This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.
Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.
Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
(HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
(golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
side-channel.
Adds a self-hosted (Ollama, qwen2.5-coder) model provider abstraction
with a pluggable opt-in cloud adapter, schema grounding, and a shared
cost/safety guard every AI-suggested query is assessed against --
compiling to and executing through the same unchanged Phase 2 IR/
compiler and Phase 4 tenant scoping as a hand-written query, no
parallel execution path.
Track A (built into the query bar): inline ghost-text autocomplete,
"Explain this query", "Fix this query" with a diff view, and a
rule-based "Optimize" suggestion. Track B: natural-language-to-query
translation, always a separate review step from execution, with
`sentryctl query --nl` requiring explicit confirmation to run.
Every accepted/dismissed translate-fix-optimize interaction is logged
into the same append-only audit_log table Phase 4 built.
Two real product bugs were found and fixed via live browser
verification (a Svelte effect re-running on every keystroke that
silently cancelled the ghost-text debounce; a ghost-text widget
positioned at document offset 0 instead of the cursor), and a real
costguard logic bug (unbounded-aggregation vs. raw-row) was caught by
its own test suite. New integration tests wire a real Ollama client
through the real HTTP handler against a mock server matching Ollama's
wire contract (hack/mock-ollama), keeping model-quality verification
out of CI as a disclosed, periodic human-run check instead.
See /docs/phase-7-ai-design.md and /docs/phase-7-runbook.md.
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.
Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.
Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).
Saved, shareable multi-panel dashboards (table/line/bar/single-stat
panels via gridstack + uPlot, global + per-panel time range, JSON
export/import) and threshold/absence alert rules with an
ok/pending/firing evaluator and webhook/Slack/PagerDuty delivery.
- New /metadata component: Postgres control-plane store for dashboards,
panels, notification targets, alert rules/state, and delivery log --
see docs/phase-3-dashboard-design.md for why ClickHouse's MergeTree
family isn't a fit for this access pattern (needs real row-level
locking and read-your-writes consistency).
- api/internal/dashboards: dashboard/panel CRUD, pure -- panel query
execution stays client-side, reusing the existing /query endpoint.
- New /alerting service: rule/target CRUD, a ticker-driven evaluator
(claim-then-evaluate concurrency control, transactional-outbox
delivery, query errors and threshold zero-rows never coerced into a
false transition) and webhook/Slack/PagerDuty delivery with
retry/backoff. See docs/phase-3-alerting-design.md for the full
state-machine design and the four correctness properties it
implements.
- web: /dashboards and /alerts UIs; cli: sentryctl dashboards/alerts
list/get/apply, seeding a future Terraform provider's JSON contract.
- hack/alert-load-test: 500 rules against real ClickHouse data, real
measured results in docs/phase-3-runbook.md.
Five real bugs found by actually running this against a live stack
(documented in the runbook, not just fixed silently): a latent Phase 2
bug where ClickHouse rejected the timestamp format used for
earliest=/latest= queries; a "now" literal token injected into query
text; a GridStack/uPlot layout-timing race; JS's Date.parse being too
lenient to use as a timestamp-detection heuristic; a rule's "enabled"
field silently defaulting to false when omitted; and the evaluator's
claim-batch-size and worker-pool-concurrency defaulting to the same
value, causing 500 concurrently-due rules to take 125s to cycle through
instead of the configured 60s.
Extends the agent, ingest, storage, api, and web with Windows Event
Log/ETW sourcing and Tantivy-backed free-text search, per the approved
Phase 1 plan.
- CLAUDE.md: materialized on disk (never existed as a file before) with
a new Phase 1 "done looks like" section.
- agent: Windows Event Log (EvtSubscribe) and ETW sources, Windows
service wrapper (install/uninstall/run-service), both feature- and
target_os-gated so Linux builds/tests/clippy stay unaffected. Also
fixed two pre-existing Phase 0 clippy gaps (dead-code on
default-features-only builds, a type-inference edge case) found while
testing every feature combination properly for the first time.
UNVERIFIED on real Windows -- no Windows toolchain existed anywhere in
the build environment; flagged prominently in three places.
- proto/ingest: new record_id field, assigned once server-side in
ingest's gRPC front end so ClickHouse and Tantivy agree on the same ID
for the same record.
- storage: record_id column + bloom filter index, verified against a
live ClickHouse.
- search: new service, Tantivy index, rskafka consumer as an independent
second consumer group on the same Redpanda topic ingest already reads.
- api/web: new /search endpoint and page, sharing the query page's
result-table shape and component.
- hack/windows-fixture: sends realistic Windows-shaped data straight to
ingest, so the pipeline's handling of it is verifiable without a
Windows host.
Verified end-to-end on the live docker-compose stack: the same record_id
comes back from both /query and /search for the same log line, including
for windows-fixture's synthetic Windows Event Log data. Real bugs found
and fixed along the way: api/Dockerfile missing proto/ in its build
context, search's logs being completely silent (RUST_LOG gap), and
search/target/ missing from .gitignore/.dockerignore.
End-to-end log pipeline for Linux hosts, per /docs/architecture.md:
- proto: shared gRPC contract (agent <-> ingest), Go bindings checked in
- agent: Rust, musl-targeted, journald/file sourcing, RFC5424 parser,
mTLS gRPC client, no required config for the common case
- ingest: Go, single binary with --mode server|consumer|all; gRPC front
end forwards to Redpanda unchanged, consumer normalizes and
batch-writes to ClickHouse with at-least-once delivery
- storage: ClickHouse schema + a plain SQL-file migration runner
- api: minimal SELECT-only query endpoint, plain REST (not gRPC+gateway
yet -- see api/README.md)
- web: SvelteKit static SPA, one query page
- transport: Redpanda compose + topic provisioning
- cli: sentryctl ping stub
- hack/dev-certs: throwaway CA + cert generation for local mTLS
- root docker-compose.yml + docs/phase-0-runbook.md tie it together
Not yet run end-to-end against real Docker/ClickHouse/Redpanda -- see the
runbook's caveats section before relying on this working as-is.
jcoffey-dev