jcoffey-dev
4b5dae5879
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
74 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
74 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
// Package sessioncheck is alerting's half of local login (see
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// api/localauth's package doc comment for the full feature). It only
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// ever validates an already-issued session against the shared
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// local_sessions table api/localauth writes to (same Postgres, no Go
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// import) -- it never handles a raw password, never creates a session,
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// and has no user-management surface at all; that stays exclusively in
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// api. Deliberately its own small package rather than an import of
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// api/localauth: this repo's hard, documented convention is no shared
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// Go store/HTTP code between api and alerting, only /proto (see
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// alerting/internal/httpserver/cors.go's WithCORS doc comment) --
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// duplicating this one hash-and-look-up check is a small, low-risk
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// price for keeping that boundary real.
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package sessioncheck
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"time"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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)
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var ErrInvalidSession = errors.New("sessioncheck: invalid or expired session")
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type Checker struct {
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pool *pgxpool.Pool
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}
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func NewChecker(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *Checker {
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return &Checker{pool: pool}
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}
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// roleRank duplicates api/authz.Role's rank table -- same "no shared Go
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// code between api and alerting" boundary this package's doc comment
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// already explains for hashToken, applied to the one extra column
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// (role) middleware.go now needs to enforce a floor on mutating
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// requests (see RequireSession).
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var roleRank = map[string]int{"viewer": 1, "editor": 2, "admin": 3, "owner": 4}
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// roleSatisfies reports whether role meets minRole on the same
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// Viewer<Editor<Admin<Owner scale api/authz.Role.Satisfies uses.
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func roleSatisfies(role, minRole string) bool {
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return roleRank[role] >= roleRank[minRole]
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}
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// Validate hashes raw (plain SHA-256, no bcrypt -- see
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// api/localauth/token.go's hashToken doc comment for why a session
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// token doesn't need bcrypt's deliberate slowness) and checks it
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// against local_sessions, returning the session's role snapshot
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// alongside. Returns ErrInvalidSession for both "no such session" and
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// "expired" -- middleware.go's caller doesn't distinguish them either,
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// same posture api/localauth.Store.GetSession already takes for the
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// same two cases.
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func (c *Checker) Validate(ctx context.Context, raw string) (role string, err error) {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(raw))
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hash := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
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var expiresAt time.Time
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err = c.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT role, expires_at FROM local_sessions WHERE token_hash = $1`, hash).Scan(&role, &expiresAt)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return "", ErrInvalidSession
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}
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return "", err
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}
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if expiresAt.Before(time.Now()) {
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return "", ErrInvalidSession
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}
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return role, nil
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}
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