a different subject name) and consumer.rs refuses any tagged record whose tenant isn't in the polled set. Off unless ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL/ENTERPRISE_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKEN are both set (search/src/config.rs rejects exactly one being set); startup blocks on the first fetch succeeding (fail-closed cold start), and a later refresh failure keeps serving the last-known-good set rather than clearing it. Genuinely verified in this environment, no live enterprise-auth needed:

cd search
cargo test --quiet tenants::
# start_fetches_and_serves_the_initial_list / start_sends_the_bearer_token
# run against a real (hand-rolled, dependency-free) TCP server -- actual
# reqwest request construction (the Authorization: Bearer header, the
# /internal/active-tenants path) and actual JSON response parsing, not a
# fake HTTP client. start_fails_closed_when_the_first_fetch_fails and
# start_fails_closed_when_the_server_is_unreachable prove the cold-start
# refusal: ActiveTenantTracker::start returns Err rather than falling
# back to an empty (accept-nothing, silently-safe-looking-but-wrong-for-
# operators) or permissive (accept-anything, the exact bug being closed)
# default.
go test ./internal/authhandler/... -run TestActiveTenants -v
# GET /internal/active-tenants requires a RoleService credential -- a
# valid human session (even for a real Owner) is rejected the same way
# an invalid/missing token is, the regression test for this endpoint's
# whole reason to distinguish token kinds.

The ClickHouse/Tantivy asymmetry this section used to disclose is now closed too. chwriter.Registry.StartRefreshing (new) spawns a goroutine that re-lists active tenants every minute (matching ActiveTenantTracker's interval -- see enterprise-ingest/main.go's dataSourceRefreshInterval) and reconciles the writer map: opens a connection for a newly-active tenant, closes and removes one no longer active. A tenant deprovisioned after enterprise-ingest startup now loses ClickHouse write access within a minute, not "until the next restart." A refresh failure (rbacstore unreachable, or one tenant's new connection failing to open) logs and leaves the existing map untouched for that tick -- the same last-known-good posture ActiveTenantTracker uses, so a transient Postgres blip doesn't evict every other tenant's already-working writer. Neither engine does a live per-write check (a database/HTTP round trip per record would be a real throughput cost neither implementation accepts), so a roughly one-minute staleness window remains on both sides by design, not a gap unique to either anymore.

cd enterprise
go test ./internal/chwriter/... -run TestRefreshListerErrorLeavesRegistryUnchanged -v
# Docker-free -- refresh's early-return on a lister error, proven the
# same way the existing fail-closed tests are: a Registry constructed
# directly (bypassing New, so nothing dials ClickHouse), asserting
# WriteBatch still refuses afterward.

go test ./internal/chwriter/... -run 'TestRefreshAddsNewlyActiveTenant|TestRefreshRemovesNoLongerActiveTenant' -v
# skip-gated (CHWRITER_TEST_CLICKHOUSE_ADDR) -- the actual add/remove
# reconciliation against real connections: a tenant absent at New() time
# gains a working writer after refresh() sees it in a later lister call;
# a tenant present at New() time loses its writer (WriteBatch starts
# refusing it) after refresh() stops seeing it.

Not run in this environment: same live-ClickHouse caveat as everything else here -- the two new skip-gated tests are correct Go that's never executed against a real database. See /docs/security/threat-model.md's "Read this first".

Also not built: Helm/docker-compose.yml do gate whether enterprise-ingest runs at all (ingest.requireTenantCredential, same flag §13 uses for validation -- see deploy/helm/sentry/templates/ enterprise-ingest.yaml), but docker-compose.yml's version is a disclosed, weaker approximation of Helm's: Helm achieves genuine -mode=server/-mode=consumer mutual exclusivity between ingest and enterprise-ingest; compose's enterprise-ingest service is a profile-gated opt-in extra that does NOT split ingest's own server/consumer halves, so with the enterprise profile active, both ingest -mode=all and enterprise-ingest independently consume every message via different consumer groups -- harmless duplication for local verification, not a topology compose actually enforces the way Helm does.

