jcoffey-dev
4b5dae5879
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
53 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
53 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
package config
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import (
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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func TestLoadDefaults(t *testing.T) {
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cfg, err := Load()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Load() error = %v", err)
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}
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if cfg.HTTPListenAddr != ":8080" {
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t.Errorf("HTTPListenAddr = %q, want :8080", cfg.HTTPListenAddr)
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}
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if cfg.QueryTimeout != 30*time.Second {
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t.Errorf("QueryTimeout = %v, want 30s", cfg.QueryTimeout)
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}
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if cfg.CORSAllowedOrigin != "*" {
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t.Errorf("CORSAllowedOrigin = %q, want *", cfg.CORSAllowedOrigin)
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}
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if cfg.SearchGRPCAddr != "localhost:50052" {
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t.Errorf("SearchGRPCAddr = %q, want localhost:50052", cfg.SearchGRPCAddr)
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}
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}
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func TestLoadInvalidTimeoutErrors(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv("QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "not-a-number")
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if _, err := Load(); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected error for non-numeric QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, got nil")
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}
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}
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// TestDevCredentialWarnings is the regression test for the
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// security-audit finding that docker-compose.yml's hardcoded
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// "sentry-dev-only" password has no runtime fail-safe if an operator
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// forgets to override it for a real deployment.
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func TestDevCredentialWarnings(t *testing.T) {
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if got := (Config{}).DevCredentialWarnings(); len(got) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("empty passwords: warnings = %v, want none", got)
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}
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real := Config{ClickHouse: ClickHouseConfig{Password: "a-real-password"}, Postgres: PostgresConfig{Password: "another-real-one"}}
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if got := real.DevCredentialWarnings(); len(got) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("real passwords: warnings = %v, want none", got)
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}
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devOnly := Config{ClickHouse: ClickHouseConfig{Password: devOnlyCredential}, Postgres: PostgresConfig{Password: devOnlyCredential}}
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if got := devOnly.DevCredentialWarnings(); len(got) != 2 {
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t.Errorf("both dev-default passwords: warnings = %v, want 2 entries", got)
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}
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}
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