web/src/routes/select-tenant now calls enterprise-auth's existing
GET /auth/memberships / POST /auth/select-tenant protocol (built earlier
this phase, previously called only from Go tests) via
fetch(..., {credentials: 'include'}) -- new listMemberships/selectTenant
functions in $lib/api.ts, using a dedicated request helper that reads
plain-text error bodies (loginhandler's http.Error responses), unlike
every other request helper in that file which expects JSON.
Credentialed cross-origin fetch needed CORS enterprise-auth didn't have:
api/httpserver.WithCORS's wildcard-friendly default can't be combined
with a credentialed request at all (browsers refuse to honor
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: "*" on one) -- added WithCredentialedCORS
(literal origin, Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true) alongside it,
wired into enterprise-auth via a new CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN config var
defaulting to POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL (web's own origin, the same
default pattern SELECT_TENANT_REDIRECT_URL already used).
adapter-static's route crawler doesn't discover a page nothing links to
(this one is only ever reached via enterprise-auth's redirect) -- fixed
with select-tenant/+page.ts's `export const prerender = true`, the same
declaration every other route already has.
Genuinely verified in a real browser in this environment, not just
type-checked: a throwaway Node server standing in for enterprise-auth's
exact wire contract (including its plain-text error bodies), driven
through the full flow via mcp__claude-in-chrome -- cross-origin
pending-login cookie set, credentialed preflight + GET/POST round trip,
a real click choosing a tenant, the post-selection redirect, and the
missing/expired-cookie error path rendering the backend's actual
message. No Docker or live Postgres/IdP needed, since the point was
exercising web's own fetch/CORS/cookie wiring, not enterprise-auth's
internals (already covered by loginhandler's own tests).
This closes the tenant-picker as the last named gap in Phase 4. What's
left is the already-disclosed live-verification caveat shared by every
Postgres/ClickHouse-backed piece and both SSO protocols: none of this
has run against a real database, external IdP, or multi-container
deployment in this environment.
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.
Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.
Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).
Saved, shareable multi-panel dashboards (table/line/bar/single-stat
panels via gridstack + uPlot, global + per-panel time range, JSON
export/import) and threshold/absence alert rules with an
ok/pending/firing evaluator and webhook/Slack/PagerDuty delivery.
- New /metadata component: Postgres control-plane store for dashboards,
panels, notification targets, alert rules/state, and delivery log --
see docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md for why ClickHouse's MergeTree
family isn't a fit for this access pattern (needs real row-level
locking and read-your-writes consistency).
- api/internal/dashboards: dashboard/panel CRUD, pure -- panel query
execution stays client-side, reusing the existing /query endpoint.
- New /alerting service: rule/target CRUD, a ticker-driven evaluator
(claim-then-evaluate concurrency control, transactional-outbox
delivery, query errors and threshold zero-rows never coerced into a
false transition) and webhook/Slack/PagerDuty delivery with
retry/backoff. See docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md for the full
state-machine design and the four correctness properties it
implements.
- web: /dashboards and /alerts UIs; cli: sentryctl dashboards/alerts
list/get/apply, seeding a future Terraform provider's JSON contract.
- hack/alert-load-test: 500 rules against real ClickHouse data, real
measured results in docs/phase-3-runbook.md.
Five real bugs found by actually running this against a live stack
(documented in the runbook, not just fixed silently): a latent Phase 2
bug where ClickHouse rejected the timestamp format used for
earliest=/latest= queries; a "now" literal token injected into query
text; a GridStack/uPlot layout-timing race; JS's Date.parse being too
lenient to use as a timestamp-detection heuristic; a rule's "enabled"
field silently defaulting to false when omitted; and the evaluator's
claim-batch-size and worker-pool-concurrency defaulting to the same
value, causing 500 concurrently-due rules to take 125s to cycle through
instead of the configured 60s.
Replaces the separate SQL-only /query and text-only /search endpoints
with one pipe-syntax query language (plus raw SQL escape hatch) that
compiles to a single IR and execution plan across both backends, so a
query like `message:"connection refused" | stats count by host` runs
as one request instead of two disjoint tools.
- api/internal/querylang: lexer -> ast -> parser -> ir -> planner ->
executor, each layer independently tested.
- Execution generalizes Phase 1's proven Tantivy-prefilter pattern
into a 4-way routing table (pure ClickHouse / text-only / text +
aggregation / raw SQL passthrough).
- Unified web query page and `sentryctl query`, both hitting the same
POST /query endpoint.
- Benchmarked against a real 1,022,000-row dataset
(hack/benchmark-fixture); caught and fixed a real bug where the
Tantivy prefilter cap (10,000) produced an IN-clause exceeding
ClickHouse's default max_query_size -- lowered to 5,000, documented
in docs/query-language-design.md and docs/phase-2-runbook.md.
- docs/query-language-reference.md: customer-facing syntax reference.
Extends the agent, ingest, storage, api, and web with Windows Event
Log/ETW sourcing and Tantivy-backed free-text search, per the approved
Phase 1 plan.
- CLAUDE.md: materialized on disk (never existed as a file before) with
a new Phase 1 "done looks like" section.
- agent: Windows Event Log (EvtSubscribe) and ETW sources, Windows
service wrapper (install/uninstall/run-service), both feature- and
target_os-gated so Linux builds/tests/clippy stay unaffected. Also
fixed two pre-existing Phase 0 clippy gaps (dead-code on
default-features-only builds, a type-inference edge case) found while
testing every feature combination properly for the first time.
UNVERIFIED on real Windows -- no Windows toolchain existed anywhere in
the build environment; flagged prominently in three places.
- proto/ingest: new record_id field, assigned once server-side in
ingest's gRPC front end so ClickHouse and Tantivy agree on the same ID
for the same record.
- storage: record_id column + bloom filter index, verified against a
live ClickHouse.
- search: new service, Tantivy index, rskafka consumer as an independent
second consumer group on the same Redpanda topic ingest already reads.
- api/web: new /search endpoint and page, sharing the query page's
result-table shape and component.
- hack/windows-fixture: sends realistic Windows-shaped data straight to
ingest, so the pipeline's handling of it is verifiable without a
Windows host.
Verified end-to-end on the live docker-compose stack: the same record_id
comes back from both /query and /search for the same log line, including
for windows-fixture's synthetic Windows Event Log data. Real bugs found
and fixed along the way: api/Dockerfile missing proto/ in its build
context, search's logs being completely silent (RUST_LOG gap), and
search/target/ missing from .gitignore/.dockerignore.
End-to-end log pipeline for Linux hosts, per /docs/architecture.md:
- proto: shared gRPC contract (agent <-> ingest), Go bindings checked in
- agent: Rust, musl-targeted, journald/file sourcing, RFC5424 parser,
mTLS gRPC client, no required config for the common case
- ingest: Go, single binary with --mode server|consumer|all; gRPC front
end forwards to Redpanda unchanged, consumer normalizes and
batch-writes to ClickHouse with at-least-once delivery
- storage: ClickHouse schema + a plain SQL-file migration runner
- api: minimal SELECT-only query endpoint, plain REST (not gRPC+gateway
yet -- see api/README.md)
- web: SvelteKit static SPA, one query page
- transport: Redpanda compose + topic provisioning
- cli: sentryctl ping stub
- hack/dev-certs: throwaway CA + cert generation for local mTLS
- root docker-compose.yml + docs/phase-0-runbook.md tie it together
Not yet run end-to-end against real Docker/ClickHouse/Redpanda -- see the
runbook's caveats section before relying on this working as-is.
jcoffey-dev