Files
cairnobs/api
jcoffey-dev abeee0076b Build and browser-verify the tenant-picker frontend page
web/src/routes/select-tenant now calls enterprise-auth's existing
GET /auth/memberships / POST /auth/select-tenant protocol (built earlier
this phase, previously called only from Go tests) via
fetch(..., {credentials: 'include'}) -- new listMemberships/selectTenant
functions in $lib/api.ts, using a dedicated request helper that reads
plain-text error bodies (loginhandler's http.Error responses), unlike
every other request helper in that file which expects JSON.

Credentialed cross-origin fetch needed CORS enterprise-auth didn't have:
api/httpserver.WithCORS's wildcard-friendly default can't be combined
with a credentialed request at all (browsers refuse to honor
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: "*" on one) -- added WithCredentialedCORS
(literal origin, Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true) alongside it,
wired into enterprise-auth via a new CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN config var
defaulting to POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL (web's own origin, the same
default pattern SELECT_TENANT_REDIRECT_URL already used).

adapter-static's route crawler doesn't discover a page nothing links to
(this one is only ever reached via enterprise-auth's redirect) -- fixed
with select-tenant/+page.ts's `export const prerender = true`, the same
declaration every other route already has.

Genuinely verified in a real browser in this environment, not just
type-checked: a throwaway Node server standing in for enterprise-auth's
exact wire contract (including its plain-text error bodies), driven
through the full flow via mcp__claude-in-chrome -- cross-origin
pending-login cookie set, credentialed preflight + GET/POST round trip,
a real click choosing a tenant, the post-selection redirect, and the
missing/expired-cookie error path rendering the backend's actual
message. No Docker or live Postgres/IdP needed, since the point was
exercising web's own fetch/CORS/cookie wiring, not enterprise-auth's
internals (already covered by loginhandler's own tests).

This closes the tenant-picker as the last named gap in Phase 4. What's
left is the already-disclosed live-verification caveat shared by every
Postgres/ClickHouse-backed piece and both SSO protocols: none of this
has run against a real database, external IdP, or multi-container
deployment in this environment.
2026-08-14 23:02:09 -07:00
..
2026-08-13 17:29:38 -07:00
2026-08-13 17:29:38 -07:00

api

Sentry's query API: a single POST /query endpoint accepting either the pipe syntax or raw SQL, compiled and routed across ClickHouse and Tantivy by internal/querylang. Replaces Phase 0/1's two separate placeholder endpoints (raw-SQL-only /query, free-text-only /search) — see /docs/query-language-design.md for the grammar, IR, and routing design, and /docs/query-language-reference.md for the user-facing syntax.

Why plain REST, not gRPC + REST gateway

CLAUDE.md pins the control plane to "Go, gRPC + REST gateway." This service is plain net/http instead — a deliberate simplification, not a change to the pinned stack. Wiring up a .proto service, google.api.http annotations, and protoc-gen-grpc-gateway codegen for one endpoint doesn't buy much at this size. api does speak gRPC internally — to /search — this simplification is about the public-facing surface only.

Endpoint

POST /query — body {"query": "...", "language": ""}, response {"columns": [...], "rows": [[...], ...]} or {"error": "..."}.

  • query is either pipe syntax (service=api | where status>=500 | stats count by host) or raw SQL (SELECT ...). Auto-detected by whether the query starts with SELECT (case-insensitive).
  • language optionally overrides detection: "sql" or "spl". Exists for the rare case a pipe query legitimately starts with the literal word "select" as a bare search term.
  • Both syntaxes compile to the same querylang/ir.Plan and execute through the same code path — see internal/querylang/executor for the four routing cases (pure ClickHouse; Tantivy prefilter + ClickHouse rows; Tantivy prefilter + ClickHouse aggregation; raw SQL passthrough).

GET /healthz — for docker-compose/k8s liveness checks.

No auth. Not scoped yet — don't expose this beyond a trusted dev/homelab network.

Configuration

Environment variables (see internal/config/config.go):

Var Default Purpose
HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR :8080
CLICKHOUSE_ADDR localhost:9000 Native protocol port
CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE / _USERNAME / _PASSWORD sentry / default / ``
SEARCH_GRPC_ADDR localhost:50052 Must match /search's GRPC_LISTEN_ADDR
QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS 30 Per-request timeout
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN * Wide open by default since there's no auth yet; tighten together

searchclient.Dial connects to /search over plain TCP, no TLS — same trust boundary as api's existing plain-TCP connection to ClickHouse. mTLS in this project is specifically the agent↔ingest edge boundary, not every internal hop.

Building & testing

go build ./...
go vet ./...
go test ./...
# from the repo root, not api/
docker build -f api/Dockerfile -t sentry-api .

Testing notes

internal/queryapi's HTTP handler depends on ClickHouse and /search only through the narrow interfaces querylang/executor defines (SQLRunner, SearchClient), so routing, compilation, JSON encoding, and error-status mapping are all unit-tested against fakes — no live ClickHouse or /search instance needed, and the real lexer/parser/ planner run unmocked in these tests, only the backends are faked. See internal/querylang's own package docs for how compilation and execution are tested independently of each other. executor.ChRunner (the reflection-based row scanning against ClickHouse's driver.Rows) and internal/searchclient's actual gRPC dial are not unit-tested — the former because faking driver.Rows fully would be significant test-only scaffolding the driver's own docs say isn't meant to be implemented by adopters; the latter because it's a thin wrapper with nothing but wiring to test. Both are exercised end-to-end via the docker-compose flow in /docs/phase-2-runbook.md.