Files

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jcoffey-dev 1de77b969f Build per-tenant ClickHouse write-routing for ingest (Tantivy still deferred)

ingest tags every record with a tenant_id Kafka header (built previously),
but nothing consumed it to actually route the write. This closes that for
ClickHouse: enterprise/cmd/enterprise-ingest (a second binary, mirroring
enterprise-api) reuses ingest/consumer's own flush loop unchanged, with
enterprise/internal/chwriter.Registry -- a per-tenant clickhousewriter.Writer
registry -- swapped in as the writer. A batch pulled from the single shared
Redpanda topic can mix records from many tenants, so WriteBatch groups by
TenantID and dispatches each group to its own tenant's connection, fail-
closed on an empty or unrecognized tenant_id.

ingest/consumer and ingest/clickhousewriter move out of internal/ (same
reason api/internal/* moved earlier this phase: enterprise/ can't import
anything under another module's internal/). Their New() constructors now
take small local Config structs instead of ingest/internal/config types,
so enterprise/ doesn't need that import either.

Building this surfaced a real bug: tenantprovision.ProvisionClickHouse
only granted SELECT on a tenant's ClickHouse user, correct for chrunner's
read-only use but not enough for chwriter reusing the same credential to
write -- every real per-tenant write would have failed closed with a
permission error. Fixed by widening the grant to SELECT, INSERT; no
cross-tenant boundary is crossed by also allowing INSERT within a
tenant's own database.

Helm gates enterprise-ingest's Deployment on the same
ingest.requireTenantCredential flag that already gates tag validation --
write-routing is meaningless without tagging already being required, so
they're one decision, not two. docker-compose.yml's version is a
disclosed, weaker approximation: it can't achieve Helm's genuine
-mode=server/-mode=consumer split, so with the enterprise profile active
both ingest and enterprise-ingest independently consume every message
via different consumer groups -- harmless duplication for local
verification only.

Not built: Tantivy's independent Redpanda consumer (search/src/consumer.rs)
still doesn't read the tenant_id header at all -- every record still lands
in the one shared index regardless of tenant. Not run: the live-ClickHouse-
gated tests (chwriter's cross-tenant routing test, tenantprovision's INSERT
regression test) -- no Docker/database access in this environment; they're
correct Go that has never executed, disclosed as such in docs/security/
threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md §14.

2026-08-14 19:26:09 -07:00

helm/sentry

Build per-tenant ClickHouse write-routing for ingest (Tantivy still deferred)

2026-08-14 19:26:09 -07:00

operator

Unify the Tenant CRD with enterprise-api -provision-tenant (lightweight)

2026-08-14 09:07:10 -07:00

README.md

Unify the Tenant CRD with enterprise-api -provision-tenant (lightweight)

2026-08-14 09:07:10 -07:00

README.md

deploy

Kubernetes deployment for Sentry, added in Phase 4 (/deploy was deliberately stubbed through Phase 3 -- see /CLAUDE.md's Phase 3 non-goals). Two pieces:

operator/ -- a small Go controller-runtime Operator managing one CRD (Tenant). See operator/README.md.
helm/sentry/ -- a Helm chart covering every docker-compose.yml service, plus the operator and Tenant CRs when enterprise.enabled=true. See helm/sentry/README.md.

What "multi-tenant-aware" means here, precisely

Per /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md, tenant isolation itself lives at the application layer inside enterprise/ (enterprise-api holds a map of per-tenant ClickHouse connection pools via internal/chrunner; search holds a map of per-tenant Tantivy indices via src/registry.rs) -- not at the Kubernetes layer. This directory is not "one Deployment per tenant" or a general multi-cluster system; that's an explicit Phase 4 non-goal (see /CLAUDE.md). What it does add:

A Tenant CRD + controller (operator/internal/controller) that reflects real provisioning state onto status.phase/a Ready condition, derived from whether enterprise-api -provision-tenant has reported real ClickHouse provisioning.
A Helm chart that can install zero-or-more Tenant CRs (values.tenants) alongside the rest of the stack, and swaps api's Deployment for enterprise-api's whenever enterprise.enabled is true, so which query binary actually serves traffic is no longer a separately-forgettable decision (see helm/sentry/README.md's "api vs enterprise-api" section).

