df90b85ec448073b52dff469f69e2a6f1178730c
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 jcoffey-dev
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7fabc6a067 |
Build the Phase 8 conformance corpus
The design argues the conformance suite is the specification and should be built before either implementation, since two hand-written implementations of one language diverge unless something shared pins them. This is that suite: 38 cases in /processing, a language-neutral top-level directory for the same reason /proto is one -- the Rust agent and the Go ingest tier both consume the definition and neither owns it. Nothing executes the cases, because neither implementation exists. A stdlib-only validator checks the corpus stays well-formed and runs in CI: known actions, addressable fields, compilable patterns, names matching filenames, and no case depending on record_id, which is withheld so the question of whether an ingest-side rule can see one stays open. The validator was checked against seven deliberately broken cases before being trusted, since "38/38 valid" means nothing from a validator that cannot fail. Writing the cases first has already paid for itself twice. It forced two determinism decisions the prose had left vague, both of which a conformance suite cannot avoid answering. Sampling is counter-based rather than random: random is statistically nicer and impossible to assert on. Windows are measured on record timestamps rather than wall-clock, which makes replay deterministic and, not incidentally, makes backfill behave correctly where a wall-clock window would not. And it made the missing aggregate_count answer concrete. The design does not say what that action emits, or what a query not expecting a synthetic record sees. Rather than invent one by writing cases, the validator rejects any case using it, so the design question has to be answered before the behaviour can be frozen by accident. The corpus includes the acceptance case from real measured data: the two processes that account for roughly 60% of a real workstation's journal volume, and the one kernel message worth keeping. Signed-off-by: John Coffey <[email protected]> |
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jcoffey-dev
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e8b6a8bc2e |
Answer 404 for unrouted paths, and keep the route lists honest
web/nginx.conf ended its try_files chain in an unconditional /200.html, so every path the site does not have -- /wp-login.php, /.env, a typo'd inbound link -- came back as the SPA shell with a success status. It now answers 404, which needs nginx to know which routes exist: most it infers from the build output, but dynamic routes and ones that never opted into prerendering have no file on disk and are listed by hand. Those hand-maintained lists drift, and the drift is invisible until it ships: vite dev and npm run preview route from the client manifest and never read nginx.conf, so a new dynamic route works everywhere a developer would look and 404s in production. hack/check-web-routes.sh compares the lists against web/src/routes, and a workflow runs it. Its own workflow rather than another job on license-compliance.yml, which already carries one unrelated check. Also turns absolute_redirect off. With nginx's default the trailing-slash canonicaliser reconstructs the origin from its own listen port, so a request for https://demo.cairnobs.org/settings/ was answered with Location: http://127.0.0.1:3000/settings -- the container's internal address, unreachable from the client, and downgraded to http on the way. Verified by curl against the built image; it was latent here before the canonicaliser existed too, through the directory redirect on /dev. |
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jcoffey-dev
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81ee47b1cd |
ci: fix the security scan, which has failed on every push
Two unrelated causes, plus one that hid the others. govulncheck: setup-go used go-version-file, so it installed exactly what each go.mod pins -- `go 1.25.0` -- and then reported 28 CVEs in that release's standard library (crypto/x509 quadratic name-constraint parsing, GO-2025-4007, and friends), all fixed in 1.25.3. None of it described anything we ship: every Dockerfile builds FROM golang:1.25-alpine, a floating tag that resolves to the newest 1.25.x, so the binaries already had the fixes. The go directive is a minimum language version, not a statement about which toolchain to audit with. Track the floating 1.25 line instead, and the scan matches production. Confirmed by running govulncheck against a patched toolchain locally: deploy/operator reports 0 vulnerabilities and exits 0. cargo-deny: RUSTSEC-2024-0384, `instant` is unmaintained. A maintenance advisory rather than a vulnerability -- no CVE, nothing to patch -- and it arrives transitively via tantivy 0.22.1 -> measure_time 0.8.3, so it cannot be dropped without moving off the pinned Tantivy. The advisory's substance does not apply here anyway: instant papers over std::time::Instant being missing on wasm, and search builds native musl. Ignored in search/deny.toml with that reasoning recorded and a note to delete the entry at the next Tantivy upgrade rather than let it ossify. Both matrices now set fail-fast: false. Only two of the twelve jobs actually failed; the other nine were cancelled, which made a two-cause failure look like a total collapse and hid every finding but the first. |
