This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.
Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.
Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
(HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
(golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
side-channel.
Extends the existing CheckIn RPC with a one-shot AgentCommand
(restart only -- stop/uninstall need real per-platform OS
service-manager integration and stay deliberately out of scope),
delivered at-most-once: cleared the instant it's handed to the agent
in a response, since a restarting agent's process is gone before it
could ever confirm receipt. On restart, the agent flushes whatever's
buffered, aborts its source task, and exits cleanly, relying entirely
on the host's own service manager to bring it back up.
Issuing a command is gated at RoleAdmin (stricter than config
editing's RoleEditor) and logged into the same audit_log table Phase
7's AI interactions use, via a new agent_command event type.
A real bug was found and fixed during live verification: the first
implementation tried to atomically read-and-clear pending_command in
a single INSERT...ON CONFLICT statement using a sibling CTE
referenced only from RETURNING, on the assumption that Postgres
evaluates every part of a WITH query against one pre-statement
snapshot. That's wrong specifically for FOR UPDATE, which always
reads the latest row version including one written earlier in the
same statement -- confirmed empirically (a restart command was
always coming back empty even when genuinely pending, so the agent
never received it). Fixed by splitting into two real, ordered
statements inside one explicit transaction.
See /docs/agent-management-design.md's "Lifecycle commands" section.
Extends the heartbeat mechanism with a second gRPC service on the same
mTLS channel (AgentControl.CheckIn, agent-initiated on the existing
heartbeat ticker -- still push-only, no inbound port on any agent) so
an agent reports its running config and can pick up an operator-set
override. A new web UI section (/agents) lists every agent that's
checked in, shows its reported config, and lets an operator edit a
narrow, deliberately-scoped subset remotely: batch/heartbeat tuning,
and (journald sources only) the unit filter.
TLS material and the ingest endpoint are never reportable or remotely
editable, by proto shape rather than a validation rule -- a bad or
malicious edit there could permanently strand an agent or redirect
where its logs go, unlike every other editable field, which only
degrades behavior.
An override lives only in the agent's memory (agent.toml is never
rewritten) and re-syncs on the agent's own schedule; changing the
journald filter aborts and respawns the source task since there's no
other way to change what's being tailed. Building the hot-reload path
surfaced a real, independent, pre-existing bug: shutdown was using
poll_timeout(), which only drains once flush_interval has elapsed,
silently dropping anything buffered more recently on every graceful
shutdown that landed between flushes -- fixed with a new unconditional
Batcher::flush_all(), now used at both shutdown and hot-reload.
Verified live end-to-end against a real stack: an edited heartbeat
interval changed a running agent's actual send cadence within one
check-in cycle (confirmed by the real timestamps landing in
ClickHouse), and an edited journald filter triggered a real source
restart, both reflected back in the next reported-config snapshot.
See /docs/agent-management-design.md.
jcoffey-dev