Files
cairnobs/enterprise/internal/authhandler/authhandler_test.go
T
jcoffey-dev 3eb0f4c589 Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.

Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.

Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).
2026-08-13 22:16:59 -07:00

176 lines
5.2 KiB
Go

package authhandler
import (
"encoding/json"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/session"
)
func testHandler(t *testing.T) (*Handler, *session.Manager) {
t.Helper()
m, err := session.NewManager([]byte("this-is-a-32-byte-test-signing-key!"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session.NewManager: %v", err)
}
return New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{}), m
}
func doAuthorize(t *testing.T, h *Handler, mutate func(*http.Request)) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
mux := http.NewServeMux()
h.RegisterRoutes(mux)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/internal/authorize", nil)
if mutate != nil {
mutate(req)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return rec
}
func TestAuthorizeViaServiceToken(t *testing.T) {
h, m := testHandler(t)
token, err := m.IssueServiceToken("alerting")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IssueServiceToken: %v", err)
}
rec := doAuthorize(t, h, func(r *http.Request) {
r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, body = %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var body authorizeResponse
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
}
if body.Role != "service" || body.TenantID != "" || body.UserID != "" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected response: %+v", body)
}
}
func TestAuthorizeViaSessionCookie(t *testing.T) {
h, m := testHandler(t)
token, err := m.IssueUserSession("acme", "u1", "editor")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IssueUserSession: %v", err)
}
rec := doAuthorize(t, h, func(r *http.Request) {
r.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookieName, Value: token})
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, body = %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var body authorizeResponse
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
}
if body.TenantID != "acme" || body.UserID != "u1" || body.Role != "editor" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected response: %+v", body)
}
}
func TestAuthorizeBearerTakesPrecedenceOverCookie(t *testing.T) {
h, m := testHandler(t)
serviceToken, err := m.IssueServiceToken("alerting")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IssueServiceToken: %v", err)
}
sessionToken, err := m.IssueUserSession("acme", "u1", "viewer")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IssueUserSession: %v", err)
}
rec := doAuthorize(t, h, func(r *http.Request) {
r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+serviceToken)
r.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookieName, Value: sessionToken})
})
var body authorizeResponse
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
}
if body.Role != "service" {
t.Fatalf("expected the Bearer service token to win, got role %q", body.Role)
}
}
func TestAuthorizeNoCredentialsIsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
h, _ := testHandler(t)
rec := doAuthorize(t, h, nil)
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestAuthorizeInvalidTokenIsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
h, _ := testHandler(t)
rec := doAuthorize(t, h, func(r *http.Request) {
r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-real-token")
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestFeaturesReflectsConfiguredMechanisms(t *testing.T) {
m, err := session.NewManager([]byte("this-is-a-32-byte-test-signing-key!"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session.NewManager: %v", err)
}
h := New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), m, Features{OIDCEnabled: true, SAMLEnabled: false})
mux := http.NewServeMux()
h.RegisterRoutes(mux)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mux.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/auth/features", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, body = %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var body featuresResponse
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
}
if !body.SSOConfigured || !body.OIDCEnabled || body.SAMLEnabled {
t.Fatalf("unexpected features response: %+v", body)
}
}
func TestFeaturesAllFalseWhenNothingConfigured(t *testing.T) {
h, _ := testHandler(t)
mux := http.NewServeMux()
h.RegisterRoutes(mux)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mux.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/auth/features", nil))
var body featuresResponse
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
}
if body.SSOConfigured || body.OIDCEnabled || body.SAMLEnabled {
t.Fatalf("expected all-false features when nothing is configured, got %+v", body)
}
}
func TestAuthorizeTokenFromWrongManagerIsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
h, _ := testHandler(t)
otherManager, err := session.NewManager([]byte("a-completely-different-32-byte-key!"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session.NewManager: %v", err)
}
token, err := otherManager.IssueServiceToken("alerting")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IssueServiceToken: %v", err)
}
rec := doAuthorize(t, h, func(r *http.Request) {
r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
}
}