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jcoffey-dev
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13cf9a30cb |
Rebrand: Sentry -> Cairn OBS
Full rebrand across cosmetic branding, code identifiers, and infrastructure/data-plane naming, using the supplied Cairn OBS logo package. Cosmetic: favicon/logo swap (also closes a stale license-audit finding -- the old favicon was SvelteKit's unreplaced scaffold logo), new centered welcome landing page, larger/legible sidebar logo, page titles, CLAUDE.md/README/docs prose. Code identifiers: Go module path github.com/sentry/sentry -> github.com/cairnobs/cairnobs across all 13 modules and ~91 files (protoc regenerated); Rust crates sentry-agent/sentry-parser/sentry-search -> cairnobs-*; CLI sentryctl -> cairnobsctl; Terraform provider fully renamed (sentry_dashboard etc. -> cairnobs_dashboard, provider type, env vars); every session/auth cookie name; agent config paths and Windows service identity. Deliberately preserved: the gRPC wire protocol's protobuf packages (sentry.logs.v1, sentry.agent.v1) and their Go import directory (proto/sentry/...) -- renaming the wire-level package would break every currently-deployed agent binary (confirmed two real hosts, including mail.inbuxa.com, are actively streaming through this exact contract) until rebuilt and redeployed in lockstep with an ingest cutover. Only the Go module path wrapping the generated code changes. Infrastructure: every docker-compose container name (root and three component-level compose files); the Helm chart (directory, Chart.yaml, named-template helpers, all templates, values.yaml image repos); Kubernetes Operator (CRD group sentry.io -> cairnobs.io, both CRD YAML files, Go identifiers, RBAC markers); the coupled enterprise/tenantcrd package. Caught and fixed real path-coupling bugs along the way: the Helm chart's search/ingest volume mounts and the dev-only-credential detection constant vs. docker-compose.yml's literal values had to move together or a security warning would have silently stopped firing. Data plane: Postgres database sentry_metadata -> cairnobs_metadata and role sentry -> cairnobs; ClickHouse database sentry -> cairnobs; Kafka topic sentry.logs.raw -> cairnobs.logs.raw and its consumer groups. Source-level defaults, docker-compose.yml, and every migrate.sh/ provision script default updated together; already-applied migration files left untouched per this repo's immutable-migration convention. Verified at every layer: all 13 Go modules build/vet/test clean, both Rust workspaces (agent, search) build/clippy/test clean, npm run check/ build clean, docker compose config validates on all four compose files. Live-verified against a real docker stack multiple times through this work, including a final fresh-volume run confirming the actual renamed Postgres database/role, ClickHouse database, and Kafka topic all work end to end with a real login and query, zero console errors. |
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jcoffey-dev
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4b5dae5879 |
Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel. |
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jcoffey-dev
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661568085e |
Phase 6: license-compliance audit and enterprise/ relicensing to AGPLv3
Full dependency inventory across Rust/Go/npm plus Docker base images and vendored assets (776 rows, 502 unique deps), classified against AGPLv3 compatibility with real citations rather than assumptions. enterprise/ relicensed from its commercial-license stub to AGPLv3, matching core -- the one real flag (Redpanda's BSL 1.1) was evaluated against primary sources and accepted as-is rather than triggering a broker swap. CI enforcement wired up (.github/workflows/license- compliance.yml, this repo's first CI workflow), a root LICENSE file added, and every doc/comment referencing the old commercial-license boundary updated to describe it as architectural only. See /docs/compliance/ for the full report, inventory, and policy. |