Now unified, in a deliberately lightweight way: enterprise-api -provision-tenant=<id> stays the sole real actor — it's the only thing that calls ClickHouse (CREATE DATABASE/CREATE USER/GRANT, via enterprise/internal/tenantprovision) and writes rbacstore. What changed: once it succeeds, it also syncs the result into the Tenant CRD (enterprise/internal/tenantcrd) — creating the Secret with real credentials (the controller no longer generates a placeholder one that authenticated against nothing) and setting the status fields the controller reads to compute Phase/Ready. The controller itself gained no new credentials and still never touches ClickHouse/Postgres -- it's a pure function of spec.suspended and whatever -provision-tenant has reported, never an independent second guess at "is this tenant really provisioned." A Tenant reaching status.phase: Active now means the same thing rbacstore.tenants. status='active' does, not two different claims — see enterprise/internal/tenantcrd's and operator/internal/controller/ tenant_controller.go's doc comments for the full split, and enterprise-api -provision-tenant's TENANT_CRD_NAMESPACE env var (set automatically by the Helm chart when tenantOperator.enabled) to turn this on. Deliberately not built: the operator's reconcile loop itself calling ClickHouse/rbacstore directly (a "full unification" option considered and set aside — it would give the operator two new credential sets and require real reconcile-loop idempotency design for an inherently one-shot external side effect, a bigger and riskier change than this repo's provisioning story needed to close the actual gap, which was two disconnected sources of truth, not two actors).

Verification status -- read before trusting this against a real cluster

Not verified against a live Kubernetes cluster. This environment has no kubectl/kind/minikube/kubebuilder/cluster reachable, so nothing here has been kubectl apply'd or helm install'd for real. Same disclosed-limitation shape as /agent/README.md's "Windows-specific agent code remains unverified on real Windows" from Phase 1 -- a real gap to close before shipping, not swept under the rug.

What was actually verified, offline, in this environment (network access was available to fetch these tools, but no cluster):

deploy/operator: go build/go vet/go test ./... all pass, including reconciler tests against controller-runtime's fake client (internal/controller/tenant_controller_test.go) -- real reconcile logic exercised, but not against a real apiserver (no envtest binaries available; see that test file's doc comment).
enterprise/internal/tenantcrd (the "lightweight unification" half -provision-tenant runs): go test passes against k8s.io/client-go's fake dynamic and typed clientsets -- real client library, fake transport, same shape as enterprise/internal/ searchclient's in-process gRPC tests. What this doesn't prove: that sentry.io/v1alpha1.Tenant's real CRD schema (a real apiserver's OpenAPI validation) accepts exactly what this package writes -- the helm template/kubeconform check below covers the schema shape, not a live write against it.
deploy/operator/config/crd/sentry.io_tenants.yaml: parsed with sigs.k8s.io/yaml + strict-unmarshaled into the real k8s.io/apiextensions-apiserver CustomResourceDefinition Go type -- catches YAML syntax errors and structural mistakes, not a live-cluster admission check.
deploy/helm/sentry: helm lint passes; helm template renders cleanly under both default values and a enterprise.enabled: true + two-tenant override; the rendered output was checked with kubeconform -strict against the real Kubernetes 1.31 OpenAPI schema for every built-in resource kind (22-31 resources depending on values, 0 invalid) -- this catches schema mistakes (wrong field names, wrong types) but not whether the resources actually reconcile correctly together on a live cluster (Job/StatefulSet startup ordering, PVC provisioning, actual pod scheduling). Specifically confirmed by parsing the rendered YAML (not just eyeballing it): exactly one Deployment/Service named sentry-api renders in each mode, with the enterprise.enabled: true render using the enterprise-api image and the default render using plain api's. Also confirmed for the tenantOperator.enabled: true case: enterprise-api gets its own ServiceAccount/Role/RoleBinding (exactly tenants/tenants/status/ secrets, no more), tenant-operator's own ClusterRole no longer grants secrets at all, and TENANT_CRD_NAMESPACE is set on enterprise-api's container only when tenantOperator.enabled is true.
Docker image builds (operator/Dockerfile and every other Dockerfile this chart references) were not verified in this session -- Docker's daemon wasn't reachable here either (see the Phase 4 task 5 conversation for why). Build and push every image this chart's values.yaml references before installing it.

Before relying on this in production: kind create cluster, helm install with --include-crds, and walk through helm/sentry/README.md's two-tenant example end to end.