jcoffey-dev
3eb0f4c589
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
15 lines
696 B
SQL
15 lines
696 B
SQL
-- A user's role is per-tenant, not global -- see
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-- /docs/phase-4-rbac-design.md's role matrix (Viewer/Editor/Admin/Owner).
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-- One row per (tenant, user); a user with no row for a tenant has no
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-- access to it at all (default-deny, not default-viewer).
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenant_memberships
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(
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id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
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tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('viewer', 'editor', 'admin', 'owner')),
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created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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UNIQUE (tenant_id, user_id)
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)
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