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Build SAML login (enterprise/internal/loginhandler), mirroring OIDC

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Adds GET /auth/saml/login + POST /auth/saml/acs alongside the existing
OIDC pair, both converging on the same upsert-user/resolve-tenant/
issue-session path. loginhandler.New now takes an optional
*saml.ServiceProvider, RegisterRoutes registers each protocol's routes
independently so either, both, or neither can be configured. SAML's
replay/unsolicited-response defense (InResponseTo, standing in for
OIDC's state) is carried via a SameSite=None sentry_saml_request cookie
-- None because the ACS endpoint receives a cross-site POST from the
IdP's origin, which SameSite=Lax cookies are never sent on.
enterprise-auth's main.go now fetches+parses SAML_IDP_METADATA_URL at
startup (samlsp.FetchMetadata) and wires the result through.

Verified to the same bar as OIDC: a real fake IdP
(crewjam/saml/samlidp, genuine XML signing/verification) drives the
full login->ACS->session-cookie round trip and negative paths (bad
InResponseTo, missing request cookie, missing email/NameID, no/multiple
tenant memberships), all in loginhandler/saml_test.go, no Docker
needed. The login-form HTML is bypassed by pre-seeding a saml.Session
directly into samlidp's session store and presenting the matching
`session` cookie -- an IdP-supported shortcut (confirmed by reading
GetSession), the same "skip the UI, keep the crypto real" approach
oidctest gave the OIDC tests.

Writing that test caught two real bugs in internal/saml.ParseResponse,
both fixed here: it never called r.ParseForm() before reading the
POSTed SAMLResponse field, so every real ACS POST would have silently
decoded an empty response; and its email-attribute matching missed
urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3 (the standard LDAP "mail" OID), which
is what an IdP sends by default absent an explicit
AttributeConsumingService request for "email" -- exactly what
samlidp's own DefaultAssertionMaker does, and plausibly what real IdPs'
default SAML app templates do too.

Docs (CLAUDE.md, threat-model.md, architecture.md, enterprise/README.md,
phase-4-runbook.md, docker-compose.yml's enterprise-auth comment)
updated in lockstep: SAML login moves from "protocol mechanics only" to
"built, verified with a real fake IdP, not yet tried against a real
external IdP or a running enterprise-auth container" -- the same
disclosed gap OIDC already carried.
This commit is contained in:
jcoffey-dev
2026-08-14 06:39:36 -07:00
parent 3037b31b0f
commit 08a90a27aa
14 changed files with 825 additions and 149 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
enterprise/cmd/enterprise-auth/main.go
+41 -10
View File
@@ -4,15 +4,16 @@
//
// Wires session issuance/validation (internal/session), the
// POST /internal/authorize endpoint api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer calls (the
// piece that turns on RBAC enforcement in /api), and -- since
// internal/loginhandler -- the real GET /auth/oidc/login and
// GET /auth/oidc/callback handlers that issue a *human* session after
// an actual IdP round trip, resolving tenant/role via internal/rbacstore.
// Still deliberately missing: SAML's equivalent (ACS endpoint) -- same
// shape, not yet built, following internal/loginhandler's OIDC pattern
// once it is. What's fully wired: -mint-service-token (the RoleService
// credential /alerting presents) and, when OIDC_ISSUER_URL is
// configured, a real human login flow.
// piece that turns on RBAC enforcement in /api), and --
// internal/loginhandler -- the real GET /auth/{oidc,saml}/login and
// GET /auth/oidc/callback + POST /auth/saml/acs handlers that issue a
// *human* session after an actual IdP round trip, resolving tenant/role
// via internal/rbacstore. Both protocols are now fully wired -- OIDC via
// discovery, SAML via fetching+parsing SAML_IDP_METADATA_URL at startup
// (crewjam/saml's samlsp.FetchMetadata; a trusted operator-supplied URL,
// same trust level as OIDC_ISSUER_URL's discovery fetch, not
// end-user-controlled input). Also fully wired: -mint-service-token
// (the RoleService credential /alerting presents).
package main
import (
@@ -21,12 +22,14 @@ import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"os/signal"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/crewjam/saml/samlsp"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/authhandler"
@@ -34,6 +37,7 @@ import (
"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/loginhandler"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/oidc"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/rbacstore"
samlpkg "github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/saml"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/enterprise/internal/session"
)
@@ -114,6 +118,33 @@ func main() {
logger.Info("OIDC not configured (OIDC_ISSUER_URL unset) -- skipping discovery, /auth/oidc/* routes disabled")
}
// samlProvider stays nil (loginhandler.RegisterRoutes then registers
// nothing) unless SAML is actually configured -- same shape as OIDC
// above.
var samlProvider *samlpkg.ServiceProvider
if cfg.SAML.IDPMetadataURL != "" {
metadataURL, err := url.Parse(cfg.SAML.IDPMetadataURL)
if err != nil {
logger.Error("parsing SAML_IDP_METADATA_URL", "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
idpMetadata, err := samlsp.FetchMetadata(ctx, http.DefaultClient, *metadataURL)
if err != nil {
logger.Error("fetching SAML IdP metadata", "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
samlProvider, err = samlpkg.New(samlpkg.Config{
EntityID: cfg.SAML.EntityID, ACSURL: cfg.SAML.ACSURL, IDPMetadata: idpMetadata,
})
if err != nil {
logger.Error("constructing SAML service provider", "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
logger.Info("SAML provider configured", "idp_metadata_url", cfg.SAML.IDPMetadataURL)
} else {
logger.Info("SAML not configured (SAML_IDP_METADATA_URL unset) -- /auth/saml/* routes disabled")
}
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
@@ -123,7 +154,7 @@ func main() {
SAMLEnabled: cfg.SAML.IDPMetadataURL != "",
}
authhandler.New(logger, sessionManager, features).RegisterRoutes(mux)
loginhandler.New(logger, oidcProvider, sessionManager, rbac, cfg.PostLoginRedirectURL).RegisterRoutes(mux)
loginhandler.New(logger, oidcProvider, samlProvider, sessionManager, rbac, cfg.PostLoginRedirectURL).RegisterRoutes(mux)
srv := &http.Server{Addr: cfg.HTTPListenAddr, Handler: mux}