7a86008062545bd076856de29a19671df62e2e54
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 jcoffey-dev
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7a86008062 |
Complete the low-risk half of the Sentry -> Cairn OBS rebrand
Sweeps the references that carry no runtime coupling, and fixes one that
turned out to be a real bug rather than stale branding.
Docker network: sentry_default -> cairnobs_default across 23 runbook and
test-header `docker run` commands. Compose derives the network from the
directory name, so this lands together with renaming the working copy to
cairnobs/ -- the two are only correct as one change.
Stale references corrected: four Dockerfile "repo root (sentry/)"
headers; .env pointing at the long-renamed deploy/helm/sentry/ chart;
five Helm comments describing the topic as sentry.logs.raw when all four
code paths have defaulted to cairnobs.logs.raw for some time; an
absolute /home/john/Projects/sentry/ path in the operator's package doc,
now repo-relative; the hand-written Tenant CRD description in both of
its identical copies, whose Go source already said Cairn OBS.
Migration 0043 repoints the default tenant's data source. 0026 seeded it
with ('sentry', '/var/lib/sentry-search') to match what
api/internal/config then defaulted to; the rebrand later moved those
defaults to "cairnobs" and /var/lib/cairnobs-search without moving the
already-applied row, leaving the default tenant naming a ClickHouse
database nothing writes to. Scoped to the exact stale values so it is a
no-op on any deployment that set them deliberately. 0026's comment is
annotated as superseded; its applied SQL is untouched.
Deliberately not included: the gRPC wire packages (sentry.logs.v1,
sentry.agent.v1) and proto/sentry/ import paths, which cannot change
without a lockstep agent/server upgrade; the Helm chart's
sentry_metadata database and sentry role, which need a real Postgres
migration on existing deployments; and the compliance audit records in
docs/compliance/, which are a dated historical record.
go build, go vet, and go test pass for ingest and deploy/operator.
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jcoffey-dev
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13cf9a30cb |
Rebrand: Sentry -> Cairn OBS
Full rebrand across cosmetic branding, code identifiers, and infrastructure/data-plane naming, using the supplied Cairn OBS logo package. Cosmetic: favicon/logo swap (also closes a stale license-audit finding -- the old favicon was SvelteKit's unreplaced scaffold logo), new centered welcome landing page, larger/legible sidebar logo, page titles, CLAUDE.md/README/docs prose. Code identifiers: Go module path github.com/sentry/sentry -> github.com/cairnobs/cairnobs across all 13 modules and ~91 files (protoc regenerated); Rust crates sentry-agent/sentry-parser/sentry-search -> cairnobs-*; CLI sentryctl -> cairnobsctl; Terraform provider fully renamed (sentry_dashboard etc. -> cairnobs_dashboard, provider type, env vars); every session/auth cookie name; agent config paths and Windows service identity. Deliberately preserved: the gRPC wire protocol's protobuf packages (sentry.logs.v1, sentry.agent.v1) and their Go import directory (proto/sentry/...) -- renaming the wire-level package would break every currently-deployed agent binary (confirmed two real hosts, including mail.inbuxa.com, are actively streaming through this exact contract) until rebuilt and redeployed in lockstep with an ingest cutover. Only the Go module path wrapping the generated code changes. Infrastructure: every docker-compose container name (root and three component-level compose files); the Helm chart (directory, Chart.yaml, named-template helpers, all templates, values.yaml image repos); Kubernetes Operator (CRD group sentry.io -> cairnobs.io, both CRD YAML files, Go identifiers, RBAC markers); the coupled enterprise/tenantcrd package. Caught and fixed real path-coupling bugs along the way: the Helm chart's search/ingest volume mounts and the dev-only-credential detection constant vs. docker-compose.yml's literal values had to move together or a security warning would have silently stopped firing. Data plane: Postgres database sentry_metadata -> cairnobs_metadata and role sentry -> cairnobs; ClickHouse database sentry -> cairnobs; Kafka topic sentry.logs.raw -> cairnobs.logs.raw and its consumer groups. Source-level defaults, docker-compose.yml, and every migrate.sh/ provision script default updated together; already-applied migration files left untouched per this repo's immutable-migration convention. Verified at every layer: all 13 Go modules build/vet/test clean, both Rust workspaces (agent, search) build/clippy/test clean, npm run check/ build clean, docker compose config validates on all four compose files. Live-verified against a real docker stack multiple times through this work, including a final fresh-volume run confirming the actual renamed Postgres database/role, ClickHouse database, and Kafka topic all work end to end with a real login and query, zero console errors. |
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jcoffey-dev
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e15a63408a |
Revoke tenant users' system.* access explicitly, don't assume default-deny
