jcoffey-dev
4b5dae5879
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
128 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
128 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
package localauth
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import (
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"context"
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"strconv"
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"time"
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"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/authz"
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)
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// fakeStore implements both store (handler.go) and sessionStore
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// (authorizer.go) -- a real *Store satisfies both too, this is just the
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// in-memory test double, same "fake enforces the same invariants the
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// real pgx-backed Store does" posture dashboards/handler_test.go's
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// fakeStore documents.
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type fakeStore struct {
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users map[string]*User // by id
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hashes map[string]string
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byUsername map[string]string // username -> id
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sessions map[string]Session
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nextID int
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createErr error
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}
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func newFakeStore() *fakeStore {
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return &fakeStore{
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users: map[string]*User{},
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hashes: map[string]string{},
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byUsername: map[string]string{},
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sessions: map[string]Session{},
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}
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) CreateUser(_ context.Context, username, passwordHash string, role authz.Role) (*User, error) {
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if f.createErr != nil {
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return nil, f.createErr
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}
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if _, ok := f.byUsername[username]; ok {
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return nil, ErrUsernameTaken
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}
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f.nextID++
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id := "user-" + strconv.Itoa(f.nextID)
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u := &User{ID: id, Username: username, Role: role, CreatedAt: time.Now()}
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f.users[id] = u
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f.hashes[id] = passwordHash
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f.byUsername[username] = id
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return u, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) ListUsers(_ context.Context) ([]User, error) {
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var out []User
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for _, u := range f.users {
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out = append(out, *u)
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) GetUserForLogin(_ context.Context, username string) (*User, string, error) {
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id, ok := f.byUsername[username]
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if !ok {
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return nil, "", ErrNotFound
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}
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return f.users[id], f.hashes[id], nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) GetUserByID(_ context.Context, id string) (*User, error) {
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u, ok := f.users[id]
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if !ok {
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return nil, ErrNotFound
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}
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return u, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) DeleteUser(_ context.Context, id string) error {
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u, ok := f.users[id]
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if !ok {
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return ErrNotFound
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}
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delete(f.users, id)
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delete(f.hashes, id)
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delete(f.byUsername, u.Username)
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for hash, sess := range f.sessions {
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if sess.UserID == id {
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delete(f.sessions, hash)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) SetPasswordHash(_ context.Context, userID, hash string) error {
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if _, ok := f.users[userID]; !ok {
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return ErrNotFound
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}
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f.hashes[userID] = hash
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for h, sess := range f.sessions {
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if sess.UserID == userID {
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delete(f.sessions, h)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) CountLocalUsers(_ context.Context) (int, error) {
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return len(f.users), nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) CreateSession(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string, role authz.Role, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {
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raw, hash, err := newOpaqueToken()
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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f.sessions[hash] = Session{UserID: userID, TenantID: tenantID, Role: role, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(ttl)}
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return raw, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) GetSession(_ context.Context, tokenHash string) (*Session, error) {
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sess, ok := f.sessions[tokenHash]
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if !ok || sess.ExpiresAt.Before(time.Now()) {
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return nil, ErrNotFound
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}
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return &sess, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) DeleteSessionByHash(_ context.Context, tokenHash string) error {
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delete(f.sessions, tokenHash)
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return nil
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}
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