jcoffey-dev
3eb0f4c589
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
13 lines
463 B
YAML
13 lines
463 B
YAML
apiVersion: v2
|
|
name: sentry
|
|
description: >-
|
|
Sentry: Kubernetes-native distributed log aggregation. Phase 4 adds
|
|
multi-tenant-aware deployment (per-tenant ClickHouse credential Secrets
|
|
via the tenant-operator, optional enterprise-auth) on top of the same
|
|
single-cluster topology Phases 0-3 ran under docker-compose -- see
|
|
deploy/README.md for what "multi-tenant-aware" does and doesn't mean
|
|
here.
|
|
type: application
|
|
version: 0.4.0
|
|
appVersion: "phase-4"
|