Files
cairnobs/proto/sentry/agent/v1/agent_control.proto
T
jcoffey-dev 4b5dae5879 Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.

Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
  SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
  sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
  their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
  extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.

Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
  in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
  extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
  or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
  internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
  alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
  mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
  goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
  (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
  on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
  config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
  docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
  (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
  Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
  vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
  running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
  license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
  history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
  for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
  comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
  side-channel.
2026-08-18 23:53:20 -07:00

121 lines
5.8 KiB
Protocol Buffer

syntax = "proto3";
package sentry.agent.v1;
option go_package = "github.com/sentry/sentry/proto/sentry/agent/v1;agentv1";
// AgentControl is the control-plane counterpart to logs.v1.LogIngest's
// data-plane PushBatch -- the same mTLS channel/connection an agent
// already has open to ingest, a second gRPC service on the same
// listener rather than a second protocol or connection the agent would
// need to maintain (see /docs/agent-management-design.md). CheckIn is
// agent-initiated, called on the agent's own heartbeat ticker: there is
// still no path for the platform to reach into an agent uninvited. An
// agent asks "what should I be running" on its own schedule -- the same
// push-not-pull posture the heartbeat feature this builds on already
// established.
service AgentControl {
rpc CheckIn(CheckInRequest) returns (CheckInResponse);
}
// ReportedConfig is what an agent tells the platform about itself --
// read-only, for inventory/visibility. Deliberately excludes tls/ingest
// endpoint fields: those are never reported and never remotely
// overridable (see DesiredOverride's comment) -- reporting the ingest
// endpoint back to itself would be redundant (that's exactly the
// connection this request arrived over), and TLS material has no
// business leaving the host at all.
message ReportedConfig {
string agent_version = 1;
string source_kind = 2; // "journald", "file", "eventlog", "etw"
string source_detail = 3; // human-readable summary: unit name, file path, or channel list
uint64 batch_max_size = 4;
uint64 batch_flush_interval_ms = 5;
bool heartbeat_enabled = 6;
uint64 heartbeat_interval_ms = 7;
}
message CheckInRequest {
string host = 1;
string service = 2;
ReportedConfig current_config = 3;
// The DesiredOverride.version this agent last successfully applied,
// empty if it has never applied one. Lets the server distinguish
// "pending" (an edit exists the agent hasn't picked up yet) from
// "applied" for the web UI, without the agent needing to know
// anything about that distinction itself.
string applied_override_version = 4;
}
// DesiredOverride is the remotely-editable subset of an agent's config
// -- batch/heartbeat tuning, and, for journald sources, the unit
// filter. Every field is optional: unset means "no override for this
// field, keep whatever agent.toml says locally" -- a partial edit only
// touches the fields it sets. Never includes tls/ingest: those stay
// local-file-only, permanently, a deliberate security boundary (see
// /docs/agent-management-design.md) so a bad or malicious remote edit
// can never strand an agent or redirect where its logs go.
message DesiredOverride {
optional uint64 batch_max_size = 1;
optional uint64 batch_flush_interval_ms = 2;
optional bool heartbeat_enabled = 3;
optional uint64 heartbeat_interval_ms = 4;
// Only meaningful when the agent's local source is journald; ignored
// otherwise. Empty string means "no unit filter" (tail the whole
// journal), same semantics as the local config's own unit field.
optional string journald_unit = 5;
// Opaque version stamp the platform assigns on every edit. The
// agent's only obligation is to echo it back as
// CheckInRequest.applied_override_version once applied -- it never
// interprets the value itself.
string version = 6;
// Extra file paths this agent should tail in addition to whatever its
// local [source] already is -- never a replacement for the primary
// source (an agent whose local source is journald can still be told
// to also tail a file, and vice versa). Unlike every field above,
// there's no real "unset" state for a list: the web UI/CLI always
// resubmit the complete desired list on every edit (same "PUT
// replaces the whole override" convention every other field already
// follows -- see api/agents/handler.go's handleSetConfig), so an
// empty list unambiguously means "no extra paths right now," not
// "don't touch this."
repeated string extra_file_paths = 7;
}
// AgentCommand is a one-shot action, not a persistent desired state like
// DesiredOverride -- delivered at-most-once (see CheckInResponse's
// comment). Scoped deliberately narrow: only RESTART exists today.
// STOP and UNINSTALL are real, disclosed future work, not oversights --
// both need genuine OS service-manager integration (systemd's
// Restart=/RestartPreventExitStatus= semantics vs. Windows SCM recovery
// options are different enough per platform that hand-waving them would
// be dishonest), which RESTART doesn't: a graceful shutdown followed by
// a clean process exit, relying on whatever restart policy the host's
// service manager already has configured -- the same contract systemd/
// SCM already expect from any well-behaved service.
enum AgentCommand {
AGENT_COMMAND_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
AGENT_COMMAND_RESTART = 1;
}
message CheckInResponse {
// False when no override has ever been set for this agent -- it
// should be running whatever agent.toml already has, untouched.
bool has_override = 1;
DesiredOverride override = 2;
// AGENT_COMMAND_UNSPECIFIED when there's nothing to do. Unlike
// DesiredOverride, there is no "applied_command_version" echoed back
// in CheckInRequest: the server clears a pending command the moment
// it hands it out in a response (see
// ingest/internal/agentregistry.Registry.CheckIn), not once the agent
// confirms execution -- a restarting agent's process is gone before
// it could ever send that confirmation. This is an honest at-most-
// once delivery, not at-least-once: a command lost to a network
// failure between this response and the agent acting on it is simply
// lost, same as any fire-and-forget signal. Re-issuing (PUT
// /agents/{host}/command again) is the operator's recourse, same as
// it would be for a `systemctl restart` that silently failed to reach
// its target.
AgentCommand pending_command = 3;
}