jcoffey-dev
1d57e697b1
Closes the threat model's headline finding for the SQL query path:
enterprise/internal/tenantprovision does real CREATE DATABASE/USER/GRANT
against ClickHouse, and enterprise/internal/chrunner is a per-tenant
connection registry implementing api's SQLRunner interface, resolving
the tenant from the authenticated request identity -- never a
caller-suppliable parameter. Both are wired into a new binary,
enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api, alongside the unchanged single-tenant
api/cmd/api, since AGPL core can never import enterprise/ and Go's own
internal/ package visibility rules meant enterprise/ couldn't implement
core's SQLRunner interface without importing the package that defines
it. That required moving api/internal/{authz,queryapi,dashboards,
querylang/executor,searchclient,httpserver} out of internal/ -- the
minimal set enterprise-api needs to import; querylang's compiler
internals (planner/lexer/parser/ast/ir) and api's own config stay
internal, since nothing outside api needs them directly.
Also finally wires enterprise/internal/audit into queryapi.AuditLogger
(nil since Phase 4 task 4) via a new adapter, and adds live-ClickHouse
integration tests for two of the four adversarial probes named in
docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan.
Corrected several overclaims in the docs while writing this up: an
earlier claim that rbacstore's CRUD was "verified against a live
Postgres" was never actually true in this environment (only
internal/audit was, earlier in this phase, before Docker access was
lost) -- threat-model.md, phase-4-runbook.md, CLAUDE.md, and
enterprise/README.md all now distinguish "a real integration test
exists" from "this was confirmed against a live database."
Still not built: Tantivy/free-text tenant isolation
(enterprise/internal/searchclient), and any deployment-topology
mechanism that actually routes traffic to enterprise-api instead of
plain api -- both binaries exist side by side today with nothing
enforcing or flagging which one a deployment runs.
13 lines
812 B
SQL
13 lines
812 B
SQL
-- Per-tenant ClickHouse credentials, generated by
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-- enterprise/internal/tenantprovision and consumed by
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-- enterprise/internal/chrunner's per-tenant connection registry at
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-- enterprise-api startup. Stored in the same place every other
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-- control-plane secret in this schema lives (audit_writer's password is
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-- an env var, not a DB row, since it's one shared credential -- these
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-- are per-tenant and need to be looked up by tenant, hence a table).
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-- Same trust model as CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD already being plaintext in
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-- docker-compose.yml/the Helm chart's Secret -- Postgres itself is
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-- already trusted infrastructure in this design, not a new exposure.
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ALTER TABLE data_sources ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS clickhouse_username TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE data_sources ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS clickhouse_password TEXT;
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