This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
132 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
132 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
// Package config loads alerting's configuration from environment
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// variables, same convention as /api and /ingest: no config file format.
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package config
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import (
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"time"
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)
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type Config struct {
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HTTPListenAddr string
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Postgres PostgresConfig
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APIQueryURL string // base URL of /api, e.g. http://api:8080 -- alerting never talks to ClickHouse/Tantivy directly
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APIServiceToken string // RoleService credential presented to /api's POST /query -- see queryclient.New's doc comment
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CORSAllowedOrigin string
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Evaluator EvaluatorConfig
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// LocalAuthEnabled gates alerting's own session-required middleware
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// (see internal/sessioncheck) -- same env var name as api's
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// LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED, one consistent on/off switch across both
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// services for a single-tenant deployment turning local login on.
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LocalAuthEnabled bool
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}
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type PostgresConfig struct {
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Addr string
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Database string
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Username string
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Password string
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}
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type EvaluatorConfig struct {
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TickInterval time.Duration // how often the scheduler checks for due rules
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// ClaimBatchSize and WorkerPoolSize are deliberately separate knobs,
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// not the same number: ClaimBatchSize bounds how many due rules one
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// tick pulls off the queue (needs to be large enough to drain a
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// backlog when many rules share a due time, e.g. right after bulk
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// creation), while WorkerPoolSize bounds concurrent /query calls
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// within that batch. Found by actually running hack/alert-load-test
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// with 500 rules and both numbers defaulted to the same value
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// (20): the evaluator took 125s to cycle through 500 due rules
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// instead of the configured 60s eval_interval_seconds, because each
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// 5s tick could only claim 20 rules regardless of how many more were
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// already due -- see /docs/phase-3-runbook.md's load-test section.
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ClaimBatchSize int
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WorkerPoolSize int
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QueryTimeout time.Duration // per-evaluation POST /query timeout
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}
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// devOnlyCredential is docker-compose.yml's zero-config default for
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// every Postgres/ClickHouse password in this repo -- see
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// api/internal/config.Config.DevCredentialWarnings for the full
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// reasoning (duplicated here per this repo's no-shared-code-between-
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// services convention).
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const devOnlyCredential = "sentry-dev-only"
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// DevCredentialWarnings reports whether the configured Postgres
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// credential still equals the literal dev-only default --
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// cmd/alerting/main.go logs it loudly at startup. A warning, not a
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// startup-refusing error: local dev's zero-config docker-compose.yml
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// path legitimately leaves it at this value.
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func (c Config) DevCredentialWarnings() []string {
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if c.Postgres.Password == devOnlyCredential {
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return []string{"POSTGRES_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password before this is reachable outside local dev"}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func Load() (Config, error) {
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cfg := Config{
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HTTPListenAddr: getenv("HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR", ":8081"),
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Postgres: PostgresConfig{
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Addr: getenv("POSTGRES_ADDR", "localhost:5432"),
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Database: getenv("POSTGRES_DATABASE", "sentry_metadata"),
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Username: getenv("POSTGRES_USERNAME", "sentry"),
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Password: getenv("POSTGRES_PASSWORD", ""),
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},
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APIQueryURL: getenv("API_QUERY_URL", "http://localhost:8080"),
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// Empty by default -- matches Phase 0-3 behavior for a
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// single-tenant deployment with no enterprise/ deployed (api's
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// authorizer is nil there, so an absent token is fine).
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APIServiceToken: getenv("API_SERVICE_TOKEN", ""),
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// Same "no auth yet" tradeoff as api's CORSAllowedOrigin default --
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// see api/internal/config/config.go's comment, same reasoning here.
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CORSAllowedOrigin: getenv("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN", "*"),
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}
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tickSec, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("EVALUATOR_TICK_SECONDS", "5"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("EVALUATOR_TICK_SECONDS: %w", err)
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}
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cfg.Evaluator.TickInterval = time.Duration(tickSec) * time.Second
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poolSize, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("EVALUATOR_WORKER_POOL_SIZE", "20"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("EVALUATOR_WORKER_POOL_SIZE: %w", err)
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}
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cfg.Evaluator.WorkerPoolSize = poolSize
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// Default well above WorkerPoolSize: this is "how many due rules can
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// one tick pull off the queue," not a concurrency limit -- the
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// worker pool below still bounds actual concurrent /query calls
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// regardless of how large a batch gets claimed.
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claimBatchSize, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("EVALUATOR_CLAIM_BATCH_SIZE", "1000"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("EVALUATOR_CLAIM_BATCH_SIZE: %w", err)
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}
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cfg.Evaluator.ClaimBatchSize = claimBatchSize
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queryTimeoutSec, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("EVALUATOR_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "30"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("EVALUATOR_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: %w", err)
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}
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cfg.Evaluator.QueryTimeout = time.Duration(queryTimeoutSec) * time.Second
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localAuthEnabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(getenv("LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED", "false"))
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if err != nil {
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return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED: %w", err)
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}
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cfg.LocalAuthEnabled = localAuthEnabled
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return cfg, nil
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}
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func getenv(key, fallback string) string {
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if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
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return v
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}
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return fallback
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}
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