Full dependency inventory across Rust/Go/npm plus Docker base images
and vendored assets (776 rows, 502 unique deps), classified against
AGPLv3 compatibility with real citations rather than assumptions.
enterprise/ relicensed from its commercial-license stub to AGPLv3,
matching core -- the one real flag (Redpanda's BSL 1.1) was evaluated
against primary sources and accepted as-is rather than triggering a
broker swap. CI enforcement wired up (.github/workflows/license-
compliance.yml, this repo's first CI workflow), a root LICENSE file
added, and every doc/comment referencing the old commercial-license
boundary updated to describe it as architectural only.
See /docs/compliance/ for the full report, inventory, and policy.
enterprise/Dockerfile built from enterprise/ alone, too narrow for
enterprise/go.mod's replace ../api directive once enterprise-auth
started importing api/httpserver and (transitively) api/dashboards --
confirmed broken the first time this was built with real Docker access.
Fixed to build from the repo root, matching enterprise-api/
enterprise-ingest's Dockerfiles.
Also: ClickHouse's default admin user genuinely lacked CREATE USER
privilege in docker-compose.yml -- the official image needs
CLICKHOUSE_DEFAULT_ACCESS_MANAGEMENT=1 (not the more obvious-looking
CLICKHOUSE_ACCESS_MANAGEMENT, confirmed by reading the image's own
/entrypoint.sh), which this file never set. Every tenant-provisioning
code path was correct Go that had simply never been able to
authenticate its own admin connection strongly enough to run.
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.
Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.
Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).
jcoffey-dev