Verified live against clickhouse/clickhouse-server:24.8: a freshly created tenant user was NOT default-denied from system.* the way the original design assumed -- system.tables listed every tenant's database/table names to any authenticated user regardless of grants. Fixed with an explicit REVOKE SELECT ON system.* FROM <user> after the existing GRANT SELECT, INSERT. Verifying this live also surfaced a real ClickHouse behavioral split the design didn't anticipate: system.query_log is genuinely access- checked (the REVOKE makes it hard-deny, ACCESS_DENIED), but system.tables is a filtered catalog view that ClickHouse 24.8 never denies outright -- it just returns zero rows for a properly-revoked user. Both outcomes close the actual leak. Corrected TestProvisionedUserCannotReadSystemTables to assert what each table actually does (hard error for query_log, verified-empty-and-no-foreign- database-names for tables) instead of demanding a hard error from both. |
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jcoffey-dev
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1de77b969f |
Build per-tenant ClickHouse write-routing for ingest (Tantivy still deferred)
ingest tags every record with a tenant_id Kafka header (built previously), but nothing consumed it to actually route the write. This closes that for ClickHouse: enterprise/cmd/enterprise-ingest (a second binary, mirroring enterprise-api) reuses ingest/consumer's own flush loop unchanged, with enterprise/internal/chwriter.Registry -- a per-tenant clickhousewriter.Writer registry -- swapped in as the writer. A batch pulled from the single shared Redpanda topic can mix records from many tenants, so WriteBatch groups by TenantID and dispatches each group to its own tenant's connection, fail- closed on an empty or unrecognized tenant_id. ingest/consumer and ingest/clickhousewriter move out of internal/ (same reason api/internal/* moved earlier this phase: enterprise/ can't import anything under another module's internal/). Their New() constructors now take small local Config structs instead of ingest/internal/config types, so enterprise/ doesn't need that import either. Building this surfaced a real bug: tenantprovision.ProvisionClickHouse only granted SELECT on a tenant's ClickHouse user, correct for chrunner's read-only use but not enough for chwriter reusing the same credential to write -- every real per-tenant write would have failed closed with a permission error. Fixed by widening the grant to SELECT, INSERT; no cross-tenant boundary is crossed by also allowing INSERT within a tenant's own database. Helm gates enterprise-ingest's Deployment on the same ingest.requireTenantCredential flag that already gates tag validation -- write-routing is meaningless without tagging already being required, so they're one decision, not two. docker-compose.yml's version is a disclosed, weaker approximation: it can't achieve Helm's genuine -mode=server/-mode=consumer split, so with the enterprise profile active both ingest and enterprise-ingest independently consume every message via different consumer groups -- harmless duplication for local verification only. Not built: Tantivy's independent Redpanda consumer (search/src/consumer.rs) still doesn't read the tenant_id header at all -- every record still lands in the one shared index regardless of tenant. Not run: the live-ClickHouse- gated tests (chwriter's cross-tenant routing test, tenantprovision's INSERT regression test) -- no Docker/database access in this environment; they're correct Go that has never executed, disclosed as such in docs/security/ threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md §14. |
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jcoffey-dev
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1d57e697b1 |
Phase 4: real per-tenant ClickHouse isolation via a new enterprise-api binary
Closes the threat model's headline finding for the SQL query path:
enterprise/internal/tenantprovision does real CREATE DATABASE/USER/GRANT
against ClickHouse, and enterprise/internal/chrunner is a per-tenant
connection registry implementing api's SQLRunner interface, resolving
the tenant from the authenticated request identity -- never a
caller-suppliable parameter. Both are wired into a new binary,
enterprise/cmd/enterprise-api, alongside the unchanged single-tenant
api/cmd/api, since AGPL core can never import enterprise/ and Go's own
internal/ package visibility rules meant enterprise/ couldn't implement
core's SQLRunner interface without importing the package that defines
it. That required moving api/internal/{authz,queryapi,dashboards,
querylang/executor,searchclient,httpserver} out of internal/ -- the
minimal set enterprise-api needs to import; querylang's compiler
internals (planner/lexer/parser/ast/ir) and api's own config stay
internal, since nothing outside api needs them directly.
Also finally wires enterprise/internal/audit into queryapi.AuditLogger
(nil since Phase 4 task 4) via a new adapter, and adds live-ClickHouse
integration tests for two of the four adversarial probes named in
docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md's verification plan.
Corrected several overclaims in the docs while writing this up: an
earlier claim that rbacstore's CRUD was "verified against a live
Postgres" was never actually true in this environment (only
internal/audit was, earlier in this phase, before Docker access was
lost) -- threat-model.md, phase-4-runbook.md, CLAUDE.md, and
enterprise/README.md all now distinguish "a real integration test
exists" from "this was confirmed against a live database."
Still not built: Tantivy/free-text tenant isolation
(enterprise/internal/searchclient), and any deployment-topology
mechanism that actually routes traffic to enterprise-api instead of
plain api -- both binaries exist side by side today with nothing
enforcing or flagging which one a deployment runs.
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