Known gaps (do not treat this phase as done without reading these)

Full accounting: /docs/security/threat-model.md. Headline items:

• Both storage engines' isolation exists, and both Helm and docker-compose now enforce which binary runs. deploy/helm/sentry/templates/api.yaml/enterprise-api.yaml are mutually exclusive on enterprise.enabled (§10) -- a Helm-deployed cluster can't accidentally run the non-isolated binary once that flag is set. docker-compose.yml's api/enterprise-api services are now the same mutually-exclusive choice via COMPOSE_PROFILES (§8, §10a), closing the local/dev parity gap this bullet used to name.

• The Tenant CRD (deploy/operator) and enterprise-api -provision-tenant are now unified, in a deliberately lightweight way: -provision-tenant stays the sole real actor (ClickHouse + rbacstore) and, when TENANT_CRD_NAMESPACE is set (the Helm chart does this automatically when tenantOperator.enabled), also syncs the real result into the Tenant CRD (enterprise/internal/tenantcrd) -- see §11 below. Running -provision-tenant is still a separate, deliberately manual operator action from helm install/kubectl apply -f tenant.yaml creating the Tenant object in the first place -- that split (declarative request vs. imperative provisioning action) is intentional, not the "two disconnected sources of truth" gap this bullet used to describe.

• Ingest now has a real tenant identity (§13), and both storage engines' write-routing is built (§14). An agent presents a bearer credential (enterprise-auth -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>), ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver validates it (fail-closed) and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a tenant_id Kafka message header. enterprise-ingest reads that header back and routes each record's ClickHouse write into its own tenant's database (not yet confirmed against a real ClickHouse in this environment -- see §14). search/src/consumer.rs reads the same header and routes each record into its own tenant's Tantivy index -- genuinely verified in this environment, unlike the ClickHouse side, since Tantivy needs no Docker to exercise real logic. Both engines now also gate writes on an active-tenant check that refreshes every minute -- chwriter. Registry.StartRefreshing on the ClickHouse side (new, closing what was originally a startup-only snapshot with no refresh at all) and Tantivy's ActiveTenantTracker on the other, the same interval on both, no asymmetry left between them; see §14 and /docs/security/threat-model.md's "Read this first". A newly-provisioned tenant's ClickHouse database and Tantivy index are both now real, isolated, and actually populated by write-routed traffic (the ClickHouse claim pending live confirmation, the Tantivy claim already verified) -- what used to be "permanently empty" for both is no longer true for either.

• Human SSO login now works for both OIDC (§3a) and SAML (§3b) -- each verified with a real fake IdP (genuine cryptographic signing and verification), not yet a real external IdP or a running enterprise-auth container. The tenant-picker, backend and frontend, is now fully built too (§12) -- GET /auth/memberships/ POST /auth/select-tenant, backed by a short-lived pending-login token distinct from a real session, and web/src/routes/select-tenant actually calls it via credentialed cross-origin fetch, genuinely exercised in a real browser against a contract-accurate fake backend (§12). What's still not tried is the same caveat as OIDC/SAML above: this whole round trip end-to-end against a real running enterprise-auth container instead of a stand-in.

• No admin UI to create a tenant_memberships row, but §3a/§3b's manual SQL bootstrap is gone -- enterprise-auth -create-tenant/ -grant-membership-*/-revoke-membership-*/-list-memberships-tenant/ -transfer-owner-* (offline operator flags, same shape as -mint-service-token) cover create/grant/revoke/list/transfer-owner. Changing a non-Owner role after the fact is just re-running -grant-membership-* with a different -grant-membership-role (SetMembership's upsert already supports it). RevokeMembership still refuses a tenant's current Owner (would leave tenants.owner_user_id dangling), but that's no longer a dead end -- -transfer-owner-tenant/-transfer-owner-user-email (rbacstore.TransferOwner, this package's first use of a real transaction: downgrades the current owner to admin, promotes the new owner, and updates tenants.owner_user_id atomically) hands ownership off first, and the now-downgraded former owner can be revoked normally after that. -grant-membership-role=owner itself now refuses when a different owner already exists, pointing at -transfer-owner-* instead of silently leaving a stale tenant_memberships row. Skip-gated live-Postgres tests (TestTransferOwnerMovesOwnershipAndDowngradesPreviousOwner and two refusal-path tests in enterprise/internal/rbacstore/rbacstore_test.go) haven't run against a live database in this environment, same gap as the rest of this phase's Postgres-backed pieces.

