Phase 4: Helm chart enforces api vs enterprise-api, closing the deployment-topology gap
deploy/helm/sentry/templates/api.yaml and the new enterprise-api.yaml
are mutually exclusive, gated on opposite sides of the same
enterprise.enabled flag -- exactly one renders, both as a Deployment+
Service named {{ .Release.Name }}-api on port 8080, so every consumer
(alerting's API_QUERY_URL, web's build args) needs zero conditional
logic of its own. This is the concrete fix for what the threat model
named as the single largest remaining gap once both storage engines'
isolation mechanisms were built: previously nothing forced or flagged
whether a deployment ran the tenant-isolated binary. Now the same flag
that turns on RBAC/audit/SSO also chooses the query binary.
Verified by parsing (not eyeballing) helm template's rendered output
under both value sets: exactly one sentry-api Deployment/Service either
way, with the right image, and kubeconform -strict clean against the
real Kubernetes 1.31 schema. Not applied to a live cluster (still no
cluster in this environment) -- docker-compose.yml also still runs
plain api unconditionally, so this enforcement is Helm-only for now.
Updated the threat model, architecture doc, CLAUDE.md, and deploy/
READMEs to reflect this and to name what's left: ingest has no tenant
concept for either storage engine (undesigned), and the Tenant CRD
(deploy/operator) and enterprise-api -provision-tenant are still two
separate, unreconciled provisioning mechanisms.
This commit is contained in:
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@@ -13,28 +13,34 @@ non-goals). Two pieces:
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## What "multi-tenant-aware" means here, precisely
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Per `/docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md`, tenant isolation itself lives at
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the **application layer** inside `enterprise/` (one `api` process holds a
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map of per-tenant ClickHouse connection pools; one `search` process holds
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a map of per-tenant Tantivy indices) -- not at the Kubernetes layer. This
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directory is **not** "one Deployment per tenant" or a general
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multi-cluster system; that's an explicit Phase 4 non-goal (see
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`/CLAUDE.md`). What it *does* add, matching that same document's exit
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criteria ("real per-tenant secret management, replacing today's single
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shared `CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD`"):
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the **application layer** inside `enterprise/` (`enterprise-api` holds a
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map of per-tenant ClickHouse connection pools via `internal/chrunner`;
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`search` holds a map of per-tenant Tantivy indices via
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`src/registry.rs`) -- not at the Kubernetes layer. This directory is
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**not** "one Deployment per tenant" or a general multi-cluster system;
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that's an explicit Phase 4 non-goal (see `/CLAUDE.md`). What it *does*
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add:
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- A `Tenant` CRD + controller that generates and manages one dedicated
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ClickHouse credential Secret per tenant (`operator/internal/controller`).
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- A Helm chart that can install zero-or-more `Tenant` CRs
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(`values.tenants`) alongside the rest of the stack.
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(`values.tenants`) alongside the rest of the stack, and — the newer
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piece — swaps `api`'s Deployment for `enterprise-api`'s whenever
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`enterprise.enabled` is true, so which query binary actually serves
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traffic is no longer a separately-forgettable decision (see
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`helm/sentry/README.md`'s "`api` vs `enterprise-api`" section).
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The Operator does **not** call ClickHouse (no `CREATE DATABASE`/`CREATE
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USER`/`GRANT`) and does not touch the Tantivy filesystem or
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`enterprise/internal/rbacstore` -- that's `enterprise/internal/
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tenantprovision`, still unbuilt (see the Phase 4 task 5 summary). A
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`Tenant` reaching `status.phase: Active` here means "this tenant has a
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K8s Secret," not "this tenant's ClickHouse database/grants exist" --
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those are two different systems' state machines that aren't reconciled
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together yet, named explicitly rather than implied.
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**Two still-separate mechanisms, not yet unified**: the Operator's
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`Tenant` CRD manages only the K8s-side credential Secret — it does not
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call ClickHouse (no `CREATE DATABASE`/`CREATE USER`/`GRANT`) or touch
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the Tantivy filesystem. `enterprise-api -provision-tenant=<id>` is what
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actually does that (`enterprise/internal/tenantprovision`, built and
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tested — see `/enterprise/README.md`), driven independently via
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`rbacstore`, not from the `Tenant` CRD's reconcile loop. A `Tenant`
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reaching `status.phase: Active` here means "this tenant has a K8s
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Secret," not "this tenant's ClickHouse database/grants exist" — running
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both mechanisms for the same tenant ID today requires two separate
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operator actions, named explicitly rather than implied to be one.
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## Verification status -- read before trusting this against a real cluster
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@@ -62,11 +68,15 @@ access was available to fetch these tools, but no cluster):
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cleanly under both default values and a `enterprise.enabled: true` +
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two-tenant override; the rendered output was checked with `kubeconform
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-strict` against the real Kubernetes 1.31 OpenAPI schema for every
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built-in resource kind (22-29 resources depending on values, 0
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built-in resource kind (22-31 resources depending on values, 0
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invalid) -- this catches schema mistakes (wrong field names, wrong
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types) but not whether the resources actually reconcile correctly
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together on a live cluster (Job/StatefulSet startup ordering, PVC
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provisioning, actual pod scheduling).
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provisioning, actual pod scheduling). Specifically confirmed by
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parsing the rendered YAML (not just eyeballing it): exactly one
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`Deployment`/`Service` named `sentry-api` renders in each mode, with
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the `enterprise.enabled: true` render using the `enterprise-api` image
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and the default render using plain `api`'s.
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- Docker image builds (`operator/Dockerfile` and every other
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`Dockerfile` this chart references) were **not** verified in this
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session -- Docker's daemon wasn't reachable here either (see the
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