RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
26 lines
791 B
AMPL
26 lines
791 B
AMPL
module github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise
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go 1.25.0
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require (
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github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.20.0
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github.com/crewjam/saml v0.5.1
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github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4
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github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
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github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 v5.10.0
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golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0
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)
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require (
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github.com/beevik/etree v1.5.0 // indirect
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github.com/jackc/pgpassfile v1.0.0 // indirect
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github.com/jackc/pgservicefile v0.0.0-20240606120523-5a60cdf6a761 // indirect
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github.com/jackc/puddle/v2 v2.2.2 // indirect
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github.com/jonboulle/clockwork v0.2.2 // indirect
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github.com/mattermost/xml-roundtrip-validator v0.1.0 // indirect
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github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig v1.4.0 // indirect
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.33.0 // indirect
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golang.org/x/sync v0.17.0 // indirect
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golang.org/x/text v0.29.0 // indirect
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)
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