Files
cairnobs/web
jcoffey-dev 4b5dae5879 Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.

Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
  SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
  sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
  their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
  extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.

Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
  in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
  extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
  or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
  internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
  alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
  mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
  goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
  (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
  on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
  config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
  docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
  (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
  Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
  vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
  running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
  license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
  history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
  for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
  comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
  side-channel.
2026-08-18 23:53:20 -07:00
..

web

SvelteKit frontend. Phase 0: one page, one query box, one table. No auth, no styling polish, no routing beyond /.

What it does

Textarea for a raw SQL string → POST {VITE_API_BASE_URL}/query on /api → renders {columns, rows} as an HTML table, or shows {error} from a rejected/failed query. That's the whole app — see src/routes/+page.svelte.

Why a static build, not a Node server

Scaffolded with @sveltejs/adapter-static: this page has no server-side data loading (all data comes from a client-side fetch triggered by the submit button), so there's nothing here that needs a running SvelteKit server. A prerendered static site is simpler to build, deploy, and reason about than running Node in production for a page that's this thin.

Because it's static, VITE_API_BASE_URL is baked in at build time, not read at container start. Set it before npm run build (or pass --build-arg VITE_API_BASE_URL=... to docker build) — changing it later means rebuilding, not just restarting the container.

Building & running

npm install
cp .env.example .env   # adjust VITE_API_BASE_URL if /api isn't on localhost:8080
npm run dev             # local dev server with hot reload
npm run check            # svelte-check, type errors
npm run build             # static output to build/
npm run preview            # serve the static build locally to sanity-check it
docker build -f Dockerfile -t sentry-web .   # context is web/, not the repo root
docker run -p 3000:3000 sentry-web

Tenant picker (Phase 4)

src/routes/select-tenant is the one route that isn't reachable by clicking around the app -- enterprise-auth's internal/loginhandler redirects a browser here after an SSO login resolves to more than one tenant_memberships row (see that package's doc comment), carrying a short-lived sentry_pending_login cookie instead of a real session. The page calls GET /auth/memberships to list the choices, and POST /auth/select-tenant on a click, both via fetch(..., {credentials: 'include'}) ($lib/api.ts's listMemberships/selectTenant) so that cookie -- and, on success, the real session cookie the POST response sets -- actually cross the origin boundary between this app and enterprise-auth. enterprise-auth's default POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL (this app's own base URL) is also where CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN defaults to, and it has to be a literal origin, not * -- see api/httpserver.WithCredentialedCORS's doc comment for why a credentialed fetch and a wildcard CORS origin can never be combined; getAuthFeatures above deliberately doesn't send credentials for exactly this reason, and is why it could stay on the plain WithCORS every other endpoint in this repo uses.

Like every other route (export const prerender = true in this route's own +page.ts), no server-side data loading -- the membership list and the tenant choice both come from client-side fetch calls the same way the root query page's does.

Verified in a real browser in this environment: a throwaway Node server standing in for enterprise-auth (implementing the exact GET /auth/memberships/POST /auth/select-tenant wire contract, including the plain-text http.Error bodies the real handler sends, not JSON) on a different origin/port than this app's dev server, driven through the full flow -- cross-origin pending-login cookie set, the credentialed preflight + GET/POST round trip, a real click choosing a tenant, and the post-selection redirect landing back on / -- plus the missing/expired-cookie error path separately. No Docker or live Postgres/IdP needed for this, since the whole point was exercising this app's own fetch/CORS/cookie wiring against a contract-accurate fake, not enterprise-auth's internals (those are enterprise/internal/ loginhandler's own tests' job, already covered there).

Why nginx, not distroless

The repo convention prefers distroless/scratch base images. Serving a static SPA still needs some HTTP server, though, and nginx:alpine is the boring, standard choice for that job — writing a custom static-file binary just to stay distroless would be more engineering than a Phase 0 placeholder page justifies. nginx.conf here is minimal: serve build/, fall back to index.html for client-side routing (only one route exists today, but this is what you want the moment a second one is added).