Files
cairnobs/hack/check-tenant-boundary.sh
T
jcoffey-dev 13cf9a30cb Rebrand: Sentry -> Cairn OBS
Full rebrand across cosmetic branding, code identifiers, and
infrastructure/data-plane naming, using the supplied Cairn OBS logo
package. Cosmetic: favicon/logo swap (also closes a stale license-audit
finding -- the old favicon was SvelteKit's unreplaced scaffold logo),
new centered welcome landing page, larger/legible sidebar logo, page
titles, CLAUDE.md/README/docs prose.

Code identifiers: Go module path github.com/sentry/sentry ->
github.com/cairnobs/cairnobs across all 13 modules and ~91 files (protoc
regenerated); Rust crates sentry-agent/sentry-parser/sentry-search ->
cairnobs-*; CLI sentryctl -> cairnobsctl; Terraform provider fully
renamed (sentry_dashboard etc. -> cairnobs_dashboard, provider type,
env vars); every session/auth cookie name; agent config paths and
Windows service identity.

Deliberately preserved: the gRPC wire protocol's protobuf packages
(sentry.logs.v1, sentry.agent.v1) and their Go import directory
(proto/sentry/...) -- renaming the wire-level package would break every
currently-deployed agent binary (confirmed two real hosts, including
mail.inbuxa.com, are actively streaming through this exact contract)
until rebuilt and redeployed in lockstep with an ingest cutover. Only
the Go module path wrapping the generated code changes.

Infrastructure: every docker-compose container name (root and three
component-level compose files); the Helm chart (directory, Chart.yaml,
named-template helpers, all templates, values.yaml image repos);
Kubernetes Operator (CRD group sentry.io -> cairnobs.io, both CRD YAML
files, Go identifiers, RBAC markers); the coupled enterprise/tenantcrd
package. Caught and fixed real path-coupling bugs along the way: the
Helm chart's search/ingest volume mounts and the dev-only-credential
detection constant vs. docker-compose.yml's literal values had to move
together or a security warning would have silently stopped firing.

Data plane: Postgres database sentry_metadata -> cairnobs_metadata and
role sentry -> cairnobs; ClickHouse database sentry -> cairnobs; Kafka
topic sentry.logs.raw -> cairnobs.logs.raw and its consumer groups.
Source-level defaults, docker-compose.yml, and every migrate.sh/
provision script default updated together; already-applied migration
files left untouched per this repo's immutable-migration convention.

Verified at every layer: all 13 Go modules build/vet/test clean, both
Rust workspaces (agent, search) build/clippy/test clean, npm run check/
build clean, docker compose config validates on all four compose files.
Live-verified against a real docker stack multiple times through this
work, including a final fresh-volume run confirming the actual renamed
Postgres database/role, ClickHouse database, and Kafka topic all work
end to end with a real login and query, zero console errors.
2026-08-21 20:53:32 -07:00

82 lines
3.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Enforces the two boundary properties /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md
# and /docs/phase-4-rbac-design.md describe as "grep-and-review-enforced,
# not compiler-enforced" -- this script IS that enforcement. Run in CI on
# every change; both checks exit non-zero (and print the offending lines)
# on a violation.
#
# 1. No core Go code imports enterprise/ -- core must stay genuinely
# single-tenant with zero multi-tenant mechanism present. This was
# originally also a licensing boundary (enterprise/ was
# commercial-licensed through Phase 5); as of Phase 6 both sides are
# AGPLv3, so this is now purely architectural -- see
# /docs/compliance/license-audit-report.md.
# 2. tenant.TrustFromValidatedSession is called, in non-test production
# code, only from the auth-middleware allowlist below -- everywhere
# else is either a mistake or a new call site that needs the same
# scrutiny the original one got.
set -euo pipefail
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
cd "$REPO_ROOT"
fail=0
echo "Checking: no core Go package imports enterprise/..."
# Core = every top-level Go module except enterprise/ and hack/ (hack/
# tooling isn't shipped, and load-test/fixture scripts have no reason to
# import enterprise/ either, but they're not part of the architectural
# boundary claim, so they're excluded rather than asserted about).
core_hits="$(grep -rn '"github.com/cairnobs/cairnobs/enterprise' \
--include='*.go' \
agent ingest storage api web cli alerting 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [[ -n "$core_hits" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: core Go code imports enterprise/ -- this must never happen:"
echo "$core_hits"
fail=1
else
echo "OK: no core package imports enterprise/"
fi
echo "Checking: tenant.TrustFromValidatedSession call sites..."
# Allowlist: files permitted to call the trust constructor in non-test
# code. Update this list deliberately, one line per new legitimate
# caller, as auth middleware (task 5) and tenant provisioning (task 4+)
# land -- an addition here should get the same review a change to
# enterprise/internal/tenant/tenant.go itself would.
allowlist=(
"enterprise/internal/tenant/tenant.go" # the definition itself
)
hits="$(grep -rn 'tenant\.TrustFromValidatedSession(' \
--include='*.go' \
enterprise 2>/dev/null | grep -v '_test\.go:' || true)"
violations=""
while IFS= read -r line; do
[[ -z "$line" ]] && continue
file="${line%%:*}"
allowed=0
for a in "${allowlist[@]}"; do
[[ "$file" == "$a" ]] && allowed=1 && break
done
if [[ "$allowed" -eq 0 ]]; then
violations+="$line"$'\n'
fi
done <<< "$hits"
if [[ -n "$violations" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: tenant.TrustFromValidatedSession called outside the allowlist:"
echo "$violations"
echo "If this is a legitimate new caller (e.g. new auth middleware), add it to"
echo "the allowlist in this script deliberately -- don't silence this check."
fail=1
else
echo "OK: TrustFromValidatedSession has no unexpected call sites"
fi
if [[ "$fail" -ne 0 ]]; then
exit 1
fi
echo "check-tenant-boundary: all checks passed"