Files
cairnobs/alerting/internal/config/config.go
T
jcoffey-dev 4b5dae5879 Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.

Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
  SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
  sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
  their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
  extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.

Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
  in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
  extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
  or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
  internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
  alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
  mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
  goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
  (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
  on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
  config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
  docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
  (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
  Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
  vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
  running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
  license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
  history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
  for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
  comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
  side-channel.
2026-08-18 23:53:20 -07:00

132 lines
5.1 KiB
Go

// Package config loads alerting's configuration from environment
// variables, same convention as /api and /ingest: no config file format.
package config
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"strconv"
"time"
)
type Config struct {
HTTPListenAddr string
Postgres PostgresConfig
APIQueryURL string // base URL of /api, e.g. http://api:8080 -- alerting never talks to ClickHouse/Tantivy directly
APIServiceToken string // RoleService credential presented to /api's POST /query -- see queryclient.New's doc comment
CORSAllowedOrigin string
Evaluator EvaluatorConfig
// LocalAuthEnabled gates alerting's own session-required middleware
// (see internal/sessioncheck) -- same env var name as api's
// LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED, one consistent on/off switch across both
// services for a single-tenant deployment turning local login on.
LocalAuthEnabled bool
}
type PostgresConfig struct {
Addr string
Database string
Username string
Password string
}
type EvaluatorConfig struct {
TickInterval time.Duration // how often the scheduler checks for due rules
// ClaimBatchSize and WorkerPoolSize are deliberately separate knobs,
// not the same number: ClaimBatchSize bounds how many due rules one
// tick pulls off the queue (needs to be large enough to drain a
// backlog when many rules share a due time, e.g. right after bulk
// creation), while WorkerPoolSize bounds concurrent /query calls
// within that batch. Found by actually running hack/alert-load-test
// with 500 rules and both numbers defaulted to the same value
// (20): the evaluator took 125s to cycle through 500 due rules
// instead of the configured 60s eval_interval_seconds, because each
// 5s tick could only claim 20 rules regardless of how many more were
// already due -- see /docs/phase-3-runbook.md's load-test section.
ClaimBatchSize int
WorkerPoolSize int
QueryTimeout time.Duration // per-evaluation POST /query timeout
}
// devOnlyCredential is docker-compose.yml's zero-config default for
// every Postgres/ClickHouse password in this repo -- see
// api/internal/config.Config.DevCredentialWarnings for the full
// reasoning (duplicated here per this repo's no-shared-code-between-
// services convention).
const devOnlyCredential = "sentry-dev-only"
// DevCredentialWarnings reports whether the configured Postgres
// credential still equals the literal dev-only default --
// cmd/alerting/main.go logs it loudly at startup. A warning, not a
// startup-refusing error: local dev's zero-config docker-compose.yml
// path legitimately leaves it at this value.
func (c Config) DevCredentialWarnings() []string {
if c.Postgres.Password == devOnlyCredential {
return []string{"POSTGRES_PASSWORD is still the default dev-only value -- set a real password before this is reachable outside local dev"}
}
return nil
}
func Load() (Config, error) {
cfg := Config{
HTTPListenAddr: getenv("HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR", ":8081"),
Postgres: PostgresConfig{
Addr: getenv("POSTGRES_ADDR", "localhost:5432"),
Database: getenv("POSTGRES_DATABASE", "sentry_metadata"),
Username: getenv("POSTGRES_USERNAME", "sentry"),
Password: getenv("POSTGRES_PASSWORD", ""),
},
APIQueryURL: getenv("API_QUERY_URL", "http://localhost:8080"),
// Empty by default -- matches Phase 0-3 behavior for a
// single-tenant deployment with no enterprise/ deployed (api's
// authorizer is nil there, so an absent token is fine).
APIServiceToken: getenv("API_SERVICE_TOKEN", ""),
// Same "no auth yet" tradeoff as api's CORSAllowedOrigin default --
// see api/internal/config/config.go's comment, same reasoning here.
CORSAllowedOrigin: getenv("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN", "*"),
}
tickSec, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("EVALUATOR_TICK_SECONDS", "5"))
if err != nil {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("EVALUATOR_TICK_SECONDS: %w", err)
}
cfg.Evaluator.TickInterval = time.Duration(tickSec) * time.Second
poolSize, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("EVALUATOR_WORKER_POOL_SIZE", "20"))
if err != nil {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("EVALUATOR_WORKER_POOL_SIZE: %w", err)
}
cfg.Evaluator.WorkerPoolSize = poolSize
// Default well above WorkerPoolSize: this is "how many due rules can
// one tick pull off the queue," not a concurrency limit -- the
// worker pool below still bounds actual concurrent /query calls
// regardless of how large a batch gets claimed.
claimBatchSize, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("EVALUATOR_CLAIM_BATCH_SIZE", "1000"))
if err != nil {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("EVALUATOR_CLAIM_BATCH_SIZE: %w", err)
}
cfg.Evaluator.ClaimBatchSize = claimBatchSize
queryTimeoutSec, err := strconv.Atoi(getenv("EVALUATOR_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "30"))
if err != nil {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("EVALUATOR_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: %w", err)
}
cfg.Evaluator.QueryTimeout = time.Duration(queryTimeoutSec) * time.Second
localAuthEnabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(getenv("LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED", "false"))
if err != nil {
return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("LOCAL_AUTH_ENABLED: %w", err)
}
cfg.LocalAuthEnabled = localAuthEnabled
return cfg, nil
}
func getenv(key, fallback string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return v
}
return fallback
}