• Per-resource dashboard grants are now enforced (api/dashboards' handler reads dashboard_permissions via enterprise/internal/rbacstore.DashboardPermissions, only when enterprise-api -- not plain api -- serves traffic), and now has a CLI surface: sentryctl dashboards permissions list|grant|revoke (cli/cmd/sentryctl/cmd_dashboards.go) against GET/PUT/DELETE /dashboards/{id}/permissions/{userId} -- still no web UI for it, just the CLI. Verified against a real httptest. Server (not a fake store this time -- the CLI has no store of its own, just an HTTP client, so this is exercising real request construction/method/path/body/error-parsing, the same pattern every other sentryctl subcommand's tests use):

  cd cli
  go test ./... -run TestCmdDashboardsPermissions -v
  

  api/dashboards' own handler tests (fake PermissionStore) and the real-Postgres enterprise/internal/rbacstore/rbacstore_test.go integration tests are unchanged by this -- the CLI is a new caller of an existing, already-tested endpoint, not new server-side logic. Those Postgres-backed tests still haven't run against a live database in this environment, same gap as the rest of this phase's Postgres-backed pieces.

• All four adversarial ClickHouse/Tantivy probes named in /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan are now closed -- see api/queryapi/tenant_isolation_gap_test.go for the full accounting. The fourth (mid-provisioning-race handling) turned out to need a real code fix on the Tantivy side, not just a test: search/ src/registry.rs's IndexRegistry opened-or-created an index for any syntactically-valid tenant_id, so a mid-provisioning tenant's query would have silently succeeded with zero results instead of being refused. Fixed via enterprise/internal/searchclient.TenantChecker (backed by rbacstore.TenantIsActive). Both the ClickHouse and Tantivy halves of this probe run genuinely, without Docker, in this environment (chrunner_test.go's TestRegistryRefusesMidProvisioningTenant, searchclient_test.go's TestSearchRefusesMidProvisioningTenant) -- rbacstore.TenantIsActive itself has skip-gated live-Postgres tests that haven't run here, same disclosed gap as the rest of this phase's Postgres-backed pieces.

Tearing down

docker compose down -v
helm uninstall sentry   # if installed against a real cluster

Troubleshooting

enterprise-auth fails to start with "ENTERPRISE_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY must be set to at least 32 bytes". Required, unlike OIDC/SAML config — see enterprise/internal/config.Load. docker-compose.yml's dev value is long enough; a custom override must be too.

POST /query returns 401 even though ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't set. Check api/cmd/api/main.go actually left authorizer nil when cfg.EnterpriseAuthURL == "" — a nil Authorizer must be a no-op (api/authz.RequireRole's doc comment). If this regresses, it breaks every existing Phase 0-3 deployment silently.

A dashboard created by one tenant is visible to another. This is the exact bug found and fixed in task 7 — see /docs/security/threat-model.md's "application-layer tenant scoping" section and api/dashboards/handler_test.go's TestCrossTenant* tests. If this regresses, Handler.tenantID or store.go's WHERE tenant_id = ... filters have been bypassed somewhere — check every store method still takes and uses a tenantID parameter.

helm template fails with error calling include: ... can't evaluate field Release in type string. A call site is passing a bare string to sentry.selectorLabels instead of (list $ "name") — see templates/_helpers.tpl's doc comment for why the plain-string form doesn't work with include.